DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 198 054 SO 013 136

AUTHOR Grossen, Earl L., Ed.
TITLE Philosophy of Education, 1978-1979. Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Far Western Philosophy of Education Society (27th and 29th).
INSTITUTION Far Western Philosophy of Education Society.
PUB DATE 80
NOTE 247p.: For a related document, see ED 159 103.
AVAILABLE FROM College of Education, Brigham Young University, Box 65-McKay, Provo, UT 84602 ($15.95 paper cover).

EDRS PRICE MF01 Plus Postage. PC Not Available from EDRS.
DESCRIPTORS Educational Objectives: *Educational Philosophy: Educational Practices: Educational Research: Educational Theories: Elementary Secondary Education: Evaluation Criteria: Higher Education: Moral Development: Social Change: Teacher Education: Values

ABSTRACT

This document contains the proceedings of the combined 27th and 29th annual meeting of the Far Western Philosophy of Education Society in March, 1980. Twenty-eight papers discussing various aspects of the philosophy of education are presented. In the first paper "Presidential Address: Dialogical Dilemmas and the Philosophy of Education," the author discusses the state of the art of the philosophic foundations of education and suggests that current social and educational ills can be alleviated if teachers, philosophers, and political leaders concentrate more on communication and dialogue than on the pursuit of awards and gains. Other chapters are entitled "Counter Forces in Modern Educational Psychology and Philosophy of Education," "Teaching for Value," "Goal Setting: A Values Clarifying Process," "Evaluating Aesthetic Values and Arts Education," "Moral Dilemmas in Education," "A Theory for the Evaluation of Student Term Papers: Plato's Divided Line Revisited," "Philosophical Remarks About Educational Evaluation: Evaluation and Values," "Sexism in Education: Myth or Reality?" "Our Educational Quandry," "Moral Reasoning, Needs Assessment and Universalizability," and "Philosophy of Education: Source and Critic of "New" Methods in Educational Research." An author index concludes the document. (DB)

****
* Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made *
* from the original document. *
****

ED198054

U S DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION & WELFARE
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
EDUCATION

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REPRODUCED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED FROM THE PERSON OR ORGANIZATION ORIGINATING IT. POINTS OF VIEW OR OPINIONS STATED DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT OFFICIAL NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION POSITION OR POLICY

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL IN MICROFICHE ONLY HAS BEEN GRANTED BY

Earl L. Grossen

TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."

PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION
1978-1979

PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-SEVENTH AND TWENTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE FAR WESTERN PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY

SP 013 136

EARL L. GROSSEN, PhD.
COLLEGE OF EDUCATION
BOX 65-McKAY
PROVO, UTAH 84602

PUBLISHED BY THE FAR WESTERN PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY,
C/O DR. EARL L. GROSSEN, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR,
COLLEGE OF EDUCATION, BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY,
PROVO, UTAH 84602.

Copyright,
1980,
by
Far Western Philosophy of Education Society.

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 74-156779.

The Typesetting, Printing, and Binding of this Book Were Done by
Brigham Young University Press, Brigham Young University,
Provo, Utah.

PREFACE

Education is our sixth sense and philosophy is its foundation and seedbed.

An educated person has his/her roots in philosophy and pedagogy.

The aim of this book of proceedings is to provide insight to scholars and students of education throughout the world. The authors of these articles have produced inciteful, provocative papers for their contributions to philosophy and the field of education.

The editor expresses gratitude to the executive officers and members of FWPES for their support and contributions.

A final series of plaudits are extended to the diligent and efficient work of the following secretaries who gave their best to make this work possible in typewritten form:

Susan L. Hogan
April Crowley
Heidi Jo Bradford
Barbara Mathias

Yours professionally,

Dr. Earl L. Grossen
March, 1980

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER 1. PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: DIALOGICAL DILEMMAS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION. DONALD S. SECKINGER 1

CHAPTER 2. OUR RELATIONSHIPS: A RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS BY DONALD S. SECKINGER: "DIALOGICAL DILEMMAS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION." HUGH C. BLACK 8

CHAPTER 3. COUNTER FORCES IN MODERN EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION. JAMES JOHN JELINEK 12

CHAPTER 4. A PHILOSOPHICAL NORM FOR AN ABNORMAL TIME ROBERT B. MCLAREN 20

CHAPTER 5. TEACHING FOR VALUE. JAMES L. JARRETT 34

CHAPTER 6. GOAL SETTING: A VALUES CLARIFYING PROCESS. GERALD E. MCDONALD. 42

CHAPTER 7. EVALUATING AESTHETIC VALUES AND ARTS EDUCATION P. ISRAEL SCHELLIN. 51

CHAPTER 8. SØREN KIERKEGAARD'S ETHICAL SPHERE AND MORAL EDUCATION. JANE FUNK IRVINE 58

CHAPTER 9. CHARACTER EDUCATION AS PROPAGANDA: AN HISTORICAL CRITIQUE. STEPHEN M. YULISH. 69

CHAPTER 10. MORAL DILEMMAS IN EVALUATION. EILEEN BOYER. 83

CHAPTER 11. PHILOSOPHICAL REMARKS ABOUT EDUCATIONAL EVALUATION: EVALUATION AND VALUES. F.S. ELLET, JR., G.D. FENSTERMACHER, B. SHUMENER 88

CHAPTER 12. A THEORY FOR THE EVALUATION OF STUDENT TERM PAPERS: PLATO'S DIVIDED LINE REVISITED. MICHAEL PRAETORIUS 105

CHAPTER 13. EVALUATING THE COMPETENCY OF HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS: AN ARBITRARY MATTER? LOIS WEINBERG. 114

CHAPTER 14. OUR EDUCATIONAL QUANDARY. JOHN CONNELY. 119

CHAPTER 15. TEACHER-EVALUATORS AS "IDEAL OBSERVERS" EKDAL J. BUYS, JR. 124

CHAPTER 16. SEXISM IN EDUCATION: MYTH OR REALITY? ALETA YOU MASTNY. 137

CHAPTER 17. THE IMPORTANCE OF CATEGORY SYSTEMS IN EVALUATION THEORY: A THEORETICAL VIEWPOINT. MARVIN C. ALKIN & FREDERICK S. ELLETT, JR. 145

CHAPTER 18. OUR CURRICULUM DILEMMA. JOHN B. CONNELY 151

CHAPTER 19. JOY. NEL NODDINGS 157

CHAPTER 20. IN SEARCH OF JOY. ALETA YOU MASTNY 165

CHAPTER 21. IS ARISTOTLE"S ACCOUNT OF HAPPINESS INCOHERENT? DAVID P. ERICSON 169

CHAPTER 22. THE PLACE OF EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATIONS IN STATE TEACHER PREPARATION POLICY: GRIST FOR THE PHILOSOPHIC MIND. DR. PETER L. LoPRESTI 179

CHAPTER 23. AN EDUCATIONAL INTERPRETATION OF MARCUSIAN THOUGHT. VAL D. RUST 191

CHAPTER 24. MORAL REASONING, NEEDS ASSESSMENT AND UNIVERSALIZABILITY. F.S. ELLETT, JR., R.E. NEWMAN, & B.M. SCHUMENER 199

CHAPTER 25. PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION: SOURCE AND CRITIC OF "NEW" METHODS IN EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH. ANTHONY STIGLIANO 208

CHAPTER 26. EXPOSITORY WRITING, GENERAL AND MORAL EDUCATION, AND EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY. HUGH C. BLACK 216

CHAPTER 27. DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION: A POLEMIC PART I OF DEMOCRACY, MODELS, AND A PARADIGM FOR INTERNSHIP. T.F. SAUNDERS, R. BLAKE, J. ENGLE, & C. DECKER 223

CHAPTER 28. SOME ASPECTS OF SELFHOOD: THE SELF AND THE OTHER. STEPHEN ALLEY 231

AUTHOR'S INDEX 237

CHAPTER 1.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: DIALOGICAL DILEMMAS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

DONALD S. SECKINGER

> . . . Well-trained philosophers who turn their attention to problems of American education have an opportunity to make a real contribution to overhauling the philosophic foundations of education, which today consist of crumbling pillars of the past placed on a sand of ignorance and pretension.[1]

I was deeply offended when James Bryant Conant wrote those words in The Education of American Teachers. At the time, in the early sixties, I was a struggling candidate in the philosophy of education based in a school of education rather than in a department of philosophy. When he spoke of crumbling pillars and of ignorance and pretension he was insulting the field in which I had chosen to make my professional career. Had I been working in a program that was based in a department of philosophy, as long as this department was not within a teachers college, I suppose I might have been flattered, perhaps even challenged.

In the years since I completed my program I have had ample opportunity to reflect upon Conant's views and I must admit that in part his comments are well taken. Certainly we do suffer from pretensions. Philosophers of education do not lack in ego strength. Some of us frown, for instance, at the inclusion of our fellow foundations of education persons from active participation in national and regional philosophy of education societies. As you will have noticed from my communications with you, I find this position indefensible. All of use in the foundations of education will live or die together, as the case may be, in the present climate of American education.

I may add that I still reject Conant's prescription that if only academic philosophers will take an interest in problems of education we will be on the road to salvation. I welcome cooperation with my friends and colleagues in departments of philosophy on university campuses and in philosophy of education societies, but I do not seek--nor do many of them now seek--a master-pupil relationship.

It is in this spirit--that we can use all the help we can get in our present confused and troubled world--that I would like to commend to you some of my own personal reflections and some of the ideas of selected philosophers of dialogue. It seems to me that many of the great and persistent external problems in the contemporary world are reflections of a breakdown in dialogue, just as it appears that the central problem of educating is the encouragement of genuine interhuman dialogue in all of our cultural and educational institutions, as well as in any informal educative arrangements we may devise.

In today's world, human beings find themselves to an ever increasing extent alienated from the natural environment, attenuated in real interpersonal relationships, and more or less estranged from their inner selves. In the world of external reality, alienation and estrangement are represented by cravings for excitement, novelty, and violence as well as the acting out of hatreds and blind aggressions. Within our own internal realities, we are increasingly subjected to varying states of frustration, boredom, and insensitivity toward other persons except as objects and functions of our own use.

Organized religions, abstracted philosophical systems, and social scientific political arrangements all appear powerless at this juncture to check our propensities for multiple-choice destruction. As a civilization we now have the capacities for nuclear devastation, for natural resource depletion, and for waste product accumulation and population pressures unprecedented in history. We are encouraged, as a way of life, to give over our human dignity and potential freedom for the sake of internal animal appetites and external systems of social control. Feverishly we seek the illusions of personal security and comfort ourselves with outworn ideologies and with technocratic arrangements in lieu of reasoned choices.

In this deepening culture crisis, the rearrangement of social institutional procedures and the redistribution of social goods and services become themselves part of a politically manipulative game. Lost sight of is the prior condition for the reallocation of natural resources and the reconstruction of cultural patterns: regeneration of our interhuman environment. Within a context of loss in our uprooted neighborhood communities in the externals of our lives, we are at the same time experiencing the poverty of internal resources of mind and spirit.

Aggravating this modern crisis of faith in ourselves is the overspecialization in our professional lives that extends down into many functions and programs of formal schooling. Tremendous emphasis is placed on cognitive gamesmanship in climbing to higher levels of education, while at professional and political decision-making junctures, it becomes more and more acceptable to sunder intellect and feeling and to numb the moral will as we calculate acceptable rates of injury, disease, and death.

From the sixties we have learned that it is possible to manufacture excuses for overseas atrocities and domestic duplicity. Some of us can now rationalize even looting and burning in our cities as symptoms of physical neglect or as just getting ours back against an impersonal body social that is in fact ourselves. As Winkler said:

> . . . Politically, we are pledged to defend our freedom at any price, even at the risk of total destruction; but, while we are raising a generation which may have to sacrifice its physical existence for the sake of an idea, we are turning our whole civilization into a cult of material values.[2]

The question is not really what denatured values are worth fighting for, but whether fighting and dying in streets and alleys or in overseas adventures will enhance or degrade whatever chances remain to actualize human values in the concrete situations of life. A truly frightening aspect of our times has been reflected in a variety of contemporary arts, and this aspect is that of the complacent bureaucrat, the vacant-eyed factory worker, the bored functionary, and even, the jittery terrorist -- all but slightly altered images of ourselves.

Gabriel Marcel, emerging from the despoilation and banal atrocities of the First World War, wrote eloquently of the human dilemma of impersonality:

> . . . We could say that the man sitting beside us was in the same room as ourselves, but that he was not really *present* there, that his *presence* did not make itself felt . . . he understands what I say to him, but he does not understand *me*: I may even have the extremely disagreeable feeling that my own words, as he repeats them to me, as he reflects them back at me, have become unrecognizable.[3]

How well this describes the dilemma of the teacher, the philosopher, the political leader, or the workingman who realizes that his encounter with his fellow is less than human. Over against this, Marcel posits a quality of life that becomes more difficult to attain in our present age of the depersonal and the unhuman: "When somebody's presence does really make itself felt, it can refresh my inner being; it reveals me to myself, it makes me more fully myself than I should be if I were not exposed to its impact."[4]

Dialogical philosophers conterd that, far from being ideal states impossible of attainment, these kinds of living relations are necessary for human survival. Some types of insanity, indeed, are characterized by the loss of human function in the realm of the interhuman--the failure to grasp the significance of who and what others are. The road to objectifying others is the pathway into one's own private hell; conversely, the way out through dialogue, as described by Merleau-Ponty, leads through the interhuman and is made possible in it:

> . . . In the experience of dialogue there is constituted between the other person and myself a common ground; my thought and his are interwoven into a single fabric, my worlds and those of my interlocutor are called forth by the state of the discussion, and they are inserted into a shared operation of which neither of us is the creator . . . we are collaborators for each other in consumate reciprocity. Our perspectives merge into each other, and we coexist through a common world.[5]

Sharply in contrast to this dialogical relation of real friendship, solidarity, and love is the more typical self imprisonment, from whose hollow center we fruitlessly and ceaselessly pursue awards and gains and other external recognitions and ratifications of our own worth. It is paradoxical that in so striving to take and to conquer, we become trapped in our own nets. As Nicolas Berdyaev put it:

. . . Egoistic self-containment and concentration upon the self, and the inabilitiy to issue forth from the self is original sin, which prevents the realization of the full life of the personality and hinders its strength from becoming effective. . . . Personality presupposes a going out from the self to another and to others. It lacks air and is suffocated when left shut up in itself.[6] Again we see the themes of compartmentalization, unhuman or nonhuman detachment, and of the artificial rendering of intellect and feeling from one another and from the responsibilities and obligations of the will. We learn from the dialogical philosophers once again the lessons of the greatest secular and religious teachers, that we cannot and should not treat persons as if they were mere objects, else we turn ourselves into things. As Martin Buber tells us:

> . . . If I face a human being as my *Thou*, and say the primary word (primary recognition) *I-Thou* to him, he is not a thing among things, and does not consist of things. . . . human being is not *He* and *She*, a specific point in space and time within the net of the world; nor is he a nature able to be experienced and described, a loose bundle of named qualities.[7]

Yet how seldom do we call forth mutual interhuman recognition from others. How rare it is, in our so-called educative situations, that we do not self-consciously manipulate events to our own preconceived ends. So very often do we speak of successful teaching in the same manner as we describe the activities of molding or shaping or making pliable our human material, making over our pupils to play out their assigned roles.

We enter into genuine living and learning relations, not in calculating ways, but with minds and hearts open to the unanticipated, ready to encounter the unique mystery that is the other person. This is opposed to much of our pedagogy that tells us to teach toward the incorporation of conceived outcomes into the learner, that abstract being who becomes our product. In contrast to a preconceived product relation, "The *Thou*," says Buber, "meets me. But I step into direct relation with it. Hence the relation means being chosen and choosing, suffering and action in one; . . . All real living is meeting."[8] This does not mean a downgrading of the end products embodied in subject matters; it does mean that real persons in their concrete wholeness may meet on their way to mutual discoveries in learning processes that *precede* the appropriation of subject matters as products.

Dialogical philosophers bring together such concepts as openness, acceptance, mutuality, choice, and consequence-taking, accentuating the risks and responsibilities inherent in our human task of person building. In this task of reconstructing ourselves--discovering our true selves--and of reaching out to others, we take a leap of faith in man postulated and lived by the philosophers of dialogue. This is not the leap of faith of Kierkegaard, who trusted not his fellow man and renounced the woman he loved. It is rather the real responsibility taken up by those who would live and suffer and love in this world and take the risks of this living upon themselves for the sake each for the other. It is in this realm, in the world of the interhuman, that freedom is discovered:

. . . The free man is he who wills without arbitrary self-will. He believes in reality, that is, he believes in the real solidarity of the real twofold entity *I and Thou*.[9] He believes in destiny, and believes that it stands in need of him.

The crucial elements are faith and trust in the real possibilities of the interhuman coupled with the conviction that each of us is responsible to initiate his or her own personal contributions to the realization of these possibilities by becoming really present to others in this world. To lack this faith and this trust, and to fail to act, in the light of this, is to accept arbitrarily the unfreedom of our animal instincts masked in our own self-serving rationales.

There is also a sharp distinction for Buber, as for his fellow philosopher Berdyaev, between the person who goes forth freely and with love and he or she who seeks only a gratifying object:

. . . The self-willed man does not believe and does not meet. He does not know the solidarity of connexion, but only the feverish outside and his feverish desire to use it. Use needs only to be given an ancient name, and it companies with the gods. When this man says *Thou*, he means "O my ability to use," and what he terms his destiny is only the equipping and sanctioning of his ability to use.[10]

Friends are not really friends if we simply use them or if their intention is simply to use us. Lovers are not in fact lovers if their sole activity is mutual exploitation. Teachers are not teachers who manipulate for their own ends only, nor are pupils genuine learners who calculate how much they can receive for how little effort put forth.

This applies to our slavish pursuit of success, to our cravings for power and prestige, and to our dedication to the illusion of personal security. And we rationalize so beautifully, indeed, as "well-trained philosophers," who know how to play the game: Our intricate sophistries serve us all *too* well in our "abilities to use!"

Equally to the point here is our willingness to allow the "significant others" in our lives to treat us as objects of their use, so long as we can derive some gratification in our terms in the relation. In this context it is not too difficult a leap to desensitize ourselves to the cries of our fellow creatures in a world grown busy and crowded.

Yet, as much as we involve ourselves in this extrovert and preoccupied culture, as much as we try to compartmentalize our caring, reality itself breaks upon us at unexpected times. On occasion we do sense a lifting of a veil between ourselves and others, who then do indeed reveal us to ourselves. In loving and in learning to accept love, in making a friend and acting in friendship, in teaching-learning situations in which we are mutually present teacher to pupil, and pupil to teacher, we glimpse what is truly human:

> . . . My *Thou* affects me, as I affect it. We are moulded by our pupils and built up by our works. . . . We live our lives inscrutibly included within the streaming mutual life of the universe.[11]

Thus I have shared with you some of the dialogical dilemmas of our world which are also of ourselves. They lie at the root of being and becoming, of philosophy and of education. We are responsible for ourselves and for our world. We hold in our hands some responsibility for what we have become and what we will become. We are in and of our own cultural contexts, yet we strive to transcend them, to break into an unanticipated and unpreconceived future.

If ". . . the idea of responsibility is to be brought back from the province of specialized ethics, of an 'ought' that swings free in the air, into that of a lived life,"[12] then who will act to bring our responsibilities into the world if not ourselves? And, given the times in which we live and move and have our being, if we do *not* act with responsibility now, then when?

Documentations.

1. James Bryant Conant, *The Education of American Teachers*, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1963, p. 131.

2. Franz Winkler, "The Three Dimensions of Reality," *Man: The Bridge Between Two Worlds*, Harper and Row, New York, 1960, p. 42.

3. Gabriel Marcel, *The Mystery of Being*, Henry Regnery, Chicago, 1951, pp. 252-253.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 254.

5. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1962, p. 334.

6. Nicolas Berdyaev, *Slavery and Freedom*, Charles Scribners Sons, New York, 1944, p. 42.

7. Martin Buber, *I and Thou*, Translated by Ronald Gregor Smith, Charles Scribners Sons, New York, 1958, p. 8.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 11.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 59.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 60.

7.

11. Ibid., pp. 15-16.

12. Martin Buber, Between Man and Man, Translated by Ronald Gregor Smith, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1965, p. 16.

CHAPTER 2.

OUR RELATIONSHIPS: A RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS BY DONALD S. SECKINGER: "DIALOGICAL DILEMMAS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION."

HUGH C. BLACK

In his presidential address Don Seckinger lives up to his potential and achieves what we have known and expected of him in a precious relationship over a number of years. He writes well -- in a uniquely well-compacted form which I suspect he learned from having his earlier "national" articles edited by William Brickman of School and Society and Intellect. That he writes a timely message compactly and well you may see in my repeating his first two paragraphs on p. 2:

"It is in this spirit -- that we can use all the help we can get in our present confused and troubled world -- that I would like to commend to you some of my own personal reflections and some of the ideas of selected philosophers of dialogue. It seems to me that many of the great and persistent external problems in the contemporary world are reflections of a breakdown in dialogue, just as it appears that the central problem of educating is the encouragement of genuine interhuman dialogue in all of our cultural and educational institutions, as well as in any informal educative arrangements we may devise.

"In today's world, human beings find themselves to an ever increasing extent alienated from the natural environment, attenuated in real interpersonal relationships, and more or less estranged from their inner selves. In the world of external reality, alienation and estrangement are represented by cravings for excitement, novelty, and violence as well as the acting out of hatreds and blind aggressions. Within our own internal realities, we are increasingly subjected to varying states of frustration, boredom, and insensitivity toward other persons except as objects and functions of our own use."

"Well-said!" and "Well-done, Don!" Your message describing our conditions and travail is timely, and you keep good company. For others in somewhat different areas of concern whom I have read recently are crying out similarly.

For example, Robert Gordis in giving a modern (1978) Jewish perspective on love and sex says this regarding the problem of marriage:

"All resources must be mobilized in order to inculcate an ideal of marriage that will reckon with human limitations and do justice to human aspirations. Nothing less will avail to rescue humankind from the morass of degradation and misery into which it is being plunged today." (1)

Another example (which I take as the springboard for my response) came to my attention shortly after March when Don sent me his presidential address. It is in the spring 1978 Newsletter of the National Institute for Campus Ministries. Sister Nancy Malone (O. S. U.) gives an account of her "interfaith" visit to Israel which strikes me impressively as somewhat parallel to Don's experiences in educational philosophy and his message to us. (2) For she does so in terms of what she calls "a profound feeling of a homecoming of the spirit; at simply the 'tears of things.'" And she, as Don, quotes Gabriel Marcel. Don's message to us, it seems to me, is likewise a well-told account of the "tears of things." He selects from what he calls "some of my own personal reflections: and commends to us "the ideas of selected philosophers of dialogue," quoting Gabriel Marcel, Nicolas Berdyaev, Merleau-Ponty, and Martin Buber. Sister Nancy's account in part I share with you because her "hope purified and chastened" helps me appreciate better Don's message to us.

Reality to Sister Nancy lies in the realization, as she puts it, "I only know -- and I know it -- that I would not have wept had I gone up to Jeruselum in the presence of Christians only. I was allowed a brief moment of 'passing over' to another tradition as theologian John Dunne speaks of it in A Search for God in Time and Memory. The place of the land (eretz Israel) as a religious phenomenon in Jewish hearts came home to me as never before." She saw both miracles and paradoxes: the miracle of cities being built in a waterless land; the paradox of "black-tented Bedouin right next to the cities and settlements." As she wondered how such hard-won settlements were going to be relinquished, she came to see the problem, that of peace. Sister Nancy came home after what she calls passing over "from first to 'second naivete.'" She put it, "I have finally seen the problem; I still want to believe in and hope for peace.

Profiting from Gabriel Marcel's insight that "This experience which is that of 'I hope . . .,' must like the fundamental experience of faith, 'I believe . . .,' be purified . . .," (3), Sister Nancy came home seeing, as she describes it, "more complexities, more paradoxes, more ironies than I had seen before." "I came home," she says, "with hope that is chastened. But I do hope, or at least, I want to." "Hope . . . might be called," she draws from Marcel, "a memory of the future."

If I read correctly his presidential message to us, Don Seckinger describes the plight of "foundations people" in terms of our frustrating attempts to deal with each other. Some of us have been termed masters; others, as pupils in educational philosophy. In numbing actions of "cognitive gamemanship," we are being propelled toward what Don calls "multiple-choice destruction." Ours is a frightening world of, as he put it, "the complacent bureaucrat, the vacant-eyed factory worker, the bored functionary, and even the jittery terrorist." In the philosophers of dialogue Don finds the message of hope he brings to us: the hope that we may become open one to another and aware of our common world as truly human persons.

I draw on knowledge of comparative religions. For in this field of knowledge I find materials which underscore one element of Don's message which I insist we not overlook: the "reality" as well as Don's "ideality." Don himself makes this distinction on p. 6 when he speaks of taking "a leap of faith" in man. Correctly, he forsakes "the leap of faith of Kierkegaard" and holds up to us "the real responsibility taken up by those who would live and suffer and love in this world and take the risks of this living upon themselves for the sake each for the other." This I wish to emphasize: our need to act responsibly toward each other in our real, everyday, troublesome world of both good and evil. As Don, I am calling for a healthy humanistic emphasis I find rooted both in Judaism and in Christianity in preference to mystical encounters of magic as our road to "salvation." Our hope, indeed, must be "purified" and "chastened."

I interpret Don as reminding us that we are troubled with "The Problem of Evil." Why do "good" men in educational philosophy and foundations suffer when so many apparently "evil" ones prosper? Why should our "good" men go to the trouble to hope, to struggle, to work so hard to attain what Don describes as so rare and unrewarding: "this dialogical relation of real friendship, solidarity, and love"?

Our religious traditions, as I know them, give varying answers. If we were Hindus, reincarnation would be our answer; and we could expect just desserts for what we have done or not done in this life in the next. The next life also offers hope for some Christians who see therein everlasting burning hell for evil beings and life in heaven for the virtuous. But there is a common world for some Jews and some Christians. Out of Judaism, based on the experiences of Job, comes the perspective of a liberal humanism. The real world is one of a sun which shines on both the wicked and the good. This is a "this-world" orientation as opposed to that of those Christians, for example, who see this as a mere stopping-off place to the next world, where just desserts are "dished out." An other-worldly, heaven-oriented response to a troubled world may mean a shunning of the material world in asceticism. Or, we may toil mightily to try to rise above our world by means of mysticism. This perspective affords to some in religion (including Christians and some philosophers of dialogue) ecstasy, escape, and satisfaction which is similar to that our younger generation seems to find so fascinating: yoga, Zen, I Ching, Tarot cards, and astrology or macrobiotic diet, drugs, and communes. (4) But perhaps -- if we are to live up to our highest capacities as human beings as some "Christians" do and some Jews in the spirit of Job do, we can attain a "better" instruction in the words attributed to Jesus of Nazareth: The Kingdom of Heaven is NOT a material kingdom, but it is "within us" or "among us." Jew or Christian, some of us see that we make our own heaven or hell in this life, in this world, which comes from a life of effort far from miracles and magic. We must recognize that the good man often suffers while the wicked prospers, that perhaps the most we can hope for is that we gain respect in the memories of our children and of our friends while we struggle after justice and righteousness in a world of tribulation.

Not even in Don's "philosophers of dialogue," I believe, may we find "THE" answer, any short-cut, any magical, mystical answer. For me, no experience of a kirkegaard, a "Born-Again" Christian, nor that of Martin Buber (said to be the chief modern apologist for Hassidism, a departure from the central tradition of Judaism and why he appeals to so many Christian theologians), nor of anyone who believes that "the single ecstatic moment of near union with God ensures virture forever after" suffices. Hope, I have. But it is a "purified," a "chastened" hope. I shall continue dealing with real, live people in education -- even the Conants of the past -- who try me, who test me, who challenge me, who depress me, and who make relevant my attempts to inform the younger generation of teachers about such dichotomies as "Progressive vs. Traditionalist" and "Academician vs. Educationist." But some of these people in "education" uplift me, "warm my heart," and do give me hope for *our* future -- which, as Don rightfully says, is of the human spirit, revealing us ideally as "human beings" rather than things to be utilized. These are, as I say with Don and Sister Nancy, "the tears of things." As Don says, we do need "all the help we can get." That "spellbinder" Jesse Jackson must still hold out to black, white, and other "colored human beings." His wise advice was, as all fourth-grade teachers know, "Little Johnny has got to master his number facts." (5)

Documentations.

1. Gordis, Robert, *Love & Sex: A Modern Jewish Perspective*, Farrar Straus Giroux, New York, 1978, p. 123.

2. Malone, Nancy M. O. S. U., "Israel: Reflections in an American Catholic Eye," *NICM Associates Newsletter*, 1: 1, 6, Number 4, Spring, 1978, National Institute for Campus Ministires, 885 Centre Street, Newton Centre, Massachussetts, 02159.

3. Marcel, Gabriel, *Homo Viator: Introduction to a Metaphysic of Hope*, Harper & Row, New York, 1962, p. 29.

4. See Kemelman, Harry, *Tuesday the Rabbi Saw Red*, G. K. Hall & Co., Boston, 1974, pp. 361-366, especially.

5. "Quotations from a Spellbinder," *Time*, 112: 46, Number 2, July 10, 1978.

CHAPTER 3.

COUNTER FORCES IN MODERN EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

JAMES JOHN JELINEK

A value, an end state of existence -- such as, for example, "back to basics" -- must be determined in its concrete make by appraisal of existing conditions of means. The assumption of a separation of things useful as means and things intrinsically good in themselves is foolish to the point of irrationality. The measure of a value a person attaches to a given end is the care he devotes to obtaining and using means without which the end cannot be attained.

Exhortations by lay and professional persons about the ends in modern education have been done sometimes in simple terms and sometimes in lofty ones, but the means school have used to attain these ends have been menial, ineffective, immoral, and dangerously counterproductive.

Research.

Experimenters in educational research have tried to investigate the impact of seemingly every conceivable means on various ends in pupil achievement. The profession now has mountains of classical research designed to show the impact of certain means on various ends in pupil achievement, those widely diverse means including administrative procedures, attendance, independent study, television, correspondence courses, class size, individual consultations, counseling, teacher effort, homework, student involvement, study time, distraction, school size, teacher selection, teacher education, teaching load, ability grouping, policy differences, general approach, discussion method, lecture method, group-centered techniques, frequency of quizzes, programmed instruction, and the like. I have documented more than one-hundred of these classical scientific investigations in the current ASCD 1978 Yearbook. What we have in these investigations is a vast preponderance of negative results. In the words of the investigators themselves, "No significant differences exist between means and ends in pupil achievement at levels of confidence based on odds of 1 to 100, 3 to 1000, or whatever."

Psychologies.

I attribute this dismal record to two of the most influential psychologies at work in modern education -- Psychoanalysis and its various offshoots and Behaviorism and its various offshoots. Both these psychologies, despite their eloquent spokesmen in and out of education, have been responsible for deterring us from the use of means adequate to the attainment of basic ends in school and society.

Psychoanalysis. Freud felt from the beginning that psychoanalysis and education were inseparable. Observations by Anna Freud, Melanie Klein, Susan Isaacs, and many others, were made to provide substantiation of Freud's theories of infantile sexuality in psychoanalysis and education. In schools, before World War II, efforts to implement these matters first took shape in the forms of radical new schools, and since then the major effect has been the penetration of psychoanalytic ideas and techniques into the regular schools under the guise of many names -- transactionalism, existentialism, self-psychologism, phenomenologism, humanism, and the like.

Thus began the chaotic confusion between ends and means. Bertrand Russell founded his Beacon Hill School on the basic premises of psychoanalysis, but yet contended that the school is an agency for the "inculcation of creeds that hold men together in fighting organizations -- Churches, States, political parties." How, one might ask, does sexual enlightenment as a means attain such ends of education as the inculcation of creeds that hold men together in fighting organizations? No rational relationship between ends and means was ever established. Beacon Hill School died a horrible death. The means it used never approached attaining the ends it sought. So it is with schools I have observed in Europe, Russia, Africa, Canada, and America.

A. S. Neill's educational thought in forty years of Summerhill has been deeply psychoanalytical. While Neill has shown that children can engage in masturbation and other forms of sexual behavior without developing guilt and regression in their adult lives, he has steadfastly refused in his school the analysis of central teaching procedures as related to various aspects of intellectual growth.

Likewise with the others -- The Children's School and Walden School of Margaret Naumberg in New York, schools throughout Europe like the Malting House School in England and the Kinderheim Baumgarten in Berlin, the regular schools of pre-Nazi Vienna, the regular schools in English education based on the methods and messages of Anna Freud -- all these and their counterparts put into jeopardy the basic moral and political principles that schools were designed to transmit to children. Russell, Lane, Reich, Isaacs, and the others, were frankly uninterested in pedagogy.

Over the years psychoanalytic modes of speech have lost their power to shock and so too perhaps their power to stimulate new educational activities. Psychoanalysis has merged with a general latitudinous mode in sexual affairs. Perhaps it has even been submerged in that vast general movement. Regular schools of most nations, including ours, are just as devoted to economic and military purposes as they ever were, while the mass arts and media advertising have learned only too well the practical lessons of psychoanalysis in selling their wares.

At best psychoanalytic theory relies on the relatively undeveloped concept of "sublimation" to account for the general displacement of sexual energy into intellectual as well as other socially useful, productive endeavors. But the theory is deficient in meeting the demands of the critical problems of men. To this day we do not know how to use the sexual energy of youngsters to lead them from the desire of objects to the desire for knowledge. Psycholanalytic theory has explained how sex should be studied, but it has not made clear how, or even whether, all intellectual study can be infused with sexual energy.

Behaviorism. The influence of behavioristic psychology on education has been to foster conservatism in politics, callousness in pedagogy, and absurdity in philosophy. Its attempt to account for all human learning as a variant of reflex contioning as in Pavlov's dogs accompanied by a neurophysiological explanation, is pure myth. Its language and literature of education have made serious philosophical treatment of curriculum, learning, thinking, and teaching clearly impossible.

At least in America most would agree that education ought to contribute to the freedom of those being educated. But if the idea of freedom is to be transalted into precise descriptions of how the trainee is to behave and how training will insure that he does so behave, then how can such training be said to contribute to freedom? The question is a critical one, especially as computer-based training machines have become available by federal subsidy and heavy corporate investment. At a superficial level educators have been quick to adopt behaviorism because it lends an air of science to their work and emphasizes the public character of their goals and procedures. But the fact of the matter is that the act of conditioning in behaviorism, the act of training -- the mode by which an artificial stimulus becomes built into the structure of living organisms including, of course, men -- makes of them programmed objects that they otherwise are not. By way of training a person can be trained to eat excretion and like it, to kill his fellow men and be proud of it, to insult an ethnic group and feel justified in doing so. In each case the artificial stimulus is so closely tied up with the satisfaction of a particular want that the response to the stimulus is felt to be "natural".

Yet what seems to be natural turns out to be grossly "unnatural". A person, or even an animal, it would seem would be alert to the consequences of his acts: if the consequence is favorable the action producing it would be perpetuated; if the consequence is unfavorable, the action producing it would be abandoned. However, in a state of arrestment, there is a paradox of behavior that is at the same time self-perpetuating and self-defeating. In this arrestment paradox, actions which have predominantly unfavorable consequences persist over a period of weeks, months, years, or even a lifetime. These actions are self-perpetuating and self-defeating. In these terms it is sad to observe that most of our students are in a state of an arrestment paradox in virtually all the critical areas of their lives.

The fact of the matter is that the arrestment paradox is caused by conditioning, the training process itself. How to produce the arrestment paradox is a simple matter. The person is trained to react in certain ways to certain stimuli and then is placed into a situation in which these responses are impossible or inappropriate. Although each of his attempts is blocked, the individual continues to go on responding as he has been trained to do, caught in the grips of the arrestment paradox, until finally he breaks down.

The basic assumption of training (behaviorism) is that man's behavior can be conditioned effectively through external stimuli -- by grades, money, green stamps, M and M drops, or other rewards. This assumption postulates a certain view of the nature of man that is saturated with materialism, bred in mechanism, and steeped in empiricism. The consequences of this mode are identifiable: The person does not develop the ability to think -- to hypothesize and to accept, reject, and/or modify hypotheses on the basis of experience. He becomes the prey of those who condition him. He does not develop the desire to find out the why of life. He does not develop the ability to formulate ideals and to bring them to fruition. He becomes a passive individual upon whom habits are impressed by his trainer. He becomes anti-intellectual. He relinquishes responsibility for his actions. He turns to violence when rewards are withheld. He does not develop inner freedom to infinite individuality. He limits his perspective. He learns gamesmanship, especially the game of NIGYYSOB.

Recapitulation. Our main point thus far has been that a value, an end state of existence, be it "back to basics," "back to law and order," "back to nature," back to "rugged individualism" or whatever, is determined in its concrete makeup by an appraisal of existing conditions as means. The assumption of a separation of things useful as means and things intrinsically good in themselves is foolish to the point of irrationality. Lay and professional persons have talked about ends of modern education both in simple and lofty terms, but the means they have used in terms of psychoanalysis and behaviorism (even with their variations of terminology and mode so eloquently defended by individuals in and out of the profession of education) simply have not been instrumental in meeting the critical realities of our world. In fact they have been menial, ineffective, immoral, and counterproductive.

Ekisticianism.

Free should the scholar be, brave and free! We need the freedom and the courage to look at alternative means, one of which I should like to recommend -- Ekisticianism (Ē-kis-tish-un-ism), a philosophy of education with a learning theory of disintegrationism, an instructional theory of heurism, and a curriculum theory of ekistics (ē-kis'-tiks).

Positive Disintegrationism. An individual is always a part of an environment. Within that environment he is self-regulative. If anything occurs within the person or within his environment or both to disintegrate his dynamic equilibrium, he responds to that disintegrative factor. His responses continue and vary until his dynamic equilibrium is restored. If old responses are inadequate in eliminating that which disintegrates his dynamic equilibrium, he is free to contrive (hypothesize) different responses that are adequate to eliminating it. In this sense the newly contrived response brings a change, an increment, to the structure of the person himself. He is not now exactly the same person he was before. Clearly by way of positive disintegrationism the individual develops effective intelligence -- he develops behavior which is guided by an anticipation of consequences. He makes it possible for himself to rethink his experience and to face subsequent situations a different person. Growth begets more growth.

Negative Disintegrationsim. However, if, as happens in conditioning, an individual uses a response to a disintegrative factor that cuts off further growth, and is not amenable to reconstruction, negative disintegrationism (the arrestment paradox) prevails. Negative disintegrationism is adevelopmental and is characterized by stabilization or involution of primitive impulses, a clear lack of symbolization and creativity, a feeble growth pattern and retarded realization of goals, and a lack of transformation of structure.

Now, then, ekistics is the study of the ecology of human beings -- the study of critical realities and critical problems that confront all of us -- children, youth, and adults -- a multiplicity of critical realities and critical problems inherent in (a) communication and society, (b) environment and the quality of life, (c) science and technology, (d) global and international perspectives, (e) justice, society and the individual, (f) the learning of values, and (g) education for a changing society, and the like. It is important to wait for basic questions in these areas to arise personally before you pontificate about them; otherwise you have all the answers, but no pressing questions, all the solutions for problems that do not yet personally exist.

Herein lies the principle of discipline in education as opposed to training. Discipline in Ekisticianism is not a matter of turning to a trainer who in the language of operant conditioning uses frames or algorithms to tell you what to do, when to do it, how to do it, and how to feel about it. Discipline is rather the pursuit of disintegrative factors intrinsically arrived at and pursued even in the face of difficulty, handicap, confusion, pain, suffering, or whatever. If an individual perceives content, be it the so-called "basics," epistemology, ontology, axiology, or whatever -- as a means instrumental toward eliminating a factor that disintegrates his dynamic equilibrium, he pursues that content with a discipline, even if at first it is unpleasant to him. He considers it a means to an end. He learns it. He builds it into structure so that he can use it again whenever the disintegrative factor reappears. He develops pleasure in it.

Criteria. Here, then, are certain realities and criteria for the so-called "basics" as they prevail in Ekisticianism as a philosophy of education and a theory of curriculum:

1. They child is born ignorant. Is he becoming increasingly more intelligent; is he becoming increasingly more adept at behaving in terms of consequences?

2. The child is born unarticulate. Is he becoming increasingly more articulate -- in writing and reading, in speaking and listening, in demonstrating and observing, in computing and understanding the computing of others?

3. The child is born unresponsible. Is he becoming increasingly more responsible for the things he says and does?

4. The child is born in a world of isolated particulars. Is he becoming increasingly more adept as developing relationships between himself and his environment, between himself and other human beings, between himself and his God?

5. The child is born self-centered. Is he becoming increasingly more empathetic?

6. The child is born asexual. Is he becoming increasingly more a man? Is she becoming increasingly more a woman?

7. The child is born aphilosophical. Is he developing wholes of meaning and a meaning of meaning? Is he becoming increasingly more skilled in developing critical analyses of critical analyses? Is he becoming increasingly more open to the study of alternative solutions to personal and social problems?

Some of us, no doubt, will view Ekisticianism, the improvement of the human conditon through curriculum development in a new philosophy of education, as being immodest and pretentious. The best response I can make to this is that prudent people make goals they can easily attain and rot in the contentment of shallow accomplishments, while wise men formulate goals they can never completely attain, but live in the glory of splendid failure. We devise curricula and philosophies of education to insure that what is attractive in the short term is weighed in the balance of the ultimate, long-term satisfaction.

Documentations.

1. Arthur Combs, "Humanism, Education, and the Future," *Educational Leadership*, January, 1978, pp. 300-303.

2. "Ekisticianism," *The World Book Dictionary*, 1977, p. 664; Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary, 1978, p. 415.

3. Rudolph Ekstein and Rocco Motto, "Psychoanalysis and Education: A Reappraisal," *Psychoanalytic Review*, Vol. 54, No. 4, 1964-1965, pp. 569-582.

4. Anna Freud, *Psychoanalysis for Teachers and Parents*, New York, 1935.

5. Anna Freud, *The Psycho-analytical Treatment of Children*, London, 1946.

6. Sigmund Freud, *The Sexual Enlightenment of Children*, New York, 1963.

7. Erich Fromm, *The Sane Society*, New York, 1955.

8. Paul Goodman, *Growing Up Absurd*, New York, 1960.

9. Susan Isaacs, *Intellectual Growth in Children*, New York, 1930.

10. Susan Isaacs, *Social Development in Young Children*, New York, 1933.

11. James John Jelinek, Editor, *Improving the Human Condition: A Curricular Response to Critical Realities*, 1978 Yearbook, Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, Washington, D. C., 1978.

12. James John Jelinek, "Learning: A Foundational Theory for Modern Education," *Principles and Values in School and Society*, Tempe, Arizona, 1976, pp. 121-127.

13. James John Jelinek, "The Outcomes of Training as Contrasted with Teaching," *Principles and Values in School and Society*, Far Western Philosophy of Education Society, Tempe, Arizona, 1976, pp. 171-185.

14. James John Jelinek, *The School in Sociological and Philosophical Perspective*, Bureau of Educational Research and Services, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona, 1969.

15. James John Jelinek, "Competency Based Education," pp. 328-337, in James John Jelinek, Editor, *Philosophy of Education in Cultural Perspective*, Far Western Philosophy of Education Society, Tempe, Arizona, 1978.

16. James John Jelinek, "Freedom and Education," pp. 65-84, in James John Jelinek, *Philosophy of Education: 1976-1977*, Far Western Philosophy of Education Society, Tempe, Arizona, 1977.

17. James John Jelinek, "The Nature of Human Values: Basic Postulates and Principles Inherent in Certain Axiologies of Modern Education," pp. 105-115, in James John Jelinek, Editor, *Philosophy of Education: 1974-1975*, Far Western Philosophy of Education Society, Tempe, Arizona, 1975.

18. James John Jelinek, "A Futurological Analysis of Exosomaticism," pp. 21-37, in James John Jelinek, Editor, *Philosophy of Education: 1973-1974*, Far Western Philosophy of Education Society, Tempe, Arizona, 1974.

19. Paul B. Komisar and C. J. B. Macmillan, Editors, *Psychological Concepts in Education*, Chicago, 1966.

20. Homer Lane, *Talks to Parents and Teachers*, New York, 1949.

21. A. S. Neill, *That Dreadful School*, London, 1937.

22. A. S. Neill, *Hearts Not Heads in the School*, London, 1945.

23. A. S. Neill, *The Problem Teacher*, London, 1939.

24. Joe Park, *Bertrand Russel on Education*, Columbus, 1963. (This book contains an objective account of the Beacon Hill School.)

25. Otto Rank, Modern Education, New York, 1932.

26. Wilhelm Reich, *The Sexual Revolution*, New York, 1945.

27. Carl Rogers, "Significant Learning: In Therapy and Education," *Educational Leadership*, Vol. 16, No. 4, January, 1959, pp. 232-249.

28. Bertrand Russell, *Education and the Good Life*, New York, 1926.

29. Bertrand Russell, *Why Men Fight*, New York, 1916.

30. B. F. Skinner, *Cumulative Record*, New York, 1961.

31. B. F. Skinner, *Walden Two*, New York, 1948.

CHAPTER 4.

A PHILOSOPHICAL NORM FOR AN ABNORMAL TIME

ROBERT B. MCLAREN

Major changes in American society are neither new nor rare. From the clearing of the forests, through countless treaties made and broken, revolution, slave trade and civil war, and depressions and international conflicts, our growing population has had to be equipped to cope with what Francois Duchene has called "The Endless Crisis." Our public schools, the primary training ground for each generation, have been expected to provide the necessary tools as well as the basic skills in their use, for making creative adjustments "on the run," as conditons continued to change.

What is not familiar to the American spirit (if one may hazard an obvious hypostatization), is a growing disenchantment with things as they are, and disillusionment about whether they will ever improve. In a generation materially advantaged as no previous people in the history of the world, we need to inquire whether the perceived malaise is real, or only the impression of fatigued optimists. If real, what resources are there for recovering or creating a new value system capable of providing a sense of direction and a motive power for pursuing it?

The response from many quarters is that ours is indeed a fear-haunted and disillusioned generation, and that formal education must carry at least some of the blame.

I

Our century was ushered in on a wave of optimism. There were the multitude of inventions, from the typewriter and ticker-tape to the trolley car and the private automobile to keep astonished mouths open. There were expositions in England, France, and America to bring the world together in a spirit of international accord. The poet Swinburn sang:

> Glory to man in the highest,
> For man is the master of things.

But within less than a score of years, the first world war turned the optimism to dismay. Spengler's Decline of the West warned of more disasters to follow. While Europe sought to recover, and the United

States enjoyed its brief "roaring Twenties," Albert Schweitzer declared that "...the suicide of civilization is in progress." Others lent their insights to the theme, and titles of books that followed read like an epitaph of our culture:

The End of Our Time (Berdyaev);
Mind At the End of Its Tether (H. G. Wells);
Civilization on Trial (Toynbee); and
The Predicament of Modern Man (Trueblood).

Even the whimsical Decline and Fall of Practically Everybody by Will Cuppy captured the sense of hopelessness. It seemed, as Marc Connely put it in the mouth of the Angel Gabriel, "Lord, it looks like everything that ain't nailed down is comin loose."

Ortega y Gasset, in his Revolt of the Masses, described our age as declining into barbarism, and lay the blame squarely on the schools for teaching only the techniques for living in a machine-oriented civilization, without providing education in moral values which alone could prevent our using the machines for mutual exploitation.[1]

Walter Lippman stated flatly: "Modern education is based on a denial that it is necessary or useful or desirable for the schools and colleges to transmit...the religious and classical culture of the western world."[2] Unless we return to those foundations, he insisted, we are doomed to further disintegration. Other writers echoed the concern. Frederic Lilge, in his book The Abuse of Learning, decried the fact that specialization in cultural affairs had encouraged people to develop expertise in social manipulation, apart from morale considerations. His case in point, which may remain forever the most monumentally tragic illustration, was the rise of Nazism in Germany, the nation with the highest cultural heritage in the world.[3] In the same vein, Erich Kahler has written: "The most frightening aspect of our present world is not the horrors in themselves, the atrocities, the technological exterminations; but the one fact at the very root of it all: the fading of any human criterion."[4]

The "human criterion" must of course be the concern of us all, and of educators in particular. But how shall educators develop and articulate the meaning of such a term without help from philosophers whose major occupation has traditionally encompassed just such a task? Yet it is precisely here we encounter a dilemma. Since the days of David Hume, who denied validity to the notion of abstract and general ideas, the empirical tradition grew in influence, and the older notion that human knowledge could be synthesised to provide a coherent world view declined. Auguste Compte proposed that the task of philosophy was confined to interpreting the interrelationships of observable phenomena. Logical positivists and members of the Vienna Circle in particular limited the scope of philosophy to the analysis of the language in which the scientifically controlled observation of such phenomena could be expressed. Metaphysical concerns, and in many instances moral and ethical problems, were either avoided or rejected as being outside the scope of philosophy.

Not all philosophers agreed, to be sure. Hocking and Royce, among the declining number of Idealists, Whitehead, Montague, and Santayana among the Realists, and a variety of Pragmatists continued to devise systems in which moral concerns might be brought to bear on social issues. But to many it seemed the field was being abandoned. Albert Schweitzer, writing after the Nazi holocaust, lamented that as philosophers turned from the world, the world ceased to look to philosophers for guidance. He wrote: "In the hour of peril, the watchman who ought to have kept us awake was himself asleep, and the result was that we (philosophers) put up no fight at all on behalf of our civilization."[5] If this seems overly harsh, one finds it even more to the point to recall the scornful reaction of Adolf Hitler who, in 1924, viewed the breaking down of political and economic structures all over Europe. He wrote: "All those symptoms of decay are in the last analysis only the consequences of the absence of a definite, uniformly acknowledged philosophy, and the resultant general uncertainty in the judgment and attitude toward the various great problems of the time."[6] In the absence of an effective philosophy for civilization, articulated and promoted by philosophers through normative social strucutures, Hitler proposed his own. Its implementation in the Nazi program produced the most torturous period western civilization had ever endured--what Winston Churchill called "this hideous epoch."

What was the response of professional philosophers? For many, it seemed that the warnings were unheard, and the catastrophies had occurred on a different planet. The magic names of Wittgenstein and Carnap were intoned while language games were played, and Herbert Geigl assured us that all important problems could be solved if only we payed careful attention to the language in which they were expressed. One was reminded of Shaw's comment in Pygmalion about the French attitude toward life: "The French don't care what you do, as long as you pronounce it correctly." But Abraham Kaplan, writing in The New World of Philosophy, commented: "I can not help but feel that there is something wrong with a philosophy, in the mid-twentieth century, that takes no notice of war, revolution, nationalism, nuclear energy, the exploration of space, or anything else distinctive of our time save the magnificent sweep of the intellect in the achievements of pure science and mathematics."[7] To be sure, careful analysis is essential in philosophical thought and method. But endless sharpening of tools, without applying them to tasks that need attention, may end in trivializing the whole philosophical enterprise.

By way of rejoinder, our present conference seeks to provide one avenue for bringing philosophy back into the mainstream of human affairs. And without necessarily being a Deweyite, one can perhaps find ground for agreeing with John Dewey, that in our kind of world the philosophy of education is the only philosophy worth considering. "Our kind of world" has been described for us by a number of critics of diverse background. Albert Camus said that our generation could be summarized in the words "They fornicated and read their newspapers...;" they could imagine no other reason to be alive. General MacArthur's memorable jibe was that (in our time) it is the educated man we have most to fear. He is joined by Graham Greene, who in his just-published novel, The Human Factor, states: "Our worst enemies are not the ignorant and the simple, however cruel; our worst enemies are the intelligent and the corrupt."[8]

If we are to correct this situation, and not give way to hand-wringing or further abdication, we can find no better place to begin than in our public schools. While not everyone attends churches or Y.M.C.A.s or other value-promoting institutions, every American child is supposed to attend our public schools, or at least their parochial counterparts. We can do little about the latter unless we are personally involved in some sectarian program. But we can all find ways to make ourselves available in helping the public schools find a sense of direction in axiological matters.

II

The most obvious question to be raised at this point has to do with what kind of value system is appropriate for public schools to promote. Parochial schools have no such problem. Their religious traditions afford a ready-made axiology, rooted in an ontological foundation in which God is the ultimately real source of all that is good, true and beautiful. Public schools are not oriented in this way, and have not been since colonial days. Furthermore, the principle of separation of church and state forbids our promoting any sectarian positions, which, in a pluralistic society, is exactly as it should be.

Happily, what is open to us is the clarification of options. There is actually a finite number of sources from which value systems can be evolved, and our task of helping our schools decide among them is made easier once we recognize what they are. For purposes of simplification, let me suggest a tri-partite division (with possible subdivisions)--that value systems are either contrived, derived from "nature," or inspired (via faith or intuition).

A. Contrived Values

Many philosophers insist that value systems are derived from the interaction of individuals with their societies. There is considerable disagreement, however, as to the ultimate frame of reference, whether it be social tradition in general, the state in particular, or the individual himself in the act of existential self-affirmation.

1. Anthropologists and social philosophers have long insisted that people make decisions in terms of the customs in which they were conditioned. Plato, in spite of his insistence that values have their origin in the transcendent realm of absolutes, asserted that lower classes were unfit to comprehend higher learning because their manual labors kept their minds earth-bound and confused. He thus recognized, at least

implicitly, the impact of social conditioning. Auguste Compte, in the 18th century, earned the accolade "father of Sociology" trying to apply the methods of natural science to studying society. He concluded that society was the source of human values. A century later, Sir James Frazer's The Golden Bough provided the first systematic study in support of such a contention. His research was subsequently reinforced by the work of Post, Morgan, Holmes, Durkheim, and Weber. But it was the late Ezra Pound who expressed it most explicitly: "In stating claims or demands in general terms as social interests, attempt is made more or less consciously to secure as much as possible of the whole scheme of social interests with the least sacrifice." This, as Felix Cohen observes, "is the familiar Pragmatist position stated in a socio-legal framework."[9]

Like Oliver Wendell Holmes, however, many students of social theory have discovered problems with the ambiguity of social custom. They know that society's traditions may be taken over by a dictator or other evolving state, or give way to mere relativism. They seek a more stable ground for their values. It is as Holmes observed, states and courts that give substance to what custom deems "right."

2. There have existed tyrants in almost every generation who have attempted to be the state, and to leave after them a structure that would, as in Hitler's dream, "endure a thousand years."

Nearly five centuries ago, Machiavelli attempted to provide a rationale for permitting rulers of states to control citizens as if they were unruly beasts, while extolling the virtues of patriotism to insure their obedience and loyalty. Few political leaders have been willing to admit openly to aspirations for such authority, but most concur that values important to the State should issue in laws and ethical pronouncements, which can be promulaged through whatever media are at hand and taught explicitly through the schools. Law, according to Hobbes, Nietzsche, Hitler, and Carl Schmitt, is a tool created by the state, for the state. For Schmitt, the "Crown Jurist" of the Nazi Party, politics was a gladiatorial arena in which each contender had to accept a fight to the death. Social custom is too vague to serve as a guide for the people, and tradition means nothing unless it is the tradition consciously designed by the leaders. "History shows," wrote Hitler, "that the right as such does not mean a thing, unless it is backed up by great power."[10]

The so-called "will of the people," is too vague to serve as a moral or ethical force, according to National Socialist theoretician, Hudolf Huber. Thus, in the Third Reich, "the Fuhrer represents the collective will of the people. He is almost infallible because, as long as he correctly interprets the nation he represents, his will is not the subjective, individual will of a single man, but the collective national will."[11] This being the case, the line of authority is so designed "...that each subordinate holds absolute obedience to his immediate superior, with everyone ultimately subordinate to the absolute leader, the Fuhrer."[12]

While admitting that the National Socialist program represented the extreme form of a State-centered axiology, I would point out that the history of governments, wherein the State itself was the supreme arbiter of values, leaves little room for optimism that "it can't happen here." Our own recent national tragedy, fostered by at least two Chief Executives in an evolving imperial presidency of which the Vietnam War, the Kent State shootings and Watergate were only symptoms, should be a constant warning.

3. Existentialism, if we are to subscribe to Crane Brinton's assessment, arose from the disillusionment and despair of those who witnessed the betrayal of individuals by the State, and who were equally disenchanted by the failure of liberal ideals to withstand tyranny. "It is easy" he writes, "to see in existentialism merely a symptom of the exhaustion of western Europe at the end of the great war. Yet...from one point of view, existentialism is the pessimistic and disillusioned inversion of nineteenth century hopeful materialistic faiths."[13] The emphasis now was for each person to seek a standard of values for himself and be fully responsible for it. To adopt the values of the society in general or the State in particular, robs one of his own authenticity as a person. "Man" wrote Jean Paul Sartre, "is nothing else but what he makes of himself."[14] Beginning with the Cartesian "Je pense, donc Je suits," Sartre affirms that coming to consciousness of one's self "in the presence of others," forces one to acknowledge them "as the condition of his own existence.... In order to get any truth about myself, I must have contact with another person."[15] This social configuration imposes a sense of responsibility, which obviated the trap of anarchy in an otherwise totally self-sufficient value-system. "One may choose anything if it is on the grounds of free involvement."[16]

The educational implications of this have been perceived by George Kneller, who writes, "If I am an existentialist teacher, I urge the student to take responsibility for, and to deal with, the results of his actions. True freedom implies not egoism, but communion."[17]

When confronted by the existential insistence that I ought to behave in a certain way toward my fellow pilgrims, however, one is tempted to retort in the words of Shakespear's Shylock: "By what compulsion must I?" If I were an atheistic existentialist, caught in literally dog-eat-dog competition for survival, discussions of "social configuration," and of "consciousness of self in the presence of others," might well transmute Sartre's "One may choose anything..." into a Social Darwinism, in which my right to survive would be predicated on the fact that I am the fittest to survive.

A religious Existentialist, like Kierkegaard, Marcel, or Buber, has less trouble with this, because his existential choice does not rise exclusively from himself, but from the sense that he participates in a "Ground of Being," a personal Father God who has made humankind a family. His existentialism, then, is conditioned by the requirement to see in each existing moment and encounter, a challenge to his integrity as one who stands before God, accountable. One's social ethics in such a situation becomes similar to that of the covenant community of ancient Israel, though without the reinforcement of rigid laws. Its modern expression is the "situation ethics" of Joseph Fletcher, and Paul Lehman. The proper stance according to Fletcher, is to examine each situation, the personalities involved, and the potentials for fulfillment of good-for-all, then let love be one's guide. "We are commanded to love people, not principles."[18] While agreeing with this in essence, Paul Ramsey warns that this remains too ephemeral to provide a working value system. "They waywardness of the human heart works against any ethos, customs or laws that are generally good for all. Only some form of rule agapism, and not act agapism can be consistent with the elaboration of...social responsibilities. No social morality was ever founded, or ever will be founded on situation ethics."[19]

B. Natural Law

Because the values contrived by individuals, social groups, and states have never succeeded in winning majority allegiance, many have proposed that we must return to Nature for a sure foundation. Long before Rousseau and Wordsworth made this their theme, the Greek Stoics of the third century B.C. proclaimed it. "Stoic philosophy found numerous followers in Rome, among them Cicero, who did much to popularize Greek philosophy in his country. Thus natural law became familiar in Roman jurisprudence."[20]

Inspired by the mystic naturalism of Pythagorean philosophy, which affirmed a cosmic harmony, later Roman jurists identified this jus naturale with the philosophical jus gentium- "...the universality of a given rule taken as an indication of its naturalness."[21] The Second Century jurist Gaius, identified jus gentium with "natural reason" clearly pointing to the law of nature. (A lack of legal precision, however, prevented natural law from being taken with complete seriousness by the Romans, who could point to the fact that while slavery was common, and supported by the jus gentium, it could not be justified by jus naturale, inasmuch as, according to Stoic philosophy, all men are born free.[23])

The effort at creating a theocracy during the early Christian centuries, albeit a hybrid with neo-Roman and monarchical infusions, kept the Natural Law theory out of Church doctrine until Acquinas melded it with Scholastic theology; it gained slightly as the Church began to lose credibility during the Renaissance. It gathered still more prominence under Hugo Groutius during the 17th century. Positing that man's reason is consonant with nature's functioning (though he bowed to the still formidable influence of the Church, in affirming that both reason and nature are under God's sway), he declared that the moral law that reason perceives in nature is as axiomatic as mathematical propositions, which even God can not negate (or would not, as a rational deity). He thus made natural law ultimately independent even of God. Again however, as in Rome, lack of precision made the natural law theory little more than the philosophical conceit that it was in the days of Ulpian and Gaius.

A renewal of interest in natural law as a source of value accompanied the Age of Reason, becoming amalgamated with a moral idealism popular for a time among some of America's so-called "founding fathers." The prevailing Puritanism, however, kept "nature" firmly in its place as the "handiwork of God," and not in itself a source of values. Not until the late nineteenth century did a thorough-going philosophy of natural law arrive, in the writing of jurist Rudolf Stammler, who based his axiological position on the critical system of Immanuel Kant.[23]

The problem with the crypto-idealism of legal philosophers like Stammler and Kohler, however, was pointed out by Felix Cohen, who noted that their dependence for legal criticism on ethics, caused them to minimize or ignore "the equally basic dependence of legal criticism on positive science...they failed to make explicit the positive premise involved in every step of the descent from the heaven of ethical axioms to the terrestrial fields of law administration."[24]

The difficulty with Natural Law theories, as to their ability to provide an axiological framework for practical living, is thus seen as two-fold. *First*, they tend to be vague, and are effective only when they draw their moral force from outside "nature" itself---one does not look to the ants, tigers, or even non-human primates for rules of behavior. *Secondly*, as is underscored by Ernst Troeltsch, the assumption that the conservation of some eternal edict of justice is best achieved by revolution is an inherent paradox of the Natural Law concept. "American democracy," he points out, "tends to issue in the strictest conservations; it regards its principles as the eternal and divine commands of morality and law."[25] Perhaps even more disturbing is the way Adolf Hitler employed the Natural Law theory in support of his Fascist program in Nazi Germany. He wrote: "The whole of nature is a continuous struggle between strength and weakness, an eternal victory of the strong over the weak. All nature would be full of decay if it were otherwise."

One wishes not to indulge in *ad hominum* arguments to discredit any given theory, but the history of the Natural Law theory raises more questions about its usefulness as a source of ethics, than it solves. And as been pointed out, it seems primarily effective only when it appeals to some standard outside itself for verification.

C. We are left then to examine the prospects for *Intuition* and *Inspiration*. George Santayana's familiar words:

> It is not wisdom to be only wise,
> And on the inward vision close the eyes,
> But it is wisdom to believe the heart.

provides a pleasant, if somewhat tentative opening gambit. Plato, as is too well known to need documentation, proposed that there is a realm of

Absolutes, from which all our systems of ethics and morality derive. This realm is known to us a priori, though our dalliance with the material world has prevented our seeing it whole. Significantly, Plato was anti-democratic, and conceived of creating a special school for the training of civic leaders. He explained that he wrote the Republic in order to discuss "justice," "...but his real reason," (as Rene Wormser tells us), "seems to have been a desire to design what he thought was an ideal state."[27] The Academy was a school for research, remarkable for the scope of its curriculum, but perhaps even more remarkable for utilizing the "project" method of instruction rather than lecture and rote memory. It functioned as a "legislative drafting bureau," Plato himself often being invited to draft laws for various Greek cities.[28] Unfortunately, Plato's progressive intent produced a reactionary result: "He was the first totalitarian philosopher." His philosophy, as educational historian, Freeman Butts points out, "would give the ruling power to an aristocratic class," and would define education in terms of producing citizens whose total allegiance was to the State. "(He) paid little attention to education for the masses who were to do the work...he was interested primarily in the education of the warrior and the ruling classes."[29]

The line from Plato, through the warrior-priests of the Middle Ages, through Napoleon's mandate for the Platonically-oriented schools of France, and the conservative schools of America, is a curving but almost unbroken line. We should not be surprised to encounter the patriotic militance of conservative school board members, educated themselves in the idealist tradition, sympathising with Noah Webster's oft quoted dictum: "Begin with the infant in his cradle; let the first word he lisps be 'Washington.'"[30] Nor should we be unprepared for the emphasis of a Max Rafferty or Ronald Reagan on the primary function of education to be the training in "good citizenship." There lurks the constant temptation in the Idealist posture to assume that intuition of transcendent values and Absolutes gives one a moral superiority. Stella Henderson reveals this in writing "Children must learn what is right and what is wrong; they must learn to love the right and hate the wrong."[31] Where the "wrong" is identified as another nation, and patriotism has become nationalistic fervor, the perils should be obvious. As Brubacher points out, "Unfortunately, nationalism is easily turned into channels of pride in the superiority of one's own nation and extending its influence in imperialistic fashion."[32]

It may have become evident that in each of the axiological systems thus far, a retrograde tendency could be noted. Intuition too often perceived a transcendent realm of values which somehow become concretised in one's own social setting, culture and state. Natural Law also found itself being appealed to as justification for state domination of the individual. The existentialist, confronted by massive tyranny finds himself isolated and ineffective, having to withdraw into safe seclusion or going under: heroically it may seem to him, but futily. His more pragmatic companions melt into the crowd, adopt the social requirements of the moment, and are just as subject to being effaced by the state as all others who must conform or die. Again, the state is supreme, and continues to be the arbiter of what is good, beautiful and over all, just.

There is no gainsaying that morality can be, and almost inevitably is legislated by the state. Once a law is passed, and citizens are schooled to believe that acceptance of it constitutes good and disobedience is evil, the majority will acquiesse. How else can we explain the easy acceptance of slavery by millions of southern Americans for more than two hundred years, or the more shocking acceptance of the German people that Jews were undesirable, and therefore eradicable? The law said so. Traditional morality, social mores, private views, Natural Law, and idealistic intuition all fell before the holocaust; the state was supreme.

But a final option remains as a value source, one so familiar and indeed thumb-worn as to be easily overlooked. This is Religious Inspiration.

In full awareness of the hazards of such a suggestion, and acknowledging the sorry history of institutional religion's bungling of ethical and moral issues, I must hasten with the reassurance that what I am talking about is not sectarian religion. I am referring rather to what Alfred North Whitehead means when he tells us "The essence of education is that it be religious. Pray, what is religious education?" he asks. "A religious education is an education which inculcates duty and reverence."[33] When one asked, "duty and reverence toward what?" Whitehead wrote "the vision of something which stands beyond, behind, within, the passing flux of immediate things...the greatest of present facts; something that gives meaning to all that passes...whose possession is the final good. The fact of religious vision, and its history of persistent expansion, is our one ground for optimism."[34]

It is interesting that among those who have given their most serious thought to the role of religious inspiration in recent years should have been scholars from the "hard sciences." Einstein, after witnessing the failure of the universities and other social agencies to stand against Hitler, saw that it was the religious community that mounted the greatest resistance within Germany and Holland, creating underground escape routes for Jews and Christians alike marked for extermination. In his final book, Einstein wrote: "what once I scorned, I now praise unreservedly." To this he added: "All religions, arts and sciences are branches of the same tree..."[35] "Are we not all children of one father?"[36] "Science can only ascertain what is, but not what should be...science without religion is lame."[37]

Arthur H. Compton, another Nobel Laureate in Physics, and active churchman, wrote: "Science can have no quarrel with a religion that postulates a God to whom all men are as his children."[38] In similar vein, Charles Townes, shortly after winning the Nobel Prize wrote an article titled "The Convergence of Science and Faith," in Think Magazine (March, 1966).

The essential insights drawn from religious inspiration have provided not only an axiological framework, but the dynamics for social reform since the prophet Amos first thundered his command for justice in ancient Israel, seven centuries before Christ. It makes a profound difference how one conceived the Deity who is to be the fountain of moral and ethical guidelines, for as a matter of fact "not all religions are alike." Confucius did not really believe in a personal God, so his ethics was state-centered. The Buddha also denied the reality of a supreme deity, and offered essentially a religion of denial and withdrawal. The Homeric deities were conceived as capricious and often immoral, and were hardly capable of inspiring a vigorous morality. But it is in a book on Biology and Ethics, that we find the striking comment that moral courage is to be found only in the human realm, and only there among people who have sought a value system in a consciously theistic setting. Socrates, it is noted, spoke often of God as the source of his judgments and actions. "The refusal of Socrates to save his life by repudiating the principles for which he lived, (required) an independently thought out philosophy of life."[39]

It is possible to behave decently and even courageously in a tight spot without faith, and when one is among friends. "The situation is entirely different if the man for whom you are expected to risk your life is an anonymous contemporary..." or even an enemy! "Gethsemane would be unintelligible to the Homeric hero."[40]

III

It is impossible to help schools decide among the many axiological models if we are ourselves unclear about their implications. These brief sketches provided here are only suggestive, and sin grievously on the side of oversimplification. Our problem is further compounded by the knowledge that even if one were to opt for encouraging religious insight as the paradigm, the laws forbidding church-state collusion would be a serious hindrance.

On the other hand, the Supreme Court, while forbidding worship in schools, has not forbidden but actually encourage religious studies. If the effort is not made, one can be fairly sure that the decision as to which value system to follow will eventually be pre-empted by state-run committees. Legislatures are tremendously effective in telling the population in general, and schools in particular, what is good and right, what is wrong and illegal and to be taught as such. As philosophers concerned about educational directions, we dare not abdicate the field and lose our opportunity by default. Robert Hutchins expressed it well: "The purpose of education is to improve men. A sound philosophy in general suggests that men are rational, moral and spiritual beings and that the improvement of men means the fullest development of their rational, moral and spiritual powers."[40] Such improvement is unlikely if we are mired down in relavatism, or give way to hedonism which is ultimately ego-centric, and under stress becomes mutual exclusiveness and finally destructive.

Hedonism, which is the essence of the free-enterprise system, will be impossible to root out unless we hold that there is a loyalty which overarches all others, whether to self, or the community, or the State, and which has the capacity to judge and correct the errors of them.

What is needed now, and I should say needed most urgently, is that such conferences as this one be set up in every school district, and that workshops be created in which all the options we have discussed can be more thoroughly examined. challenged, and where deemed useful, implemented. Thus, we can avoid the perpetual *ad hoc* aspect of the present public school scene, where value decisions are made daily, but almost always in a philosophical vacuum. What we need are specialists in every branch of philosophy, analytic as well as synthetic, drawn from the sciences as well as the humanities and human services; specialists who have risen above specialties, and who can bring to bear their particular skills and insights on the mundane problems of curriculum methodology, and social policy. In this encounter, the educational venture may rediscover its historic *raison d'etre*: to illuminate the minds of students, providing them with tools of thought and action, elevating them above information to knowledge, and from knowledge to wisdom, and from wisdom to the compassionate service of humanity, for which purpose we were created.

Documentations.

1. Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses*, New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1957.

2. Walter Lippman, "Education *Vs* Western Civilization" in *The American Scholar*, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1941, p. 187.

3. Frederic Lilge, *The Abuse of Learning*, New York: Macmillan, 1948.

4. Erich Kahler, "Man Without Values" in *The Tower and the Abyss*. New York: Braziller, 1957, p. 224.

5. Albert Schwetzer, *The Philosophy of Civilization*, New York: Macmillan, 1949, p. 8.

6. Adolph Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, translated by R. Manheim, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1943, p. 266.

7. Abraham Kaplan, *The New World of Philosophy*, New York: Random House, 1961, p. 90.

8. Graham Greene, *The Human Factor*, New York: Simon and Shuster, 1978, p. 86.

9. Felix Cohen, *Ethical Systems and Legal Ideas*, Cornell University Press, 1959, p. 5ff.

10. Quoted in the Speeches of Hitler from 1923-43, edited by G. Prange, Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, (cf. Gould and Truit, *Political Ideologies*, New York: Macmillan, 1973, p. 116).

11. Ernst Rudolf Huber, *Verfassungsrecht des Grossdeutchen Reiches*, Hamburg: 1929, p. 195. *Cf. Readings on Facism and National Socialism*, Denver: Alan Swallow, Publisher, n.d., p. 75.

12. Huber, *Ibid.*, p. 115.

13. Crane Brinton, *Ideas and Men*, New York: Prentice Hall, 1950, p. 499.

14. Jean Paul Sartre, *Existentialism*, New York: Philosophical Library, 1957, p. 15.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 37.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 48.

17. George Kneller, *Foundations of Education*, New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1971, pp. 257-8.

18. Joseph Fletcher, *Situation Ethics*, Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1966, p. 19.

19. Paul Ramsey, *Deeds and Rules in Christian Ethics*, Edinburg: Oliver and Boyd, 1965, p. 42.

20. Arthur Nussbaum, *A Concise History of the Law of Nations*, New York: Macmillan, 1962, p. 15.

21. *Ibid.*

22. *Ibid.*, p. 16.

23. D. K. Allen, *Law in the Making*, London: Oxford University Press, 1958, p. 23ff.

24. Felix Cohen, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

25. Ernst Troeltsch, "The Ideas of Natural Law and Humanity in World Politics": in Gierke, Otto, *Natural Law and the Theory of Society*, trans. Ernest Barker, Boston: Beacon Press, 1957, p. 203.

26. *Ibid.*

27. Rene Wormser, *The Law*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1949, p. 75.

28. *Ibid.*

29. Freeman Butts, The Education of the West, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973, pp. 93-94.

30. Kneller, op. cit., pp. 12-13.

31. Stella Henderson, "Introduction to Philosophy of Education" in Charles Marler, Philosophy and Schooling, Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1975, p. 222.

32. John S. Brubacher, Modern Philosophies of Education, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969, p. 90.

33. Alfred North Whitehead, The Aims of Education, New York: The Macmillan Co., 1966 (third Printing) p. 23.

34. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, New York: Macmillan, 1946, p. 275.

35. Albert Einstein, Out of My Later Years, New York: Philosophical Library, 1950, p. 9.

36. Ibid., p. 23.

37. Ibid., pp. 24-25.

38. Arthur H. Compton, "A Modern Concept of God," in Man's Destiny in Eternity, The Garvin Lectures, Boston: Beacon Press, 1949, p. 19.

CHAPTER 5.

TEACHING FOR VALUE

JAMES L. JARRETT

Watching a PBS television show, not long ago, about a New York high school, this author was both impressed and depressed. It was not just the fact that so many of the students were deviant and destructive that weighed one down, but also the prevailing air of emptiness, meaninglessness, purposelessness of their lives. Nor is there available to us the "Oh, but that's New York" or "That is a particularly troubled school" salve to our spirits, for many of us think that the difference from the norm in California or Arizona or Washington is in degree, and not all that many degrees either. It is impossible to imagine that the problem can be solved or even much mitigated by a new emphasis upon basics, by employing ten times as many truant officers, by a widespread adoption of Kohlbergian classes in moral development or of Simon-pure values clarification, or even by that most trusted of all methods, the pouring of large quantities of money into the school district coffers, to be spent at the discretion of the School Board.

"What are you doing?" the interviewers asked the students on the streets parallel to the school. "Hanging out," was the answer. As if they were shirts and sheets flapping in the wind. But the answer has a formula currency. Since it is an answer that gets nods from the whole cohort, it is taken as meaningful. Hanging out--a kind of non-expectant waiting, a drugged, withdrawn biding of one's time until something happens: a motorcycle roars by, someone puts a record on, or Godot arrives. "There's nothing in there for me," said one student, shrugging in the direction of the school building. "It's not real. Out here it's real; here I learn about the real world." Well, one wants the schools to be real, but what it would be like to take that kind of reality inside the building boggles, or terrifies, the mind.

This writer would be very glad if a sensitive anthropologist would undertake to investigate this matter empirically, but in the meantime, the hypothesis is that to a very large number of students, our high schools are, for the main part, irrelevant and boring. Probably this discontent is unevenly spread across the social and economic classes, but this author thinks it is there in great measure for the advantaged children from homes where learning is respected; so this writer doesn't think for a moment that the ritual invocation of SES will get us very far. Indeed, this author is not at all sure one knows anything that will, but an attempt should be made to make another run at this from a starting point that is labelled VALUES. This author won't make any great claims in advance for my proposals, though they may prove, if employed, not any less effective than our massive reforms of the science, math, social studies, English and other curricula, our investment in computerized machines and programmed textbooks, accountability policies, reorganization of school districts, teacher corps and teacher-centers, or even new laws for behavioristically-oriented teacher education programs.

What this author is increasingly wondering about is a re-thinking of our curricula not so much along lines indicated by "the structure of knowledge" as by "the structure of values." Structure, yes, but also the texture of values--that is, values as experienced. The re-thinking that is proposed attempts to broaden curriculum design to include re-feeling, with the agents being the pupils not less than the teachers and the teachers of teachers.

Now, in one way of treating values, there is nothing the least bit novel about his proposal--that is, of equating values with purpose; and for many contexts that equation works well enough. However, there is a strong tendency for teachers and pupils alike to treat purposes as vocational objectives and jobs as means to status and comfort, and almost suddenly the concept value has been deflated like cotton candy, leaving a small sticky-sweet taste in the mouth. And besides, there is something about "purposes" which smacks so much of delayed gratification and the relatively distant future as to obscure near-at-hand realizations and the joys of remembrance of things past. The Shakespearian-Proustian phrase will strike the earnest historian as a very odd way of expressing the value resident in his discipline, but there is a lesson to be learned in the fact that it seems odd. Anyway, there are present and past dimensions of an adequate value orientation, even though the development of our capacities for valuing has an inevitable futuristic quality about it.

One of the great advantages of thinking in terms of value-development, rather than of moral-development lies, of course, in the greater scope and variety which value has. Occasionally someone treats moral--or more usually ethical--development in a non-confining way, as when it is said that the great ethical question is: What should I do?; but more commonly moralists treat their domain as a synecdoche, letting the species stand for the genus, perhaps because they really believe it does, that it is the only truly important value. Then the message that comes across is a meta-ethical imperative: What you should do is be moral--or yet more commonly, think morally. In the latter formulation we get an immense reduction--which is not always recognized as that. Values get swallowed up in moral values, and moral values get swallowed up in thinking in clear and principled ways. Here, if ever, is the little fish swallowing the larger, and a still smaller fish finishing off both of them.

Doubtless there are equal reductions in taking any species of value as the paradigm case, but it is at least novel to enter the mansion by an unaccustomed entrance, so let us move for once around to the left and try rattling the doorknob on the side. One advantage of approaching value through aesthetics is the currency therein of the two terms creation and appreciation. Let us at once try out an overarching educational objective: to become in higher degree both a creator and appreciator of values. Such, it is suggested, would be a "becoming aim" for all students and for all teachers as well, both for themselves and in behalf of their students.

The concept "appreciation" has got closely associated with aesthetic objects not because they alone are amenable to an appreciative attitude and an appreciative attainment, but only because their value is so obviously, often even dramatically a case of appreciation. Though to be sure you might not know it from the character of the teaching of some Gadgrinds, a poem or song or dance that does not both invite and reward an appreciative approach is virtually worthless. Hence, we have such familiar course titles as Art Appreciation and Music Appreciation--and if they are not always given the respect that so-called solid subjects command, it is more because the teaching of appreciation calls for very sensitive and subtle skills. (This, it should be noted, is not at all to say that appreciation cannot be taught or learned, which would be absurdly contrary to experience we have all had.)

Now what are we to understand by the word "appreciation?" Well, it has to do with enjoyment but also with grasp, understanding, intelligibility. It is meaningful to say, "I enjoyed the music, but I didn't appreciate it," which would signify that the experience did not rise above a naively sensuous level, which of course on a given instance may be all any of us ask of it, and which, alas, is all that a great many people ever ask. This author might rather enjoy hearing a poem read in Sanskrit or watching a Balinese dancer, but if I am totally missing the symbolic qualities of the works, the author can hardly be said to be appreciating them. But we scarcely need add--or do we?--that the maligned musicologist who knew all about music but didn't like the sound of it is no nearer to appreciation.

If, as was indicated and as everyone knows, a great deal of our teaching of aesthetic subjects is aimed at learning about art, or even about the historical period of its production or biographical facts of its creator, it is partly because of the supposition that what mainly tends to block aesthetic response is ignorance--even ignorance of facts. No doubt there is something to this: it does seem to be often the case that historical and other background information does assist us in getting closer to art objects. This author remembers hearing once a very learned lecture about a painting that showed some stevedores unloading a sailing vessel.

The lecture was entirely about the ship's cargo as a reflection of the commerce of the period and place, and this author found it helped a bit to get inside the picture, now that he knew what it was they were lifting and hauling and where it came from and how much it was worth. But this author thinks it takes no argument to convince you that such teaching still remains pretty aloof, though it does have the merit of referring directly to the content of the representation, as against staying even more aloof as in the sort of lecture that dwells entirely upon concomitant events, changes in government, wars and rumors of wars, that have no obvious connection with the work in question. The fascination with so-called "background," and the fighting shy of foreground and indeed stage center, has to do primarily, this author thinks, with the security and ease of the former kind of information, and particularly with its testability. Pedagogy, no less than typical educational research, likes to play safe.

Yet, this author has said that appreciation entails a degree of understanding, from which it can be seen that he is not advocating a know-nothing view of art. Students do need help in understanding how an art object symbolizes, how the choices resulting in its particular texture make a difference, the ways it has been structured--and what other possibilities were, etc. Anyone who has ever tried to teach a poem knows that an instant not-liking-it on the part of pupils may have something to do with not understanding several of the key words, to say nothing of more evasive matters like metaphors.

Yet, that sort of teaching still stops short, in many instances, of adequately enhancing appreciation. There are modes of presentation that may help, such as making visible the teacher's own attitude toward the work, or establishing a classroom atmosphere which is permissible, legitimate, and desirable for expressing feelings.

Naturally, after all that and more, there is no guarantee of awakening appreciation. This, of course, is true of the teaching of "plain facts" and the laws of thought, too, where no guarantees are evident. Admittedly, teaching appreciation is difficult for the excellent reason that it involves a larger portion of both teacher and pupil than the sort of learning that has preempted the adjective "cognitive." But like the celebrated learning to learn, learning to appreciate has unlimited value.

"But," said Whitehead, "every subject at some phase of its development should possess what is, for the individual concerned with it, an aesthetic quality."[1] One thinks immediately of his celebrated stage or romance, the precision period of enchantment about oceans and islands, stars and constellations, giraffes and pandas, King Arthur and Robin Hood. Yet that is not all that Whitehead had in mind in speaking of aesthetic qualities present in every subject. We recall, too, his speaking of the trinity: the structure of ideas, the power of ideas, and the beauty of ideas.[2] But also of what he says about *style*, which he describes as signifying about any activity whatsoever the aesthetical qualities of attainment and restraint.[3] There is muddling through and getting the job done anyhow, and there is style, which is to say economy and elegance in performance. Oh, to be sure, there is possible here, as in all things, superabundance. William James spoke of the "rottenness of perfection," in exasperation over Santayana's hyperurbane writing. But that is an exotic problem.

Once again there is *appreciation* of style, even for those of us who stop short of being stylists in performance. Anyone can *ooh* and *ahh* at the acrobatics of a high diver, but it is informative and more importantly productive of better perception, to hear the expert commentator describe where precisely the diver went right or went wrong. In mathematics, elegance of proof is of course much esteemed. But the archaeologist has (or lacks) style, just as much; and the microbiologist and survey researcher. To be sure, one has, typically, to be some distance into a subject before stylistic niceties swim into one's ken, but their recognition and appreciation is certainly a part of what it is to learn to appreciate the subject.

A poem or sonata or comedy that does not afford pleasure--if we do not put too fine a point of the word--is, insofar, a failure. In non-art subjects we are likely to forgive, in some measure, a want of drama, suspense, harmony of construction, and many other aesthetic qualities, if only the work is insightful, stands up under verification, helps us toward some goal we cherish. But unless the subject, generally and for the most part, strikes our fancy, arouses and sustains our interest, lets us now and again be surprised by joy, it is, except incidentally for us a failure, a non-starter--and this is so whether it be a natural science, a social science, one of the humanities, physical education, home economics or something else.

It is time to quit pretending that appreciation is necessarily directed at the aesthetic features of a study, unless we insist on broadening the term "aesthetic" absurdly. No, the plain, but often neglected, truth is that any subject matter admits of the satisfaction-rooted-in-understanding that "appreciation" connotes and for many features thereof that have little or nothing to do with aesthetic qualities. This author must go further: until some degree of appreciation is cultivated, with or without the help of a teacher, any subject remains alien territory.

This may seem to small a squeak from too minute a mouse to justify our labors--until, perhaps, one asks about its consequences for pedagogy. We have generally made out our claim for this or that subject as requirable or at least highly recommendable for a place in the curriculum largely on the ground that it is necessary to know this and that, have this and that skill, in order to function as a citizen, hold up one's head in learned company, make one's way in the world, or the like. But suppose now one said, rather, "This subject merits its place by virtue of its proved capacity to afford the values of appreciation."

Suppose in turn one asked the teacher thereof not so much to guarantee mastery of a body of knowledge therein, as to work earnestly to cultivate an appreciation thereof.

Similarly, good teaching might be in significant part considered to have to do with infecting students with a sense of the value of a subject, partly through the model afforded of one who does appreciate history or economics or botany, partly through the arrangement for experiencing informed satisfaction in the presence of the subject.

One need hardly mention that this is a far cry from B & B reinforcement: it is more like combatting--to cite the famous Guinness ad.--the "I don't like it so I've never tried it" mentality with "Here, try this and I think you'll like it as much as I do, especially if you notice Y and Z."

Let's try another analogy. There is a considerable difference among the following ways of experiencing a baseball game: playing it, watching it, reading a close and vivid account of it, looking at the box scores. No one could ever become a baseball fan through reading box scores, yet one wonders if that is not what many of our courses, at all levels of schooling, settle for: just the results, the outcomes, with very little feeling for the game itself. At the other extreme, there are by definition only a few major league players, but the bush leagues and sandlots are commodious enough to accomodate everybody who wants to play. Typically, the actual playing may be for a few years only, yet that experience, giving as it does a strong sense for what makes a good play, a good player, often yields a love for the game that lasts a lifetime, so that directly or indirectly there can be the informed enjoyment that we call appreciation.

It is time to distinguish--what has until new been only implicit--between the experienced value of the study of a subject and that of something that lies beyond the intellectual enterprise. Obviously there is a difference between the pleasure of thinking about art and of looking at pictures, or criticizing dramatic construction and sitting in the theater and watching the play, of being a moral philosopher and of being a moral person. Just as obviously the two sorts of values often overlap, as when one at least intermittently thinks about the music one is very attentively and aesthetically listening to; but there are surely many cases too of their fairly sharp separation. The contention is noted in that regard and it is often advisable for the teacher to assist the pupil in the attainment of both or present some concrete reasons why they tend to enhance each other.

The motivating justification for the study of history is that is helps us enjoy history, but it's no good asking the pupil to take it on faith either that study helps enjoyment or that there is in fact such enjoyment to be had; much less that the study itself can be enjoyable.

Another way of saying this puts more emphasis upon seeing or failing to see something that is testified to be there, but less palpable than what first meets the eye. Abraham Maslow was making this point in saying:

> If I love Beethoven and I hear something in a quartet that you don't, how do I teach you to hear? The noises are there obviously, but I hear something very, very beautiful, and you look blank. You hear the sounds. How do I get you to hear the beauty? That is more our problem in teaching than making you learn the ABC's or demonstrating arithmetic on the board or pointing to a dissection of a frog.[4]

It is thought that he would have agreed that it is not just beauty, the aesthetic value par excellence, that can so easily be overlooked, but any kind of value that is inherent in either a study or what the study is about.

Now, though we can do far better in affording experience of value directly to our students, we sometimes must settle for indirection. There is doubt if Boards of Education are ready for field trips for the classes in sex education, but there and a few other places the teacher can now normally count of vivid memories of extra-curricular experiences. Sometimes we have to make better use of guided imagination. That is, we need to make our teaching more imagistic, and less abstractly verbal.

It was no less a philosopher's philosopher than H.H. Price who said:

> We have the misfortune to live in the most word-ridden civilization in history, where thousands and tens of thousands spend their entire working lives in nothing but the manipulation of words. The whole of our higher education is directed to the encouragement of verbal thinking and the discouragement of image thinking. Let us hope that our successors will be wiser, and will encourage both.[5]

It is not a little interesting that both moral development and value education in our time have been mainly taken up with precision of judgment, clarity of expression, exactness of statement, but paid little attention to the affording of instances of realizable value, either directly in experience or at least through a rich vicarious experience, as with the employment of images.

Naturally, some know that there are severe limits to the fun-and-games approach to learning algebra, plant physiology, ancient history, and the French irregular verbs. At some point the student has to face up to the fact that in any study there are some long dry stretches. Indeed, a tolerance for inescapable boredom may well be one of the prime intellectual virtues that we need to teach. Yet, unless the student gets some glimpses of the delights attendent upon the discovery of the odd fact that fills out the jig-saw puzzle, of the alternative, plausible interpretation, of a logical error in somebody's argument--in short, tastes success in solving a problem, or gaining an insight, and thus experiences that surge of new confidence in his own ability to start down a path that was formerly full of terrors--then the gain will be minimal, even if by dint of memory and persistence an A grade has been achieved. Even good thinking has to come to be appreciated. It was John Dewey who said: "A pupil who has worked through some confused intellectual situation and fought his way to clearing up the obscurities in a definite outcome, appreciates the value of clarity and definition."[6]

That illustration has the advantage of extending our discussion beyond learning to appreciate what is, so to speak, already there, to learning to create--and then appreciate--a value that has been lacking in a given context. Music teachers often exaggerate the frequency with which playing the trumpet leads directly to deep appreciation of Mahler, but it may help, and composing a little song may help more. Philosophers as teachers perhaps over-do the analysis of established philosophers' arguments at least in neglecting invitations to invent an idea or argument of one's own.

Finally we return then to the need to rethink our curriculum and pedagogy in terms of prizing and appraising: of searching for something that can be prized, even by the uninitiated, and of ways of showing how learning to appraise deepened that prizing and becomes more enjoyable. School itself must come to be more appreciated than depreciated as it yields access to a curriculum-wide variety of richly-textured values. Accepting that as a primary aim of the educative process ought to point us in a happier direction.

Documentations.

1. A.N. Whitehead, SCIENCE AND THE MODERN WORLD, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1925), p. 292.
2. A.N. Whitehead, THE AIMS OF EDUCATION (London: Williams & Norgate Ltd., 1932), p. 18.
3. Ibid., p. 19.
4. A.H. Maslow, THE FARTHER REACHES OF HUMAN NATURE (New York: The Viking Press, 1971), p. 48.
5. H.H. Price THINKING AND EXPERIENCE (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1962), p. 252.
6. John Dewey, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1916), p. 275.

CHAPTER 6.

GOAL SETTING: A VALUES CLARIFYING PROCESS

GERALD E. MCDONALD

Position in this Paper.

There is a widespread assumption held in America that educational goals exist somehow in human minds in much the same way as silver exists in a silver mine. Consequently, with the assistance of opinion polls and similar data gathering devices the mind is penetrated and the precious goals are brought to the surface where they are subjected to statistical analysis, classification and priority ranking.[1] To the contrary, what the goals of the schools ought to be is not clear to the people. When successfully undertaken, goal setting is a clarifying process in which the people learn what their goals should be. They learn their goals in proportion as they bring their own values to bear upon possible goal choices and insofar as they subject their values to critical examination.

There is another assumption traceable to the Jacksonian period of history and held by many Americans today that the average man, the man in the street, has the common sense necessary to make decisions affecting the institutions of his society. Thus it is believed that when men are allowed to gather for common purposes and given the freedom to speak, what they say will be right or valid. This assumption can be extended to the goal-setting process. When the people are allowed to organize and have a voice, the goals which they identify will be the "right" ones.

The weakness in this line of thought is that it eliminates the need for a precise structure or a way of thinking critically about educational goals which must be learned. Goal-setting sessions often reveal how difficult it is to formulate goal statements and those of us who have tried to do so know the temptation to adopt the formulations of the more articulate (and I might add vocal) members present--especially when the sessions grow long and wearisome. In other words, people who have not learned to think systematically about the setting of goals tend to look at the goal statements of others and to arrive at merely verbal agreements.

Misconceptions about the Source of Goals.

One of the many responsibilities of a school superintendent is to make available to school personnel a written statement of a district's position in education. For this task a committee may be appointed to hammer out the details of a philosophy and a set of goals before submitting them to a school board. With the endorsement of a board, the official position of a district is determined and the written statement subsequently is sent out to teachers and administrators in order to inform them and elicit their support.

At least two misconceptions are prompted by this practice. The first is to conceive of goals as residing in the written statement of an individual or a group so that the problem of determining what a school district's goals are can be resolved by locating and reading the written statement. However, educational goals do not exist in anything written whereas they should exist in the minds of teachers and administrators. In order for a goal to be such it must be understood or perceived even though it may be perceived dimly and its value may be taken for granted. Teachers and administrators may read the written statements of others, but they will not understand or learn the directions in which a school district ought to move until they begin to perceive goals in light of their own system of values.

The second misconception is to view educational goals as belonging to another, that is, to the superintendent, the school board or simply the school district. As a consequence, the people feel no responsibility for taking any "official" position while the conscientious teacher sees his role as that of a technician hired to accomplish what someone else has told him is important. This situation will persist until everyone concerned is involved in the goal-setting process, and only then will someone else's goal be seen as the very one that the individual shares in common with others.

How are Goals Determined?

There are doubtless a number of ways of affirming a set of goals and supporting them with beliefs or personal values, but the systematic process developed by John Dewey and popularized by Sidney B. Simon, Leland W. Howe, Howard Kirschenbaum and others is suggested in what follows:[2]

1. Choose a goal.

Let us assume that a local superintendent of schools has appointed a committee to set school goals and has asked them to begin by examining the existing goal statements of the district. Upon examination they realize that the statements are couched in general terms and written so as to elicit widespread agreement. For example, who could find fault with the school's attempt to develop "good" citizens, to provide a "healthy" self concept or to help young people learn to respect and "get along" with others who live and dress differently. Nevertheless the committee realizing that they must begin at some point adopt the following:

> Equip a growing person to know enough about himself and the world to be able to make wise decisions during schooling and long after his formal education has ended.

2. Define alternative ways of achieving the goal.

Some members complain that the goal as formulated seems to make sense and could be endorsed by almost anyone but without some indication of how it is to be achieved, without some suggestion of basic strategy, the statement tells them little about the direction in which the school district should go. Should decision-making be postponed until high school or junior college when presumedly students have the knowledge and the maturity to make wise decisions? Or should students be involved in making decisions from the first grade onward? Is decision-making primarily a matter of having the knowledge and the maturity for making significant valid choices or is it mainly a process involving the uses of critical thinking skills? Should the school stress teaching a process of decision-making or should it concentrate as it has in the past on teaching the "basics" in light of which students should be able to make choices at a later time?

Here are two fundamentally different approaches to decision-making and the function of subject matter and may be presented to the committee as forced choices. For example, the school should:

a) stress the development of decision-making skills from the earliest grades, including the uses of information and knowledge as these relate to students' personal and social concerns.

b) stress the acquisition of knowledge and other content skills so that students will know enough about themselves and the world to be able to make wise decisions in their later years.

If the school implements the first approach, subject matter will be made subordinate to the real life decisions of students and the decisions will be understood as meeting genuine concerns and effecting significant changes in student behavior. "What historical materials can provide the insight and the information that will enable me to respect and get along more effectively with the black students in my classes?" If the school implements the second approach, student concerns will be subordinated to an understanding of the subject matter while decision-making will be designed to increase that understanding. "In view of the developments in the United States and Asia since the second world's war should China be admitted to the United Nations?"

Of course the issue concerning which priorities the school should stress will spark controversy and accentuate differences among committee members, but unless they confront themselves with divergent choices any agreement that they might reach would only be apparent and not real.[3] Certainly they cannot agree in any meaningful way about what their school should do until they are clear about their practical and conceptual differences. Clearly stated differences in goal strategies might lead to alternative schools or at least to alternative school programs and as a consequence provide greater options for children and parents, the budget permitting.

3. Take a stand.

People are often reluctant to take a stand on a basic issue in education because it signifies (at least to them) that they have previously thought through their position and are ready to defend it, but probably it is more accurate to say that people don't have a defense until they are provoked into taking a stand. To affirm a stand on a course of action could help to close the gap between what people profess to believe about education and what they actually do about it. Let's suppose that the majority of the committee members have decided that the school district should stress the development of decision-making skills from the earliest grades . . . as these relate to students' personal and social concerns.

4. Justify the stand taken.

Because traditional commitments to the schools are based upon a rationale that is not consciously expressed, a rationale whose validity is taken for granted, the school system itself continues substantially unchanged and is unable to respond effectively to conditions that have brought about conflict and confusion concerning the purposes of learning, the organization of the curriculum or the role of the teacher. Yesterday's commitments may have been appropriate for a slow moving and stable society but today's decisions must be based upon a carefully considered rationale. Consequently, the goals committee have justified their decision by offering the following reasons:

> Conception of Man: Man is perfectible and capable of making his own decisions (with training) from his early years. Moreover, one of man's primary drives is to live happily and well in society.
>
> Conception of Society: America is in a state of confusion about its values and, specifically, about the direction in which it ought to be moving. In a democracy no elite group should determine or impose society's values or directions; rather, these must be determined by the people and ultimately by each individual.
>
> Function of the School: One of the primary functions of the school is to prepare its youth for society. When society was slow moving and its institutions stable, when its values were relatively clear and widely shared, the school was primarily responsible for imparting the content values of the cultural heritage. Today, however, society is fast changing so that the school must help youth to define its individual and social purposes and it must lay stress upon a process of critical thinking whereby each student learns to clarify his or her own tastes, beliefs and convictions.

5. Anticipate the consequences.

If a committee chooses to stress the development of decision-making skills but at the same time endorses the traditional role of the teacher, student and administrator, in other words if the committee fails to realize that its choice should make a practical difference in existing programs, the current skills of the teacher, student and administrator and above all the allocation of the budget, it isn't choosing in any significant sense. Goal strategy choices that are not seen to make a practical difference in the conduct of the school are the objects of wishful thinking to be located on the proverbial cloud nine.

6. Execute the plan.

Planning consequences must involve the schools and the community and will include new curricular designs, in-service workshops in decision-making for teachers and administrators, new uses of the library and its staff, evaluative instruments that measure performance in decision-making, changed perceptions of administrator-teacher-student relationships and other innovations that should profoundly change the status quo in the schools. From planning to the execution of clearly conceived plans is a formidable step, fraught with obstacles that can easily be imagined. For example, teachers with a preference for teaching subject matter are asked to attend workshops that stress their role in facilitating the development of decision-making skills in students or administrators who every day make decisions affecting others are being asked to implement a system in which teachers and students share in the decision-making process. In short, the people involved with the schools possess "traditional" ways of thinking and feeling and relating to one another; they are the status quo and it is they who have a built-in momentum for maintaining the educational system as it has come down from the past.[4]

Some Pertinent Reflections.

What is proposed here is simply a method of setting goals in which the individual is confronted with forced choice situations that prompt him to identify the reasons or beliefs for the choice that he feels constrained to make. It is essentially a clarifying process in which the individual is required to identify and assess his beliefs about the nature of man and society, the structure of authority, how people learn and other conceptions that help to explain why a particular goal should be chosen. Choose a goal and proceed to define alternative ways of achieving it. If the ways (goal strategies) of achieving a goal are made sufficiently divergent so that a choice of one logically excludes choosing the other or others, a forced choice situation can be created that could provoke an inquiry into a value or belief.

Goal: to develop good character and self respect.

Goal strategies: a) by helping a student to define moral alternatives and to act upon what he sees to have the most desireable personal-social consequences. ______

b) by helping the student to model his behavior in accordance with the ideals of conduct as defined by parents, school and other character-forming institutions in society. ______

Other strategies could be added but, and this is a crucial point, being constrained to choose among or between these alternatives could prompt the individual to identify his beliefs about the nature of authority and learning.

Those who choose to help a student define and act upon a moral alternative as a way of developing character could infer that all significant learning has a strong influence on behavior and is self-appropriated or discovered and that any attempt to teach moral directives will result in rote or meaningless indoctrination. On the other hand, those who choose to form character by requiring adherence to established canons of right conduct might become aware of a belief that parents have legitimate authority over their children and that, therefore, they have a right to teach conformity to their moral standards (and others in loco parentis) at least until their offspring are old enough to judge for themselves.

If the individual lacks a belief system, goal setting will probably be a meaningless activity since what is unfamiliar begins to make sense to the degree that it can be related to what is already known. It may be risky to assume that those involved in goal setting will have a set of underlying beliefs whereas in fact they may not or whereas in making explicit certain beliefs that long have been taken for granted they may be confronted with ambiguities, contradictions and other difficult to reconcile preferences. If the individual lacks what others might say is a valid belief system, doubtless they will conclude that the goals that he chooses will lack validity, but how is it known that "what he already knows" has any validity? The answer is that each individual must resort to his own epistemology. For one individual a belief may be valid if it simply makes sense; for another it may have to be chosen by him without undue influence from others; for still another a belief may have to make a difference in the quality of his living or it may have to be squared against what he has been taught previously, viz., the social mores, the teachings of parents or the doctrines of a church.

When a school district defines a goal without defining its strategy the resulting statement is ambiguous or vague. To develop in a child a good self concept may sound entirely worthwhile but the meaning of the word, good, is so vague that it fails to tell us what sort of self image is to be developed. However, to develop a good self concept by enabling a child to read, write and figure successfully tells us in no uncertain terms that what is meant is the satisfaction and sense of pride that results from reading, writing, and figuring well--an academic achievement. Some teachers will insist that the self concept to be developed should precede rather than follow academic achievement, that in fact their students do poorly because of an impoverished sense of self, implying not only a different sort of image to be developed but also a different way of achieving it. The point is that when a goal includes a statement of its strategy it becomes clear, so clear that it may become controversial and teachers may take issue with it but that without a statement of strategy a goal may appear to be agreeable and non-controversial simply because it doesn't say anything.

Whereas strategy issues pose a conflict concerning what ought to be done in school with each side being supported by a different value system issues in classroom practices are supported by controversial declarations concerning what happens or will happen when one or the other practice is employed. To say that the use of letter grades (ABCDF) generates intense competition among students and that it produces failure or a sense of failure may be restated as an hypothesis to be tested in field studies;[5] likewise to say that a P/NP designation or a written teacher evaluation will correct the defects of assigning the traditional letter grades may be stated tentatively and tested. However, the use of these controversial grading practices rest upon the same assumption that the teacher should evaluate student performance, a value judgment that is not readily reducible to empirical statements and neither is its contrary, namely, that the teacher should assist the student in responsibly evaluating his own performance. Stated here are two fundamentally different ways of achieving the school's goal of ascertaining the academic progress of its students, each forming a rationale for quite opposite grading practices and each being justified by a different conception of man and of his capacity to make decisions. More difficult to resolve than the methods of grading (which incidently, causes more heated discussion among teachers, parents ant others), nevertheless, determining the strategy to be followed in evaluation deserves more attention since it is more basic to the conduct of education. And so it is with other strategy issues!

The present system of education is based upon the assumption that those in authority should make the important decisions affecting learning and to assume otherwise is to raise the possibility of creating a new system. It is understandable that school districts are reluctant to confront themselves with a choice so radical that it could lead to the elimination of the present system, but to gloss over differences and to take a stand that is vague or ambiguous albeit agreeable to others is reprehensible. To attempt a compromise or to seek a golden mean when confronted with radically different alternatives to the conduct of learning is also confusing. For example, there are times when a few teachers will say that they not only evaluate student perfromance but that they also encourage their students to evaluate their own performance, concluding that it is not necessary to take a stand on one side or the other. The issue is made to seem unreal while being asked to take a stand is made to seem illogical or phoney. When pressed on the issue some of these teachers will say that they make the "final" decisions on grading especially when teacher and student reach an impasse over a grade to be assigned that, in effect, they make the "really" important decisions in the classroom insisting, however, that they do not play the role of the harsh judge. Still a few will refuse to take a stand and no amount of prodding can convince them that they are not thinking clearly or that they need "to stand up and be counted" on important differences concerning the source of decision-making.

It is being said that beliefs or values can be clarified when the individual is prompted to identify reasons for particular goal choices that he feels constrained to make and that goals are seen to make sense when they can be related to an individual's belief system. But isn't this process as described academic? In the goal setting example mention is made of anticipating the consequences of taking a stand, but isn't there a need to act upon this anticipation? The answer of course is yes! Goal setting activity that fails to effect changes in the conduct of the schools may be academic in its worst sense, another instance showing that what is affirmed and what is practiced in education are unrelated, but one need not be convinced that the meaning and the validity of goal setting is derived from the practical consequences that follow from implementing it.

A clear understanding of goals is a necessary prior condition to action and it is the author's contention that clarification can be achieved through a process that doesn't necessarily flow over into action. Teachers find it difficult to define in clear and precise terms basic strategies at issue in education, but once they are able to do so they discover that it is an excellent way to clarify where they stand on such matters as grading, social promotion, student decision-making and mainstreaming. As a result of this understanding their classroom behavior may not change in part because the educational establishment militates against it and the need to survive in the system is strong, but when teachers affirm clearly where they stand, when as a result they begin to believe firmly that they should make changes in their teaching the process involved will be closely related to change. Granted that goals may be transformed into written statements to be ratified by a school board and forwarded to the school where they are politely ignored and teaching goes on as usual, what this condition tells us is that the system itself must be changed to facilitate a type of goal setting that is characterized by a systematic process (as described above) of critical thinking.

DOCUMENTATIONS

1. The delphi technique used to forecast events in American industry and government has also been used to obtain opinions concerning school goals. Similarly, values clarification exercises employing paper and pencil "tests" are based upon the same assumption. Cf. Allport, G.W., P.E. Vernon, and G. Lindzey, Study of Values. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1960; Jacob Philip, Changing Values in College. Harper and Row, 1971.

2. Cf. especially: Dewey, John, How We Think. New York: D.C. and Company, 1933, chapter 7.; Simon, Sidney B., Leland W. Howe, and Howard Kirschenbaum, Values Clarification: A Handbook of Practical Strategies for Teachers and Students. New York: Hart Publishing, 1972.

3. To expect unanimous agreement concerning goals is unrealistic. It's conceivable that one school within a district might emphasize a traditional academic program while another might stress "real-life" problem solving and decision-making. As nearly as possible goals should reflect cultural differences in the community.

4. For an informative account of the status quo conditions in the schools see Sarason, Seymour B., The Culture of the School and the Problem of Change. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1971.

5. William Glasser argues that current grading practice encourages failure but what constitutes current practice? One can assume that the stress on grading varies from school to school and from teacher to teacher. Under what conditions does grading and failure take place? See Glasser, William, Schools Without Failure. New York: Harper and Row, 1969, chapter 6.

CHAPTER 7.

EVALUATING AESTHETIC VALUES AND ARTS EDUCATION

P. ISRAEL SCHELLIN

Education in the arts is basically different from education in other fields because art "presents forms - sometimes intangible forms - to imagination....probably the oldest mental trait which is typically human...; (imagination) is probably the common source of dream, reason, religion and all true observation. It is this primitive human power - imagination - that engenders the arts and is in turn directly affected by their products (Langer; 1958)."

Since the "primary function of art is to objectify feeling so we can contemplate and understand it (ibid., 1958)," art education ought to be the study of meanings (Broudy; 1972, Bruner: 1970). Confusion exists because meanings associated with any objects, especially aesthetic ones, are internalized (Barnett; 1953, Maslow; 1971). Yet, they are not subjective because we share them with other people; otherwise communication of and through them would be impossible.

The bulk of learning art is affective because we internalize the values and sensitivities imbedded in the art objects being studied. It may be true that successful students of athletics, mathematics and history, for example, identify with the values and roles of athlete, mathematician and historian, but sports, mathematics and history are disciplines in which information and technical skill, mostly through rote learning, are of paramount importance. Philosophy is important to all serious study, eventually, but in most academic, cognitive learning, values are less than secondary considerations.

With arts education, this is not true. What is difficult in arts education is not the transference of technical and skill-oriented learning. The difficulty in arts education is the dominancy of affective learning involving the values of the artist-apprentice, evaluated in comparison with the artist-professional. Since art objects are the products of expressive behavior (Barnett; 1953), ego involvement in their making is not a matter of choice, but rather, it is part of the process. Art therapy, for example, is based on this premise (Keyes; 1974). So when the student meets the art teacher in a learning environment, frequently the major shift in the successful student's behavior is the internalization of the teacher's aesthetic values in the student's search for meaning in the arts.

Art teachers generally do not consider their aesthetic values objectively. Their sense of taste, their capacity to evaluate aesthetic worth, their compositional sensitivities and their design sense are more often taken as 'given' on a level beyond evaluation. In vastly technical and segmented cultures such as ours, education in fine arts becomes necessary because of the disparity in values between those who are educated in the arts and those who are not, (Broudy; 1978), but what makes the situation even more complex is the reality that the arts are frequently taught and evaluated by people whose education in them is extremely varied.

Most solutions to academic problems are either right or wrong, even if they are relative to other problems or other situations, and even if the solutions are considered only as tools for dealing with life on this or other planets. Problems in the arts have aesthetic solutions which are not right or wrong; in the academic sense they are either better or worse, they either "communicate" or they do not. Artists talk about something "working" or not, evaluated on aesthetic criteria which education in the arts is meant to explore, explain and evaluate.

The degrees of sophistication about aesthetic criteria among educators and students are diverse because like other things, they simply reflect the diversity of the culture as a whole. The variety of imagery available to people in a modern, urban mega-technocracy is overwhelming and confusing primarily because the images come from different and sometimes conflicting sources and they are not organically interrelated (Broudy; 1972; Lanier; 1978). Coming from a variety of cultures, they are produced for diverse reasons. Generally, we have the images without knowing where they come from or why, and because we need to interpret meaning in terms of previous experience (Maslow; 1971), people misunderstand the things which result from the processes artists use. (Hall; 1976).

By comparison, a Christian in Medieval Europe literally lived with the imagery of his Catholicism. The images were organically related to the feudal agrarian economy which surrounded him; he knew his role in society; he understood his place in the universe and all the imagery in his life supported and sustained his beliefs. He was never confronted with the necessity to integrate Christian iconography from his own culture with the sound track of Star Wars, Buddhist chants, Matisse's paintings, Mickey Mouse, John Cage, Colonel Sanders, Hare Krishna, suspension bridges, Andy Warhol, Fleetwood Mac, taco stands, sweet and sour chicken, Beethoven, freeways and so forth. We moderns are really blessed with and victimized by a massive and continuous assault with intent to create havoc.

While the intention may be subconscious, it is nevertheless to the advantage of American capitalism to confuse people and to keep them confused by giving them the impression that clarity can be purchased at a supermarket or a shopping center (Bell; 1972).

The conflict in our culture may stem from our inability to decide whether to express our Puritanical idealism or to indulge in our pursuit of hedonistic happiness for its own sake (Santayana; 1920, 1967). The cultural conflicts within American capitalism go all the way back to colonial and early American Cultures which produced, as expressions of their states of mind, such diverse things as Shaker furniture, upholstered drawing-room settees, log cabins, Monticello, Mt. Vernon, slavery, the Bill of Rights, the orderly streets of Georgian Houses, the sod huts half-buried in the Kansas Territory and so on.

We want to think that modern American life is so very different, but we are still grasped up tightly in this same conflict. Part of this society is stretched out in the sun, basking nude, reading books on holistic health or being par-boiled in hot tubs while another has found IT (whatever that is) hiding in the answered prayers of Christian Zealots. Both groups might agree that the pursuit of happiness (Bruner; 1970) is basic to their motivation, but the evangelicals are really modern Mathers whose happiness rests in a Calvinistic vision of salvation from the world of choice (Bruner; 1970). The hedonists have answers too, and equally reflect, with the religious, the same American preoccupation with happiness. Their methods differ.

What we all do, as Americans, is segment our lives and categorize other peoples' behaviors as well as our own; we are slaves to our time pieces and we expect life and everything else to move in neat, linear ways (Hall; 1976). Most of all we expect life to be happy (Bruner; 1970), and that expectation gives us away, making our religions, be they capitalist, hedonist or evangelical, ripe for harvest.

Our images reflect our segmentation; our segmentation successfully relieves us of the necessity to comprehend the relationships between our intellectualizations and our feelings (Bruner; 1970), and the separation of our feelings from our images affects both the arts and our sense of education in the arts.

When school authorities are faced with budget cuts, one of the first pieces of the curriculum to be thrown out is art because it is still considered a frill. Superintendents rarely comprehend the relationships within a culture between imagery, meaning, art objects, the people who make them and the people who look at them. Because the arts are taught so poorly in most places, why should they be expected to comprehend? What is so odd is that on another floor of the same municipal building, one may find city officials legislating against pornography with the defense that the images are not just bad taste; they are morally dangerous (Key; 1976)! What is odd is that everybody, including Larry Flint, seems to understand the importance of imagery if pornography is the subject, but most people don't know enough about art to voice any opinion when education in the arts is being denied to their children on the basis that it isn't as important as, say, something "practical" like math. People do know, however, what they like, and Larry Flint has certainly paid dearly for that.

Most of the civilized world has now at least heard of California's Proposition 13. Voters thought they would save some money, so they endorsed it without much thought and with the vague presupposition that they would get back at those damned public employees with all their job security and job benefits by pulling the financial rug out from under public institutions. There is little doubt that taxes in California had been and remain absurdly high. There is also little doubt about the anger of the average property owner. No one can argue that this has been a deliberate attack on public education, but rather, public education has been the fall-guy. Even when this was made common knowledge, most people didn't care because they had been fed up with public education for a long time. Parents seemed to blame the teachers for their children's obnoxious behavior, their lack of learning skills, the drug scene, the street scene inspired by violence from screen and television, and all the other ills of the society. Those who believe that schools, like art and everything else, reflect societal conditions, have been in the minority. Teachers have been and will continue to be blamed for everything the parents feel insecure about, and to a certain extent, vica versa. There is little to be gained from perpetuating this argument.

The confusion which has existed in this society for so long grew along with and became servant to the growth of capitalism (Bell; 1972, Barnett; 1953, Santayana; 1920, 1967). Proposition 13 is an extension of this, for is it not true that a penny saved is a penny earned, especially at the expense of the enemies of capitalism such as renters, welfare recipients and public employees? Confusion has not existed just among landlords and capitalists, for we all reflect the conflicts within a culture. Our problem has been and remains that we think our job security and the job security of our students rests in public education. Art Educators are particularly vulnerable to these beliefs because artists do not make good salaries in this country; teaching is the most common supportive profession of most artists. While segments of the society at large find it simplistic to evaluate art and art in education without the resources to do it adequately, we need to evaluate ourselves and our own values, clearly and calmly.

The hostile environment in which we have operated for over a hundred years may be disintegrating around us. In the long run, this may be good because we may be forced into dialogue with industry which may, in turn, produce growth on both sides. Since there may be fewer jobs for our graduates in public education, we ought to stop preparing them for unemployment lines. We ought to ask business interests directly to what uses they might put people trained to make judgments based on highly developed aesthetic sensibilities. How should we retool our machinery to fit their needs so that we begin to train employable graduates. Because we became public employees partly by letting Puritan values operate in our psyches, we have considered the capitalist as the enemy (Santayana; 1920, 1967). As long as we need the belief in the pursuit of happiness, we need to rethink our definitions of these roles in order to adapt to the change in the economic climate.

There is danger in retooling our educational institutions for the needs of industry. We could become the instruments through which corporate interests could dominate American Society. But this is possible only if we act passively and allow ourselves to be defined and determined by industrial cohersion. It can be a mutually beneficial situation if we assertively demonstrate knowledge of who we are, what we believe, where we are going and why, through the evaluations of our own position vis-a-vis our survival as the twenty-first century approaches. The marriage between the arts and academe is obviously on the verge of at least partial collapse; there is no reason to believe that alternative relationships within the social order cannot be arranged. We can trust that art and aesthetic values will continue with considerable vitality since they always have survived before.

The "presentation of form to imagination" is a fine intellectual definition of art which, if it is true, ought to be domonstratable in working terms. We failed miserably with school boards, parents and school superintendents to assert that the "primary function of art is to objectivy feeling so we can contemplate and understand it (Langer; 1958)." Perhaps, we were naively passive, disorganized and undereducated. We may have put up with so little for so long that, like rabbits in competition with turtles, we never dreamed that determination could undo our complacency. With the knowledge of how this culture functions and why, we ought to be able to win a few races ourselves, and in the process of winning, if we must teach, why couldn't we teach the way so many parents, teachers, actors, builders, thinkers and leaders of all kinds have done before, through example? There may not be better lessons for the education of others than countless successes on our part.

A scenario of what may lie ahead for the arts in education includes the probability that public schools will contain populations of poor people who could not afford the flight into private schools. There will be no money to spend on supplies, equipment or salaries. Faculties will be made up of people who fill ethnic quotas rather than the best qualified and most motivated of our college graduates. But, those teachers who are placed in public education will be paid considerably better than the ones who will of necessity gravitate into the private schools which will begin to proliferate.

Some of the private schools will no doubt be very good places which will enhance and continue the work that has been accomplished in aesthetic education in the past few decades. There may be a trend, however, to make the private schools more conservative, or, as they say in Pasadena, "fundamental," which is a euphemism for "emphasizing reading, writing and arithmetic." Protestant values, may as they have before, determine the future of arts education in the private sector.

Too dark a picture of the future is very likely an overreaction to the immediate situation which is looming like a shadow, either late in the day we have been living or early in the day which is dawning. In either case, the shadow is considerably larger than the creature which casts it. The history of Americans is a history of a people filled with the idea that they exemplify mankind at its best (Broudy; 1977, Santayana; 1920, 1967). More likely than not, we are living in a period during which we are experiencing the extremes of the conflicts this culture has always manifest. In effect, very little has actually happened or eventually will.

The question we must answer is really the same question with which we have always been confronted; what kind of people are we? What kind of world are we making? Harry Broudy has written that a humane society is one in which there is a balance of idealization, justice and compassion. Because the free enterprise system has no "inherent limits on the desire for wealth, power and advantage, it tends to become amoral...while justice is usually regarded as a moral category, either as one of the virtues, or, as Plato would have it, the harmony among the virtues of wisdom, courage and temperance (Broudy; 1977)." Compassion is important for dealing with the realities of a world which conforms to the ideals men strive for and for the victims of imperfect justice.

> Much of the existential literature, theistic or aesthetic, makes compassion the essence of the human condition. From Kierkegaard through Sartre and Camus it dwells on the finitude of man and the lack of a rational ground for commitment to justice or God. He is thrown back on himself. In Sartre's terms, he becomes his own project. Groundless commitment and equally groundless leaps to faith give the human condition a heroic dimension - if properly staged. In the classic tragedy, the actor has fallen from great heights through a flaw not of his own making. From such dramas, if Aristotle is right, we emerge purified. Are we equally edified by simple men and women who in their everyday life stand on the brink of losing their selfhood and self-respect (Broudy; 1977)?

There is no way to answer these questions without knowledge of values as we wander through the maze of self-actualization (Broudy; 1972, Maslow; 1971), both of ourselves and of the society as a whole. In or out of traditional educational situations, the arts will continue to be preoccupied with the expression of values through the presentation of forms to imagination. While we continue to evolve, there will continue to be subject matter related to every mode of valuing. While we imagine, we continue to create and what is creating if it is not evaluating ourselves as human?

Documentations.

1. Homer G. Barnett, Innovation, the Basis of Cultural Change, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1953.

2. Daniel Bell, "The Cultural Contracidtions of Capitalism," The Journal of Aesthetic Education, Vol. 6, Nos. 1-2, 1972.

3. Harry S. Broudy, Enlightened Cherishing, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, Illinois, 1972.

4. Harry S. Broudy, "Criteria for a Humane Society," Educational Studies, vol. 8, No. 1, 1977.

5. Harry S. Broudy, "The Arts as Basic Education," lecture at the California State University, Los Angeles, unpublished, 1978.

6. Jerome Bruner, On Knowing, Atheneum, New York, 1970.

7. Edward T. Hall, Beyond Culture, Anchor Press, Doubleday, Garden City, New York, 1976.

8. Wilson Bryan Key, Media Sexploitation, Signet, New York, 1976.

9. Margaret Frings Keyes, The Inward Journey, Celestial Arts, Millbrae, California, 1974.

10. Susanne Langer, Aesthetic Form and Education, Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, New York, 1958.

11. Vincent Lanier, "Assessing the 'S' in Arts Education," The Journal of Aesthetic Education, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1978.

12. Abraham Maslow, The Farther Reaches of Human Nature, Viking Press, New York, 1971.

13. George Santayana, Character and Opinion in the United States, Norton Library, New York, 1920, (reprinted with permission by Norton, 1967).

CHAPTER 8.

SØREN KIEKEGAARD'S ETHICAL SPHERE AND MORAL EDUCATION

JANE FUNK IRVINE

I The Problem

"The ethical is and remains the highest task for every human being." (Concluding Unscientific Postscript)

Making moral decisions and acting out his or her life ethically is one of the most important endeavors in the life of an individual. Yet acting morally is not something that comes to people automatically. Part of this is because we are not always in agreement as to what is the moral thing to do. This situation is sometimes referred to as a "moral crisis" or a "crisis of values" in contemporary American society. There are many reasons for this state of affairs,[1] but the important thing is that enough people are seriously concerned about the current uncertainty to see moral education as one of the most important tasks of the schools today.[2]

Moral education is a much-used but loosely defined term. It is used to refer to both direct and indirect interventions of the school that affect students' capacities to think about issues of right and wrong, and to behave morally. The aim of moral education (ideally) is not simply to inculcate traditional values but to teach students to think through moral problems more carefully, to consider the meaning and significance of traditional values (such as they are), and to establish values and guidelines (possibly even principles) for themselves. Thus, the goal is not only the ability to think about values, but to act on them as well.

Many approaches to moral education have been put forward,[3] but none seems adequate. What undermines most of the usual programs is a tendency to treat problem areas of human behavior in isolation from the whole scope of human existence. There is a general tendency toward compartmentalized decision-making about "values" and "moral topics" (such as sex, politics) without reference to the complex dimension of the ontological status of the decision-maker.[4]

It is in an effort to bridge this gap that an examination of the ethical sphere of Søren Kierkegaard's philosophical framework seems so pertinent. The appeal of this approach lies in Kierkegaard's grounding of moral issues in the fundamental structure of human existence. It is the purpose of this paper to describe briefly Kierkegaard's formulation of the ethical level of existence (as put forward in Volume II of Either/Or[5]), to evaluate this stance on life in terms of its positive and negative aspects, and then to determine the extent to which this account of the ethical mode can be related to the field of moral education. Specifically, we will need to know whether such an approach can be taught: will it be useful in helping students think about and act on moral decisions -- in other words, in becoming ethical themselves?

It will be immediately apparent, however, that any attempt to formulate a detailed system of Kierkegaardian ethics is foredoomed. Kierkegaard does not describe an "objective" set of criteria that will yield general rules of conduct or principles of behavior. Normative (and sometimes prescriptive) judgments seem unavoidable in the domain of ethics and moral education, but in Kierkegaard's framework the normative elements become the lynch-pin of the whole investigation. No practical program of group action emerges; the uniqueness of Kierkegaard's approach lies in the selfhood each individual develops by making moral choices. Paradoxially, this will be both the greatest contribution of and biggest problem with Kierkegaard's ethical sphere.[6]

II Becoming Ethical: An Overview

The first thing to be pointed out is that it is not Kierkegaard himself who describes the ethical sphere; rather he speaks through a persona. Don Juan is Kierkegaard's classical aesthetic-seducer in Volume I of Either/Or. In Volume II, Judge William personifies morality; he is a man of the law and of the family. The main difference between the two men lies in the commitment each has made to life. The aesthete, claims Judge William, only vascillates. He lives in the presence of others at all times; he constantly changes his opinions and says something new on each occasion. He is bound by neither the rules of logical consistency nor the responsibility of moral law, and so he lets himself simply "be carried through life." (p. 200) Judge William, on the other hand, claims that he himself is guided by moral law -- he has adopted an ethical stance on life to which he is inwardly and passionaltely committed. The ethical man lives by and for moral duty, which is universal and eternal: it remains the same for each person and each generation. It commands unrelenting and energetic obedience. Responsibility, reliability, and consistency are demanded. The ethical man does not make promises he cannot keep nor does he begin tasks he cannot complete. He sees his own life and the lives of others with absolute clarity. He knows the difference between good and evil and it is his duty to do the good. At the same time, Judge William claims to possess freedom. He is in control of his own life; he is not at the mercy of momentary whims, of the citates of the crowd, of the antecedents of his past life. Rather, he has chosen the universal-ethical life and is thereby raised above the control and demands of an immediate-aesthetic existence.

Judge William gives an elaborate account of the moves one must make in order to become ethical. The basic movements are subsumed under the technical terms of despair, repentance, and responsibility.

"Every man," Judge William tells us, "however lowly his talents are, however subordinate his position in life, naturally feels the need of forming a life view, a conception of life's significance and of its purpose." (p. 184) But in despair, this life view, the whole significance and meaning of one's life, is called into question. Why? It is not merely a question of any one thing in particular which has gone wrong or which one lacks in life (in this case the "despair" would cease as soon as whatever seems to be missing were restored). Real despair is not about any actual thing; it is about no-thing. In this instance "your thought has hurried on ahead, you have seen through the vanity of all things, but you have got no further." (pp. 198-199) When nothing looks as if it could ever have any possible significance in life, precisely because no-thing matters, one despairs. And yet, paradoxically, when one realizes this conclusion, when one accepts it willingly, one is already beyond despair. When no-thing can provide direction for one's life, when no-thing matters, one is then free to determine the content and direction of one's life. It is as if the self has come out from under a large burden; one can now stand openly and can freely choose his own self.

At this point, there is not specific content involved in the choice. It is not a matter of choosing "this thing or that." (Indeed, there cannot be a specific content to choose, for then one would not properly be in despair.) It is that one chooses that is all important. The alternative (not to choose) is the avoidance or denial of one's freedom (and, as we shall see later, of one's responsibility). This act of choice requires courage, moreover. There are not guidelines; everything must be relinquished. In choosing, each man stands in complete isolation, for this is an act no man can perform for another. This choice of himself is "the highest thing he alone can do for himself." (p. 221)

The technical term for this choice of oneself is repentance. Repentance carries with it the usual Christian overtones, but it also means much more. The person who chooses himself ethically, becomes himself. This means that he does not become someone radically different than he was before; he cannot simply decide to jettison his entire personality, his entire history, and become someone new and different. The individual

> who chooses himself ethically chooses himself concretely as this definite individual, and he attains this concretion by the fact that this act of choice is identical with this act of repentance which sanctions the choice. The individual thus becomes conscious of himself as this definite individual, with these talents, these dispositions, these instincts, these passions, influenced by these definite surroundings, as this definite product of a definite environment. (p. 255)

The trick is somehow to choose oneself in such a way that none of the outward concrete characteristics that define the self are lost. Instead we must choose so that these outward characteristics are transformed into inward characteristics that belong to this self alone. To see how this is possible, we need to introduce three subsuming concepts: knowledge-ignorance, possibility-necessity, and good-evil.

Knowledge-Ignorance

The act of choosing oneself is tantamount to the Socratic move of knowing oneself (but not in the passive sense of reflection). In choosing oneself, one chooses absolutely and concretely. One is not free to relinquish any part of one's past -- no matter how painful. The choice of oneself takes an individual all the way back into the history not only of his own life but also that of his family, his race, in short, his culture. The self stands completely revealed and transparent; none of the blemishes, none of the sins of his own past or of his father's past are covered over. In the instant of choice, the "personality issues forth as apparently naked as does a child from the body of its mother." (p. 227)

Possibility-Necessity

But seeing oneself with this kind of clarity, painful as it may be, releases the self from the bondage of the past. The situation encountered in psycho-therapy is similar. Just seeing oneself clearly, being able to account for oneself, allows one to "get on top of things," to stand back from them a bit in order to put them into perspective. Up to the point where an individual is not clear about his past, he can be determined by it. Nothing seems more important than anything else and one whim seems as good as another. The asethete does not have this clarity of vision; he is myopic. But "he who lives ethically has seen himself, knows himself, penetrates with his consciousness his whole concretion, does not allow indefinite thoughts to potter about him, nor tempting possibilities to distract him..." (p. 263) He is, in short, clearly in control of his life.

Good-Evil

The category of good-evil is closely related to the category of knowledge-ignorance. With the transparency gained through the choice of himself, the individual sees himself as both good and evil. The myopic aesthete cannot see good or evil; all for him is neutral because he does not make choices that require commitments (e.g. to others, to a set of principles). But the choice to lead an ethical life brings in the categories of good and evil (precisely because the individual must examine his life and his past -- mistakes, sins and all -- and sees them so clearly). The categories are not posited in an absolute sense, however; here the question is not yet one of good or evil but "the choice whereby one chooses good and evil or excludes them." (p. 173) Here again the point has not to do with the content of the choice, but with the act of choosing. We recall, though, that Judge William has claimed that it is the duty of the ethical man to do good and shun evil, so the question of standards must be faced. It is at this point that another movement is called for, and this is responsibility.

Being now fully conscious of himself, the ethical individual must somehow assume responsibility for himself. Having chosen himself, the individual is now able to act decisively, as a whole self with a destiny. He "chooses himself as product," Judge William says, and as the product of himself he is now fully capable of transforming "all of his outwardness into inwardness" by assuming tasks and projects. (pp. 255-256) By projecting himself into the future, he takes responsibility for his concrete characteristics and talents by planning and building on them. This lends continuity to his life, but more importantly it puts the ethical person in control of his life. The aesthete, by contrast, takes no control over his characteristics. Talents are regarded as mere good fortune. He picks up tasks and drops them as quickly as new ones come along to interest him. But the ethical individual chooses his tasks carefully. These projects structure his activities and, at the same time structure his perception of himself and his world. What is not related to the task is seen as less important (or is not seen at all). Thus, the nature of the environment itself becomes what the ethical person's choices make of it. For example, what is valuable is made valuable by the fact that one chooses it. (p. 281) Since the ethical person and his world become what they are by virtue of the conscious choices this person makes, it follows that he must be completely responsible for himself and his world. As Judge William puts it, the ethical person

> may venture to use the expression that he is his own editor, but at the same time he is fully conscious that he is responsible -- responsible to himself personally, inasmuch as what he chooses will have decisive influence upon him, responsible in view of the order of things in which he lives, and responsible in the sight of God. (p. 264)

III Limits of the Ethical

There is much more that can and should be said in defense of Judge William's description of the ethical individual. Enough has been said, however, to indicate the basis of an "existential ethic." Moreover, with the discussion of responsibility, we have arrived at (the beginning of) the limits of the ethical sphere; from this point on, Judge William's statements begin to lack the authority and certainty he claims for them. What are some of the difficulties he encounters?

The most obvious problem has to do with the lack of norms in Judge William's framework. As a person who takes his own freedom of choice as the core of being ethical, we might suppose that Judge William's chief concern would be the discovery of some set of universal standards by which his choices should be guided. Indeed, he claims that the ethical is the universal, but what this is (other than a sense of duty to do the good and to follow the norms of society -- for example, to get married, to work, to fulfill obligations, to keep promises,) is never made explicit. The choices Judge William bids us to make are neither determined by objective criteria of moral goodness nor by the antecedent conditions of our past. These don't even seem to matter much, "for in the ethical realm there is never any question about the external but only the internal." (p. 269) What seems to be required is merely that we recognize our responsibility and our freedom to choose. What is chosen does not really matter.[7]

Even the content of the choice between good and evil is not strictly prescribed. Here the only criterion is that of intent. If a man intends the good, the fact that the reverse might occur is merely "another matter." (p. 269) Thus even though certain "savages" may commonly put their aged parents to death, the only question is "whether the savages mean thereby to do anything evil." (p. 269) Judge William charges them only with "defective knowledge." (p. 270) This is tantamount to saying that only ignorance is sin, and this seems to be as far as we get in a definition of good and evil.

The choice between good and evil, like the other important choices (despair, responsibility) is said, however, to create its own values. The ethical individual will always choose the good, but what is chosen is never good by any objective standards -- it is good only because he wills it. (p. 228) Hence it is impossible to offer any theoretical defense for the choices one makes or for the kind of life one leads. Even Judge William can only say of himself, in the end, that he is "nothing but a witness;" (p. 328) he can do no more than give us a list of his "accomplishments" in life.

In addition to the absence of norms, the other major problem with Judge William's account of the ethical sphere has to do with the very basis for finding meaning in life. The matter here can be put rather crudely: if the ethical individual is the author of his own existence (by virtue of responsibility), and if meaning exists by virtue of the fact that he gives meaning to things, how can he ever account for the meaning of his own life -- beyond merely intending it to be meaningful? The problem is a circular one that could be resolved if Judge William had recourse to some standards or set of values outside of those he creates for himself. But beyond the internal criteria of making his own life consistent and intelligible, there seems to be no basis for knowing why anything in his life should be important.

We are left, then, with a doctrine of freedom (to make choices) on the one hand, and a doctrine of responsibility (somehow to choose a "universal" good) on the other, but there are no standards for the choices we make. Hence, we can never be certain that our choices are right ones (e.g., that they are the most beneficial one could make for the most members of society). We are left with an ethic of "rugged individualism" and the danger with this is that it could lead to moral anarchy.[8]

IV Values and Moral Education

What can we now say about the relevance of all this for values and moral education? First, a general remark: What Judge William is really describing in Volume II is how and why one goes about becoming ethical. This, as we have seen, is not anything that is a mere aspect or segment of life; it is a passionate commitment of the whole self to a way of life.

Ethical decisions are not made in an isolated context but are extended back into one's facticity (personal and cultural history) and forward into one's projects. Ethical decisions are responsible decisions (in both the general and the technical sense of the term). Thus those programs of moral education that set up artificial moral situations (which are very often not even of particular interest to the students) or that ask students to rank their values (without reference to any particular context or set of conditions) tend to ignore the how and the why of their values -- the structure of values and the process of valuing. At the opposite extreme are approaches based on the Cartesian method of radidically questioning all knowledge and principles. Such methods, however, destroy the possibility of further ethical reflection, precisely because they rarely get beyond the stage of self-conscious questioning. In every form of moral enquiry a context is needed against which it makes sense to question values. This is why an approach to values and moral education that grounds ethics in the structure of existence is so important.

Keeping in mind the importance of this point does not, however, advance us very far in our task of formulating a theory of moral education. It was stated at the outset that the normative elements are the lynch-pin of this whole investigation. The question now becomes whether Judge William's notions of individual responsibility and freedom turn the concept of moral education into an absurdity. The goal of moral education, we recall, is to engage students in thinking through moral problems carefully, to establish guidelines and principles for themselves, and then to act upon these principles. But where do the standards come from by which to judge such principled actions?

We can attempt to deal with this difficulty by turning to responsibility and (self) knowledge. Concerning first responsibility: Unless we can hold people responsible for their actions, there seems to be no point to moral principles. Responsible acts are actions undertaken as a result of choices. Thus we generally do not hold a person responsible for his actions if they are determined by antecedent conditions or mitigating circumstances. For example, we do not hold people morally responsible (although we may hold them legally liable) for actions undertaken unintentionally or that are the result of forces beyond their control. (Smith is responsible if he intentionally ran over his neighbor's noisy and bothersome cat, but not if a sudden pain or spasm prevented him from applying the brakes of his car. Jones is responsible for signing a bad check if he knew it would bounce, but not if there was a gun pointing at his head while he did so.)

Responsibility, then, appears to be a necessary component of principled actions, but is it sufficient? Hardly. In the first place, we need to know what kinds of actions and choices moral educators are to be concerned with. Are all actions to be considered simply because we can hold people responsible for them? I will be held responsible for my decision to overindulge at a cocktail party (a hangover will assure that); but -- barring a decision to drive home -- am I to be held morally accountable for my behavior? What if I speak crossly to my children the next day because I have a headache, or work less efficiently? It might be tempting to say that all choices can be considered moral choices, but this would certainly reduce or dilute the concept of morality. Such choices are more commonly called "prudential". In the second place, we need to raise the question of accountability. To whom are we responsible? To anyone beside ourselves? If all that matters is that we make energetic choices and that we will assume the consequences of our choices, the sadistic misanthropist who is committed to the annhilation or torture of the human race (to cite an extreme but legitimate example) is the moral equivalent of the philanthropist who devotes his life to human welfare, provided only that both have freely chosen their course of action. (If the sadist is also a masochist, so much for any punishment he might receive.) Thus once again, the crux of the problem is the failure to provide any standard or method for distinguishing between a right moral action and a wrong one.

Judge William would reply that we do have a basis for judgment, and that it is grounded in self-knowledge. "Only the ethical individual seriously renders an accountability to himself and is therefore honest with himself." (p. 265) Being so enlightened, this individual would never consciously maintain that "it is his duty to do evil." (p. 269) Being properly clear about one's goals and actions puts the individual in control of his life. By making decisions and by choosing projects that structure his life, he governs his own life and becomes autonomous. Put in the words of another, the ethical person

> emerges as the author of his own personality, conceiving his own ego-ideal, modifying it in the light of his successes and failures...The principles by which the autonomous man governs his life make his decisions _consistent_ and _intelligible_ to him as his own. _His actions, in initiating his principles, thus express his own moral nature_.[9] (emphasis supplied)

It seems from what has been said thus far that consistency and intelligibility, in addition to responsibility, are the only requirements for moral actions. With complete and total honesty, the ethical individual will look at his actions (in the "full light of day") and accept the consequences. Michael Oakeshoot has suggested that "nobody can fully share in this form of moral life who is not something of a philosopher and a self-analyst."[10] Judge William could not have put it better. But in Judge William's case, such radical introspection leaves him with nothing.

When, for example, he attempts to explain the role of his father in his own life, we find that he can point to nothing concrete. His father turns out to be nothing but an empty abstraction. There is no concrete sense of how the memory of his father helps him to decide what is the right thing to do. It is very much as if in trying to ground his ethical system, he tries to attribute authority to his father. In doing so, however, he quite literally explains away his father's authority. Once an individual sees his life so clearly, he can easily explain away the forces that have shaped him: they can become merely excuses or legitimations for actions. At this point, the question becomes whether Judge William's system leads to autonomy or self-destruction. At best, it would seem to leave us an approach to morality that is not too distinct from that of Values Clarification -- where radical self-honesty is called for along with exposure to the group. Judge William's words echo this goal: I say it is every man's duty to become revealed." (p. 327)

These shortcomings make the positive value of Judge William's system dubious. The issue that needs to be faced by Judge William and by moral educators is whether moral education can exist without reference to some kind of outside authority. Judge William's consistent reference to the influence of his father (and to the conventions of society) seem to indicate that it cannot. Judge William is caught, as we have seen, between two contradictory claims: 1.) that the ethical person is free to determine the course of his life and 2.) that it is the ethical individual's responsibility to uphold the universal good. On the one hand, we have complete freedom; on the other, we have absolute authority.

The solution to this problem is not to be found in searching for some sort of middle ground. This, in fact, is what Judge William tries to do, and he fails. In the end, it causes Judge William to remain too insistently rationalistic. For all his emphasis on subjectivity (i.e., on making subjective choices without reference to external standards), Judge William's reasons reduces what are most often powerful subjective forces into empty concepts (his father, for example). Furthermore, perhaps what counts more in the actions we undertake and choices we make isn't simply the knowledge and conscious judgment exercised, but the general, unspecific disposition we have. And this disposition, moulded in an individual by habitual emotional response, may never be accessible to rational analysis.

There is no middle ground. instead what is needed is to pose the question in a different way. It needs to be posed so that it can account for the way in which values are internalized. The way in which a life-view is formulated in an individual allows him to respond to concrete issues of right and wrong. If we are honest, we will recognize that in most situations the average person, when faced with conflicting claims of duties and desires, has little recourse to a vast system of thought and analysis of "choice" in explicit terms. Instead, he embodies a set of values he has "picked up on" since infancy from his environment, from modeling behavior, and from learning a language. The question is how these values become genuinely one's own, how they allow one to lead a fully integrated life as a reliable and responsible (ethical) adult.

Furthermore, the question needs to be posed in such a way as to account for the inherently social aspect of ethical systems. Judge William has rightly pointed out that we are, of course, morally responsible to ourselves when we enter into the ethical realm. The ethical individual regulates his life so that he can lead an authentic life as a unique and autonomous individual. But responsibility is also, and equally importantly, a part of the larger context of society. Moral responsibility is necessary for any form of social existence. It acts primarily to sustain the common interests of the social group, and thus it serves the principles of justice. This means that responsibility occurs as a *relation* between an individual and his fellow men. Thus an individual is responsible not only because he has made an energetic and fully conscious choice, but also because in acting on his choices he touches -- or does not touch -- the interests of others. If he does not, and he causes harm to others, then he is responsible for failing to allow for that harm, for acting exclusively out of his own self-interest, or for having withdrawn from the realm of social relations.

Ultimately, Judge William's system remains an egotistical one. Nowhere is there room for the development of a concern for others. The goal of becoming ethical is not just to produce autonomous individuals who are responsible to themselves, but also individuals who understand what the larger context of morality is, why it is needed, and who -- because they understand this -- are willing to do what is morally required of them. Valuing the rights of others could serve as the source and basis of the reverence and authority which is lacking in Judge William's view.

Still, we owe Judge William a debt of gratitude. For by pushing the ethical realm to its limits, he has shown us we cannot expect to gain from it. We cannot expect easy answers to the complex question of values -- issues of right and wrong, good and bad. We cannot expect that such issues will always be amenable to rational analysis. We cannot expect a clever program of group action to emerge, nor can we expect that values and morals can be easily taught. The unique contribution of Judge William's approach lies in the way it reveals the selfhood each individual develops by making moral choices. Becoming ethical remains the most important, but also the most difficult, task of every human being.

Documentations.

1. The crisis of values has been attributed to scientific and technological advances (the expansions of what *can* be done has outstripped our knowledge of what *ought* to be done; the ability to preserve life beyond the point of meaningfulness is one such example); to the rattling events of the past decade which have followed one another in such rapid succession that we have been left numb from their impact (a wave of political assasinations, the violence of civil rights struggles, student revolutions, the Vietnam War, Watergate, more political assasinations and kidnappings, etc., etc.); to the rapidly changing environments in which we live (values come and go as quickly as styles; we have, for example, in a relatively short time switched from valuing frugality to valuing conspicuous consumption to valuing ecologically oriented frugality again); to the pluralistic nature of our society; and to the breakdown of the traditional strongholds of values, the church and the family.

2. See the June, 1975 issue of *Phi Delta Kappan*. This entire issue is devoted to the question of moral education. In a survey taken for this issue, readers were asked to rank eighteen distinctive educational goals.

Third in rank was developing good character -- with an emphasis on the development of moral character and responsibility, and developing a moral and ethical sense of the values, goals, and processes of a free society.

3. The most popular forms of moral education are Values Clarification and Lawrence Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental approach. Some attention is also given to John Wilson's analytic program, and Michael Scriven's cognitive approach.

4. In a critique of Values Clarification, for example, John S. Stewart points out that because the emphasis is so much on the content of values, Values Clarification avoids the most important aspect -- namely the structure of values and valuing. The emphasis is on the what of moral judgment, never on the why. See John S. Stewart, "Clarifying Values Clarification: A Critique." Phi Delta Kappan, June, 1975, pp. 685-688.

5. Søren Kierkegaard, Either/Or, Volume II. translated by Walter Lowrie, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1971. References and citations from the text will be followed by the page numbers on which they appear.

6. There is considerable disagreement over whether the ethical is a sphere that stands on its own or whether it needs to be considered as a part of a larger ethico-religious context. If there is to be any validity in what Kierkegaard has to say for moral education, it seems wise to stick with the ethical. Not only is the religious off-limits for public school educators, I hope to show that there is something to be got out of the ethical without having to include the religious.

7. Except, perhaps in the acknowledgment that consequences follow from choosing, and are responsibly accepted in acts of choosing.

8. The answer to this problem for Kierkegaard is faith: it almost looks at this point if the whole ethical sphere is set up just to break down, for without the breakdown of the ethical -- in Kierkegaard's total system -- there would be no need for the leap of faith.

9. S. I. Benn, "Freedom, Autonomy, and the Concept of a Person."

10. M. Oakeshoot, "The Tower of Babel" in his Rationalism in Politics (London: Methuen, 1962), pp. 59-79.

CHAPTER 9.

CHARACTER EDUCATION AS PROPAGANDA: AN HISTORICAL CRITIQUE

STEPHEN M. YULISH

John Ruskin said, "Education is not to teach men what they do not know, but to teach men to behave as they do not behave."

The growth of the character education movement in America during the latter part of the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth century represented the response of the State, via the educational system, to the declining status and power of the Church and the Family. These institutions which had previously held significant power in the sanctioning of morality and ethical behavior were victimized by the secularization of a growing urban, industrial, mechanized society. The security of small towns and the isolation of a more peaceful existence were continually threatened by the onslaughts of technological progress. As a result, the traditional centers of community life, namely the Church and the Family, found their ability to sanction moral behavior jeopardized. In addition, concepts such as religious faith and dogma by which the Church had helped maintain order and control in the community were shattered by evolutionary doctrine and the rise of the new faith in Science.

In the latter part of the nineteenth century many clergy, feeling a loss of power and prestige, made an attempt to secularize their dogma into a social gospel.[1] Religious values were often stripped of their dogma and symbolism and were instead presented merely as ethical precepts. Felix Adler, founder of the Ethical Culture Society, epitomized this desire to replace the old dream of salvation with the secular ideal of the "perfect civilization...the Kingodm of God on Earth."[2] In order to generate a common ethical base which would not only unify (homogenize) the diverse groups of immigrants and minorities in America, but would also attempt to purify those afflicted by the evils of poverty, disease, and crime, it became apparent that the State was to become the new bearer of morality. John Dewey reflected the bond between the new secularized morality and the social gospel dream of a Kingdom of God on Earth when he wrote:

> I beleive that every teacher should realize the dignity of his calling, that he is a social servant set apart for the maintenance of proper social order and the securing of the right social growth. I believe that in this way the teacher always is the prophet of the true God and the usherer in of the true Kingdom of God.[3]

This new civic religion received much of its justification from the work of two German philosophers, Johann Herbart and G. W. F. Hegel. Herbart's psychological theory, while stressing the importance of moral training in education, was based upon a framework well grounded in the values of authority, obedience, and supremacy of law. The Herbartians in America, including Charles De Garmo (President of Swarthmore College), Charles McMurry (Peabody Teacher's College) and Frank McMurry (Columbia University), felt that reform of the individual was the chief task of the school. Training in individual morality by way of habit formation was perceived as the all sufficient cure for the social injustices of the time. The Herbartians never considered the possibility that in spite of an individual's knowledge and goodness, he or she may have been powerless to do anything about it. Furthermore, by focusing on the development of morality in individuals, they never addressed the possibility that the existing system itself might have been immoral.[4]

G. W. F. Hegel's concept of the State as a divine institution also influenced many moral educators in America. William Torrey Harris, who was Superintendent of St. Louis schools, 1869-1888, and United States Commissioner of Education, 1889-1906, was an Hegelian. Hegelianism provided him with an optimistic and idealistic social thought which infused the world with a divine purpose and thus endowed the individual with a noble and immortal destiny. It more importantly justified the existing social order and its authorities by maintaining that the present social system was the inevitable stage in the unfolding of objective reason and was therefore right.[5] Another Hegelian, Washington Gladden, who was very influential in the social gospel movement, spoke in 1908 at the Fifth General Convention of the Religious Education Association where he insisted on the reinstitution of moral aims in the schools. "The State," he said, "was first of all a religious, a divine institiution, since it springs out of an impulse divinely implanted in the human soil."[6]

Habit formation and the internalization of the values of society as expressed in both Herbartianism as well as Hegelianism were crucial to the establishment of the concept of the State as the true bearer of morality. The values promulgated not only reflected the social gospel concerns with unity and purity, but they also reflected the semi-mechanical virtues of regularity, punctuality, order, and neatness, which were dictated by the growing industrial order. Charles Rugh won the first prize in a moral education essay contest sponsored in California in 1907. Rugh saw the separation of Church and State and the raising of the State to the place of supreme power as a mandate for the State to train its children in morality. He wrote that, "While historically the Church was the mother of schools, by support and control, the State is now the father."[7] Thus gradually the concept of the good moral person became synonymous with the concept of the good citizen or good worker. To be a good person in society meant that one was socially efficient, patriotic, and obedient to authority.

The National Education Association was very influential in the growth of moral education. In its declaration adopted in 1905, it stated that, "the building of character is the real aim of the schools and the ultimate reason for the expenditure of millions for their maintenance."[8] A year later the Association published a list of 58 papers on moral and religious education presented at their conventions in the forty-seven years from 1859-1906.[9] In 1908 the N.E.A. appointed a committee of its National Council to investigate and submit a "Tentative Report on a System of Teaching Morals in the Public School." The report, submitted in 1911, reflected the evolution of moral training into training for citizenship and social efficiency. Not only was it important to this committee to fix society's virtues into habit, but it was also deemed necessary to inculcate proper regard for law and order, patriotism, obedience, self-control, discipline, and social efficiency. The main problems in society were attributed to inefficiency and individual maladjustment. According to the committee chairman, James Greenwood, it was the purpose of the school to make problem children over, to remodel them by means of "educational surgery."[10]

Other organizations active in the drive for character education in the public schools were the American School Peace League and the N.E.A. Committee on Democracy. Formed as an outgrowth of the National Peace Congress in 1907, the League flourished and by 1919 was active in forty-five states. The N.E.A. gave its support to the League in 1909 and allied it with its own Committee on Democracy chaired by A. Duncan Yocum. Its high ideals of brotherhood, peace, and international justice melted away in 1917 in its "Call to Patriotic Service."[11] The League announced its policy to cooperate with the President in his aims to safeguard the principle of democracy throughout the world and lay a foundation for a durable peace. Interestingly enough, the implicit concerns of the League with order and stability once manifested in a drive for international peace now became the pragmatic rationale for war. Citizenship training by the League played a vital role not only in maintaining a belief in American values and institutions during the war, but it also attempted to dispel any dissent or criticism. After the war the League changed its name to the American School Citizenship League.

In July of 1921 the National Council on Education recommended appointment of a permanent committee on Character Education which would work closely with the Committee on Democracy and the American School Citizenship League. Under the chairmanship of Milton Bennion of the University of Utah, a Committee on Character Education flourished in the N.E.A. from 1921-1926. The Committee stressed the two goals of social progress and the development of personalities. The Committee spoke highly of case method approach and of the use of behavior clinics to deal with maladjusted children. The new social gospel issued forth from the mouth of the educator in the new sacred language of science.

It is important to remember that in most cases the creation of a socially valuable citizen was not to be accomplished through coercion or repression which were seen to cause a loss in moral potency. The child had to desire and will the desired ends for himself. If however that was not possible to accomplish, other methods were considered. In the 1926 report of the N.E.A. Committee on Character Education, it was stated that:

> Long ago surgical interference in the brain was proposed as a means of controlling character; it seemed then a wild idea, yet even that is by no means unthinkable now, although certainly not yet practical.[12]

Milton Bennion may have grasped the fate of character education when he wrote in 1924 that "Faith in and reverence for power that makes for righteousness is a moral force that should not be ignored in any phase of character education."[13]

The First World War convinced many American that intellect without a moral idea was potentially evil since many believed Germany to be a case in point. Guy Fernald, a prominent psychologist-psychopathologist, wrote that,"It is not the intellect but the character of our efficient enemy in Germany that we despise."[14] What this meant to educators was that it was not enough to educate persons merely in terms of their intellect, but one had to consider their character as well. The Bolshevik coup of 1917 also created anxiety among those who feared an uprising of the proletarian masses (especially the immigrants) in this country. Character education programs arose in the decade after the First World War as a response to this perceived desire for well adjusted citizens of high character. The war, however, represented a period of extreme nationalistic jingoism in this country, and much of the goose step obedience that was criticized among the Germans was later incorporated into many of our own character education programs. These programs advocated a State-sanctioned morality which relied heavily upon the values of unquestioning loyalty, patriotism, and obedience to law.[15]

In 1922, J. Montgomery Gambrill, an historian at Teachers College, wrote that it might have been that, "While Prussia lost the War, Prussianism won it."[16] He pointed out how in the recent world tragedy, Germany had been singled out as the villain and America had been the Sir Galahad that came nobly and unselfishly to the rescue of civilization. In apparent disdain, he wrote:

> "In all our wars and international controversies since the nation began, we have been wholly in the right: we always are right, and by plain implication, we never can be anything but right...The Founding Fathers were divinely inspired and wholly above such sordid human motives as a desire to extend the opportunities for profitable investment...The Constitution is a sacred scripture, not to be criticized; the school should cultivate toward it an attitude of veneration while the 'good citizen' will view with horror any proposal to change our form of government...It is not only our right but our duty to place American interests above all others. 'America First' is a good maxim to teach American children, though 'Deutchland Uber Alles' is an outrageous song for young Germans. 'My country right or wrong' is the only sound principle for us,

> though it is particularly reprehensible for the people of Germany who fully deserve the ruin that came upon them for loyally following their government. The German Kaiser was at once dangerous and ridiculous when he assured his people that 'We are the salt of the Earth,' but when the American President informs his people that 'We are the Flower of Mankind,' it is a dictum to be complacently received and to pass unquestioned."[17]

Those concerned with character education objectives failed to recognize the potential drawbacks of generating a political conscience. George Coe of Union Theological Seminary was very much opposed to such programs. He felt that in such a pedagogy, "the State, Hobbes Leviathan, loomed as sovereign not only of territory but also of conscience."[18] The teacher, according to Coe, was to be the servant of Truth, not of the majority. Coe believed that "at the heart of the whole agitation for character education (was) the concern, expressed or unexpressed, for appropriate use of authority and appropriate response to authority."[19] The good citizen, according to the objectives of character education, was one who willingly signed a blank check upon his ethical reserves and placed it in the hands of government officials, whoever they happened to be.

Coe felt that character education was unable to avoid being propaganda since it sought to make up the mind of the student, develop his habits, automatic processes, and unquestioning obedience to command. His concern is validated when one looks at a statement by Paul Rankin, Superintendent and Director of Research and Adjustment of the Detroit Public Schools. Rankins beleived that "character education is largely a matter of attitude. It behooves all of us to learn from the advertising man, the propagandist and others who are expert in determining and in modifying people's attitudes."[20]

This propaganda was seen by Coe to be directed towards a limited, often specious, good; and thus unevenly distributed. The kind of good that some dominant class had experienced was prescribed as the common good. It was Coe's sincere belief that "citizens have no duties to the State; rather, acting as the State, they have duties to persons."[21]

In situations where the conscience of the people was to be dictated by the State, free criticism of the actions of such a body was not possible. Whatever the State sanctioned as moral, was, by definition, the just and the good. Persons were considered primarily in their roles as citizens, and thus their loyalty or duty was to the State with little recourse to any other or higher moral authority.

The N.E.A. Committee on Democracy headed by A. Duncan Yocum of the University of Pennsylvania attempted to bond democracy not only with character education but with religion as well. The new social gospel of democratic faith permeated this bond. Yocum wrote:

> Superthreats to civilization and democracy require super-education that is necessarily complex. But through its very complexity the character education which makes a few virtues controlling, will, through the interdependence of one virtue upon another, insure control of all; and through this interdependence in their elements teach morality through religion, religion through morality, and democracy through both.[22]

The comparison of nationalism to a religious movement persisted in the decade after the war. The school system often viewed as the Church of the new secular religion was thus held to be strictly accountable for any lapse from the official theology or for any slur upon the popular mythology. Character education programs were perfect examples of the nationalistic outgrowths of the new secular religion. Carlton Hays, in his book Essays on Nationalism published in 1926, wrote that nationalistics like religious enthusiasts had a chronic fear that the masses were on the point of losing their faith, and thus only information that strengthened their faith and promoted popular devotion to it should be imparted to them. Such a program sought to keep the minds of the young pure and uncontaminated from knowledge of the full truth which it was assumed might weaken, if not destroy, the nationalistic faith.[23]

An affirmation of this concept of a State-sanctioned morality was the U.S. Supreme Court decision in the MacIntosh case of 1930. The case involved a Canadian clergyman who wanted U.S. citizenship but was denied it due to his refusal to swear to the oath of allegiance to bear arms in time of war. He stated that he would have to reserve the right to question in each case whether the war was necessarily or morally justified. The U.S. Supreme Court in a 5 - 4 decision upheld his denial of citizenship. They concluded that "unqualified allegiance to the nation and submission and obedience to the laws of the land, as well as those made for war as those made for peace, are not inconsistent with the will of God."[24]

Much of the concern with crime, delinquency, poverty, and other social ills was blamed upon the faulty adjustment of individuals to societal norms. Thus most character education programs focused upon remediating the perceived problems of individuals. Percival Symonds wrote of the promise of such an objective.

> In a planned society one would study individuals to help them make the best adjustments possible. Those discovered with criminal tendencies would be re-educated so as to prevent these tendencies from finding overt expression. Vocational guidance would become interested in the selection of the most fit. Society would be looking for leaders rather than waiting until they forced themselves to the front. In a planned society the needs of the individual and the demands of the society would become identical.[25]

Education for character justified itself not only in terms of creating good patriotic citizens, but also made use of socioeconomic and psychological justifications as well. One had to adjust to the norms of society both psychologically as well as socially or economically. Character education was education for values, not for skills or knowledge.

The structure and function of the school also changed as a result of character education concerns. The school gained more control over the lives of its students. It even often reached into the homes of the parents in an effort to re-educate them. Guidance programs, both psychological and vocational, became a part of the everyday workings of the school. Report cards were changed in many cases to account for character and behavior ratings as well as, or in place of, ratings of intellect. Homerooms and homeroom teachers were incorporated to provide students in a departmentalized setting with a moral example to follow as well as a daily period for character education.[26]

The curriculum mandated became highly differentiated as an increasing number of personality and character measures were utilized and special classes were necessitated for these special children. When the situation was not controllable, the problem students were sent to special schools for character deviates.[27] Some schools also brought psychologists and counselors into their schools to assist them not only in adjusting their students to norms of society, but also in identifying character or personality deviates who were to be earmarked for remedial treatment.

Milton Fairchild founded the Moral Education Board in 1896. In 1911 he organized the National Institution for Moral Instruction in Chevy Chase, Maryland which, aided by large sums of money from a mysterious "donor," assisted the drive for character education. Searching for the best Code of Morals for children, Fairchild organized a $5,000 contest from Washington's birthday 1916 to Washington's birthday 1917. William Hutchins' "Ten Laws of Right Living" won the prize. According to his code, the child was not only to "obey the laws of right living which the best Americans have always obeyed," but was also to "try and find out what my duty is, what I ought to do, and my duty I will do, whether it is easy or hard; what I ought to do I can do."[28]

A second contest sponsored by Fairchild's then reincorporated Character Education Institution ran from October of 1919 until February 22, 1921 and offered a $20,000 prize for the best character education plan. While the prize winning entry was submitted by Edwin Starbuch of the State University of Iowa,[29] many other plans were being developed across the country. Many school districts, while not making use of such formal plans, incorporated character education programs into their everyday curricula. Diverse programs sprung in Utah, Nebraska, Washington, D.C., New York, Massachusetts, Alabama, Tennessee, California, Connecticut, Montana, Wisconsin, Illinois, and Michigan. Values stressed included order, adjustment, worthy home membership, worthy use of leisure time and vocational guidance.

In 1926 the Department of Superintendence of the N.E.A. initiated its own Committee on Character Education as a result of its perception of a decaying moral climate in America. Believing that one of the chief objectives of the public school was training in right conduct, it surveyed 300 cities as to what was being done in the development of character education. Its Fourth Yearbook published in 1926 contained their findings. They found that character education programs across the country were "seemingly feverish, anxious, and even frantic in character."[30] The majority of the 229 questionnaires returned seemed to indicate that most character education efforts were directed toward utilization of regular curricular and extracurricular activities to develop desirable habits and ideals.

The N.E.A. Committee on Character Education of the Department of Superintendence devoted its entire 10th Yearbook in 1932 to a discussion of character education. One of the recommendations of the Committee was the necessity of forging new conceptions of right and wrong. In the new age of social change "relativity must replace absolutism in the realm of morals as well as in the spheres of physics and biology."[31] This relativity of morality was best suited for the pragmatic actions of the State. As long as the State sanctioned moral behavior, it needed the freedom to change the sanctions depending upon the circumstances.

Measurement of character and personality traits was a natural outgrowth of the intelligence testing developed during the First World War. In a symposium on Intelligence and Its Measurement in 1921, many of the contributors stated that one of the next steps in research was development of the measurement of character.[32] This concern was further magnified as intelligence tests were found to be inconclusive in predicting one's success in school or in a vocation, one's potential for delinquency, or one's day to day behavior.[33] Gradually, many psychologists turned to the classification, quantification, and standardization of noncognitive character traits as a means of predicting an individual's success in life and possible adjustment to society as well as determining the occupation best suited to his character.

The desacralization of religious dogma and morality by means of scientific test measurement was highly significant of the bond between science and religion in character testing as well as character education. The new social gospel united the old gospel of salvation with the new gospel of the planned society. This bond between science and religion in character assessment was clearly evident in the Character Education Inquiry at Columbia. Created in 1924 after gentle prodding by the Religious Education Association, it remained at Columbia under the supervision of Edward Thorndike until 1929.

The men chosen to head the group were Dr. Hugh Hartshorne, Professor of Religious Education at the University of Southern California and Dr. Mark May, Professor of Psychology at Syracuse University. While secularized religion provided the ethical and moral standards, psychology provided the experimental methodology and gave the organization status and influence.

Hugh Hartshorne and Mark May, co-directors of the Character Education Inquiry at Teachers College, spearheaded much of the research into character testing and measurement. They felt that "schoolmen and psychologists have been realizing that prediction of success in any vocation depends upon other factors than intelligence and talent."[34] Their studies in deceit, however, reflected many of the same racial and ethnic biases as did the I Q test. Children of Northern European parents were found to be more honest, cooperative, and charitable than those of Black, Irish or Italian background. Jews, who were seen to exhibit high intelligence and high occupational status, also were perceived to exhibit high deceptiveness.[35]

Charles Davenport of the Department of Genetics of The Carnegie Institute set out to study the differences in social traits between races rather than differences in intelligence. His study was one of the earliest to find the German students (Northen Europeans) highest in leadership, pertinacity, humor, frankness, sympathy, and loyalty (half the traits and all the good traits). The Irish were found to be highest in suspiciousness and at the bottom of all the other traits. The Jews were found to be highest in generosity and obtrusiveness, but also second highest in suspiciousness.[36]

The Downey Will Temperament Test was used to point out the weaker personality structure of Blacks. They were seen to be especially prone to the catatonic form of dementia praecox. The extreme aggressiveness of Northern Blacks was viewed as a compensation for their inferiority complexes. Such a finding was partly legitimated by the fact that the "tendency of Negro drivers to beat their mules more mercilessly than do white drivers is a matter of observation."[37] All the designating traits that Blacks scored higher on than whites were explained in a negative manner. As an example, the high score of Blacks on the trait of motor impulsion was seen to be indicative of their lack of restraint and consequent extreme expression of feelings. The indices that whites scored higher on were explained in a positive manner as well as was the fact that the total score (higher for whites) was indicative of strength of personality.

A careful examination of many of the character tests and measures indicated that in most cases they were more indicative of language skill abilities, cultural environment, and knowledge of the law and ethical mores than they were indicative of moral worth or possible moral conduct. It is no small wonder that many non-English speaking immigrants and minorities, as well as many groups which were outside the mainstream of American life, scored poorly on these character or personality tests. The tests reflected deviations from the accepted cultural norm rather than indicated moral character.

The Brotemarkle Comparison Test was another example of this type of conceptual confusion. Students were presented a list of words which were indicative of a certain principle, attitude, or response. Along with this list of words two extremes of the concept in question were also presented. The students were to fill in the blanks along the continuum. For example, the student was given the list of words: bad, fair, mean, kind, pure, wicked, considerate. He was also given the extremes of good _ _ _ _ _ _ _ evil. The object was to fill in the appropriate blanks. A deviation score was obtained which indicated the number of spaces each word was misplaced from the standard. Brotemarkle then queried his subjects about their character as reflected or not reflected by the results of his test. The reason for all of this examination was given by Brotemarkle:

> Under a closer examination the individual problem of faulty adjustment might be discovered; presenting a better opportunity to the social worker, psychiatrist, criminologist, or kindred worker, to correct the underlying motivating background of morals, personality, or character.[38]

As was stated previously, these types of measures were hardly indicative of moral worth or possible moral conduct. Those person who were unfamiliar with the fine distinctions of the English language were described as immoral or lacking in moral sense. Several other measures, including Kohs' "Ethical Discrimination Test,"[39] even went so far as to use knowledge of proverbs (a penny saved is a penny earned) as measures of morality. Kohs, a member of the Psychological Court of Domestic Relations in Portland, Oregon, wanted to utilize his test for identifying character deviates. A lack of knowledge of proverbs, just as the lack of knowledge of the English language, is hardly an indication of a morally deficient character.

A final example of the confusion between social alienation or cultural differences and character deficiencies was the Woodworth Cady Questionnaire. This measure was a revised version of a psychoneurotic questionnaire developed during the First World War to identify war neuroses. While it was rewritten or modified for use with children, its basic assumptions remained the same. Children were classified as exhibiting psychotic tendencies if they felt that they were being treated unfairly by teachers, not getting a square deal in life, afraid of the dark, worried about their health, or anxious to get away from school and get a job. These type of questions (answers) take on new light when considered from the perspective of the poor, the socially alienated, and the immigrant. Therefore it should not be surprising that Ellen Mathews' use of the revised Woodworth Questionnaire revealed that Italians had definitely larger scores and Jewish children had slightly larger scores than did children of Saxon, Celtic, and Teutonic stock.[40] There was no attempt to corroborate the fears of the oppressed. Persons who might have had to live in a hostile environment were often classified as paranoid or neurotic if they could not adjust to their situation in life. The scenario of a child being unjustly treated and then classified as paranoid for identifying such treatment is a Kafkaesque nightmare.

Character education programs were primarily concerned with the adjustment of children to the existing social order and the diagnosis and remedial treatment of character deviates. Very few educators heeded the printed warnings of some of the character measures which pointed out the potentially harmful effects of stigmatizing an individual child. The character test manuals developed by Hartshorne and May at the Character Education Inquiry contained the following warning:

> Caution in use of results of character tests cannot be too frequently emphasized. Indiscriminate testing of children is to be deplored and treatment of results in any but the most confidential manner involves grave injustice to the individual concerned...recommendation for honesty or dishonesty, based on a single test, would not only be a gross violation of confidence but also a contradiction of facts of social behavior with as much objectivity as we treat behavior of physical objects. But unlike physical objects, persons have a stake in the measurements which are made of them. Let us take warning, therefore, from the misuse of I Q and achievement scores and make haste slowly.[41]

While Harshorne and May recongnized the misuse of I Q test scores at an early date, they failed to take the responsibility in terms of their own work. Their findings on the high deceptiveness in Blacks, Southern Europeans, and Jews generated potentially harmful effects by stigmatizing certain ethnic, religious and racial groups. Groups, just as individuals, have a stake in the measurements which are made of them. The question of CIE's responsibility for the use of its tests was also never considered. If they felt that indiscriminate testing was taking place and children were being unjustly labeled by the results, what responsibility should they have taken to control its use or regulate its implementation? Was it enough to merely state the limitations or narrow objectives of the test knowing full well that it was being given for other reasons?

The character education movement epitomized the growing power of the State via the educational system over the weakening institutions of the Church and the Family. The educational system's primary function was to generate good citizens who were both socially and economically adjusted to society, as well as loyal and obedient to its authority. The good person became the good citizen and the values of patriotism, loyalty, obedience, and adjustment became the dictates of a new civic religion. William Irwin Thompson may have captured the fate of the educational system when he wrote that "the public school system which had been created to put muscle into democracy ended by becoming the closing fingers of the long arm of the State."[42]

Documentations.

1. See Richard Hofstadter, Age of Reform (New York: Vintage Press, 1955), p. 35 and Richard Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in American Thought (New York: Beacon Press, 1955), p. 107.

2. Felix Adler, *The Moral Instruction of Children* (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1892), p. 30.

3. John Dewey, *My Pedagogic Creed* (Chicago: A. Flannagan Company, 1897), p. 17.

4. See Charles De Garmo, "Ethical Training in the Public Schools," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 2, 1891-92, pp. 577-579; Charles De Garmo, "Social Aspects of Moral Education," *National Herbart Society Yearbook*, 3, 1897, pp. 35-36; Charles De Garmo, *Herbart and the Herbartians* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1896); Charles McMurry, "Round Table Report to the National Council of the Influence of Herbart's Doctrine on the Course of Study in the Common Schools," *National Education Association Proceedings*, 34, 1895, pp. 475-478.

5. See William T. Harris, "Social Culture in the Form of Education and Religion," *Educational Review*, Vol. XXIX, 1905, pp. 18-37.

6. Washington Gladden, "Bringing All the Moral and Religious Forces into Effective Educational Unity," *Education and National Character* (Chicago: R. R. Donnelly and Sons, 1908), p. 35.

7. Charles Rugh, *Moral Training in the Public Schools: The California Prize Essays* (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1907), p. 4.

8. Declarations, *N.E.A. Proceedings*, 45, 1905, p. 43.

9. Fiftieth Anniversary Volume, *N.E.A. Proceedings*, 1906, p. 715.

10. James Greenwood, "The Home and School Life," *N.E.A. Proceedings*, 49, 1911, p. 381.

11. An Eleven Year Survey of Activities of the American School Peace League from 1908-1919 (Boston: American School Citizenship League, 1919).

12. *Character Education*, Report of the Committee on Character Education of the N.E.A. (Washington: U.S. Bureau of Education, 1926, No. 7), p. 2.

13. Milton Bennion, "Report of the Committee on Character Education," *N.E.A. Proceedings*, 62, 1924, p. 279.

14. Guy Fernald, "Character vs. Intelligence in Personality Studies," *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, 15, April 1920, p. 8.

15. See "Resolutions," *National Education Association Proceedings*, 54, 1916, pp. 27-28; *National Education Association Proceedings*, 55, 1917, pp. 26-27; *Report of the Commissioner of Education*, 1917, Vol. 7, pp. 1-16.

16. J. Montgomery Gambrill, "Nationalism and Civic Education," *Teachers College Record*, 23, February 1922, pp. 120.

17. J. Montgomery Gambrill, "Nationalism and Civic Education," *Teachers College Record*, 23, February 1922, pp. 110-111.

18. George Coe, "Religious Education and Political Conscience," *Teachers College Record*, 23, September 1922, p. 303. Coe later advocated the development of a super political conscience in and through church schools. See George Coe, "Shifting the National Mind-Set," *Religious Ed.*, 19, October 1924, p. 321.

19. *Educating for Citizenship* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1932), p. 21.

20. Paul Rankin, "The Training of Teachers for Character Education," *National Education Association Proceedings*, 68, 1930, p. 326.

21. Coe, *Educating for Citizenship*, *op. cit.*, p. 189. Coe recognized that character objectives such as being a good neighbor or respecting property often meant that one was to ignore class stratifications or respect the property of the wealthy elite. In other words, character education meant adjustment to the status quo.

22. A. Duncan Yocum, "Three Reports on Character Education Objectives," *N.E.A. Proceedings*, 61, 1923, p. 253.

23. Carlton Hays, *Essays on Nationalism* (New York: Macmillan, 1926), p. 114.

24. U.S. v. MacIntosh 283 U.S. 625.

25. Percival Symonds, *Psychological Diagnosis in Social Adjustment* (New York: American Book Company, 1934), p. vii.

26. For a complete description of individual character education programs see Stephen M. Yulish, "The Search for a Civic Religion: A History of the Character Education Movement in America 1890-1935." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois, 1975.

27. See Arch O. Heck, "Special Schools and Classes in Cities of 10,000 Population or More in the United States," *United States Office of Education Bulletin No. 7*, 1930; also Edward H. Stulken, "Character Education in Special Schools," *Chicago Principals Club Sixth Yearbook on Character Education*, June 1931.

28. William Hutchins, *Children's Code of Morals for Elementary Schools* (Washington: National Capital Press, 1917), p. 2.

29. *Character Education Methods, The Iowa Plan* (Chevy Chase: Character Education Institution, 1922).

30. *Character Education*, Chapter XIV, *Fourth Yearbook* (Washington: Department of Superintendence of the N.E.A., 1926), p. 381.

31. *Character Education, Tenth Yearbook* (Washington: Department of Superintendence of N.E.A., 1932), p. 11. The family was seen as the most powerful of all educational agencies but hardly an agency of betterment. The Church as well was seen to have lost its authority with outworn dogmas. See pg. 20 and pg. 23.

32. "Intelligence and Its Measurement: A Symposium," *Journal of Educational Psychology*, 12, March and April 1921, pp. 123-147 and pp. 195-216.

33. See S. L. Pressey, "An Attempt to Measure the Comparative Importance of General Intelligence and Certain Character Traits in Contributions to School Success," *Elementary School Journal*, 21, November 1920, pp. 220-29; W. W. Charters, "Success, Personality, and Intelligence," *Journal of Educational Research*, 11, March 1925, pp. 169-176; Curt Rosenow, "Is Lack of Intelligence the Chief Cause of Delinquency?", *Psychological Bulletin*, 27, 1930, pp. 147-157; Walter Bingham, "Intelligence and Personality in Vocational Success," *Vocational Guidance Magazine*, 3, January 1925, pp. 122-126.

34. Hugh Hartshorne and Mark May, "Research in Character Education," *Phi Delta Kappan*, 9, April 1927, p. 129.

35. "Studies in Deceit," *Studies in the Nature of Character*, V. I. (New York: Macmillan Company, 1928), p. 252.

36. Charles Davenport, "Comparative Social Traits of Various Races," *School and Society* 14, October 1921, pp. 344-348.

37. John McFadden and J. F. Dashiell, "Racial Differences as Measured by the Downey Will Temperament Test," *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 7, March 1923, p. 40.

38. R. E. Brotemarkle, "Comparison Test for Investigating the Ideational Content of the Moral Concepts," *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 6, September 1922, p. 242.

39. S. C. Kohs, "Ethical Discrimination Test," *Journal of Delinquency*, 7, January 1922, pp. 1-15.

40. Ellen Mathews, "A Study of Emotional Stability in Children," *Journal of Delinquency*, 8, January 1923, pp. 20 and 32.

For another example of a character measure which classified concerns with injustice and enemies as paranoid, see S. L. Pressey, "A Group Scale for Investigating the Emotions," *Journal of Abnormal Psychology and Social Psychology*, 16, April 1921, pp. 55-64.

41. See Hugh Hartshorne and Mark May, *Character Education Inquiry Test Manual No. 1* (New York: Association Press, 1930).

42. William Irwin Thompson, *Passages about Earth* (New York: Perennial Library, 1973), p. 16.

CHAPTER 10.

MORAL DILEMMAS IN EVALUATION

EILEEN BOYER

This paper is written from the point of view of an independent evaluator who subcontracts to conduct evaluation studies on projects supported by federal agencies. The purpose of this paper is to present some of the value conflicts an evaluator may face on such a project. Many issues will be raised but few solutions will be offered.

The congressional proviso mandating evaluation of Titles I and III of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 led to instances of funding agencies requiring evaluations of projects to show what effects had resulted from expenditure of funds. (5) It is now common for many federal agencies to require evaluation plans in the original request for funding. In fact, some requests for proposals state that the evaluation section will be one of the criteria upon which the decision to fund will be based. Some agencies will supply a breakdown by category of the scoring of a proposal. One near miss due to an inadequate evaluation plan will send the wise proposal writer in search of the assistance of a professional evaluator for preparing the next proposal. He will do this for two reasons. First, the proposal writer is aware that the evaluation plan will be influential in determining the funding of the project. And second, he is also aware that the use of a professional evaluator's name in the proposal may also be influential with those funding the project.

This situation creates moral dilemmas for the evaluator. First should he participate in the formulation of a proposal? Second, if the project is funded, to whom is the evaluator responsible--the funding agency or the project management? And third, is it ethical for an evaluator to assist in designing a project and also to conduct both the formative and summative evaluations?

Should an Evaluator Participate in Writing a Proposal? Worthern and Sanders, in Educational Evaluation: Theory In Practice, (4) express the belief that there is a need to have an evaluator involved in the planning stages of a project if evaluation is to reach its full potential. This idea is also implicit in Stufflebeam's context evaluation (4) which is undertaken to identify the setting, goals, and objectives of a project. The results of context evaluation would normally be included in the program description section of a proposal. The notion of an evaluator participating in the developmental process of a project is also found in Dennis Gooler and Arden Grotelueschen's Process Accountability in Curriculum Development. (1) Michael Scriven, in the Methodology of Evaluation, (2) also recognizes the potential benefit of and evaluator participating in program development. Therefore expert opinion seems to support the participation of an evaluator in writing a proposal.

Practical considerations also support this conclusion. If an evaluator does not participate in writing the proposal, the project may not be funded or, perhaps worse, it may be funded and no evaluation will be undertaken. Without evaluation, there is no basis for assuming that the dollar support devoted to these projects is being well spent. By participating in writing the proposal an evaluator can assure that if the project is funded, evaluation will be an integral part of the project and he can also insure that adequate funds will be allocated to support the evaluation activities. Therefore it would appear that collaboration on the proposal is a desirable activity for an evaluator. As we shall see this participation may also cause problems for the evaluator.

Does the Evaluator Represent the Funding Agency or the Project Management? The evaluator is a subcontractor of the project management and is directly responsible to the project director. Therefore it seems clear that his responsibility is to the project management. However, by participating in writing the proposal and by allowing his name to be submitted as project evaluator, the evaluator may feel some moral obligation to the funding agency. If the project is proceeding in consonance with the original proposal or if changes are being made on the basis of adequate data, there will be no problems for the evaluator. However, one can imagine a situation in which project management decides to make major changes in the program based on its perspective of programatic activities to date. Suppose the evaluator disagrees because the original objectives or strategies were in concert with the funding agencies' original objectives and were, in fact, the principle reason for the project being funded. In addition, suppose the evaluator does not believe that adequate data has been collected to justify these changes and is convinced that better training of project personnel or greater expenditure of resources would overcome the difficulties. In this kind of situation, what are his responsibilities, if any, to the funding agency?

Before considering the evaluator's options in such a situation, it should be pointed out that this conflict may be based on honest disagreement between the evaluator and the project management. As Stake (3) points out, deciding which standards to apply in an evaluation study is a subjective judgment on the part of the evaluator. Unfortunately, it is also a subjective judgment of the part of the project management. Because their concerns are different, it is logical to expect that the evaluator and project management might invoke different standards for making decisions. One concern of project management might be the future funding of the project. It is unlikely that an unsuccessful project would be funded, therefore, it would be extremely difficult for project management to continue to invest time, energy, and money into an approach that does not appear to be too successful. The evaluator on the other hand is normally concerned with collecting data to document program successes and failures, therefore, it is equally difficult for him to suggest changes without adequate documentation. The problem is that criteria upon which decisions are to be made are debatable. How much time (one month, two months, or three months) should be spent before an approach is judged inadequate? How much training does the personnel require in order to be effective in their roles? Or is it ethical to continue to spend taxpayers money on an approach which does not appear too promising when the same funds could be invested in more promising activities? Decisions on how resources should be invested will be subjective judgments on the part of both the evaluator and project management. They may not reach the same conclusions.

To return to the original concern, what is the evaluator's responsibility if project management is making radical program changes, which in his opinion, are based on inadequate data, are not in consonance with the proposal and appear to be detrimental to the project's development? As mentioned previously, the evaluator may feel morally responsible to the funding agency. He may also believe that the project management has a moral obligation to make every effort to try to implement the project as proposed. This situation may cause the evaluator great stress. In fact he may feel obligated to consider his options, he could resign, he could continue to defend the funding agencies' expectations as expressed in the proposal, he could evaluate the new activities of the project management or he could report his concerns to the funding agency.

The possible consequences of each activity should be considered. If he resigns the project may not be evaluated at all. Furthermore project management may lose a potentially valuable perspective on their activities. In addition the evaluator might also gain the reputation of being difficult to work with and uncooperative. If he continues to defend the rights of the funding agency, he runs the risk of alienating project personnel and losing their cooperation in data collection. On the other hand, if he evaluates the new activities of the project, he risks damaging his reputation with the funding agency. As for reporting his concerns to the funding agency, it is not clear that this action is even a viable option. In the first place, his contract usually specifies that he is directly responsible to the project director and therefore no mechanisms exist for communicating directly with the funding agency. In the second place, even if a channel for communication did exist it is not clear that it would be ethical to use it. Although the evaluator may feel that he has moral obligations to inform the funding agency of major program discrepancies so that they can decide whether or not to take action, it can be argued that his responsibility is limited to providing data to the project management upon which to make decisions. Any further action represents an attempt to usurp management prerogatives. Furthermore, if he decides to report to the funding agency, he is placing himself in the role of judging management decisions. This does not appear to be an appropriate role for a formative evaluator.

Ideally the formative evaluator would be able to serve the needs of both the funding agency and the project management. However, as can be seen there may be situations in which this is not possible. The evaluator will then have to make some difficult value judgments which may determine his effectiveness in working with project personnel and may also limit the contributions he can make to the program.

Can an Evaluator Fill More Than One Evaluation Role and Maintain His Objectivity? An evaluator who has participated in designing a project on which he is conducting a formative evaluation may have to ask himself some uncomfortable questions. Could his objections to program changes be based on his own ego involvement with the concepts in the proposal? Or could his objections to changes be based on his resentment over the dismantling of an evaluation plan over which he spent many hours? Since the evaluator can entertain these doubts, project personnel probably also share them. Thus his credibility as a formative evaluator may be questioned and his effectiveness lessened. His participation in writing the proposal plus his involvement in the formative evaluation may also limit the credibility of the summative evaluation as he can be perceived as having a vested interest in the outcome of the project. Is it ethical for an evaluator to participate in a project when both his credibility and effectiveness may be limited by the fact that he participated in formulating the project? It is the potential loss of credibility that led Scriven (2) to suggest that the evaluator who assists in designing the program, the formative evaluator, and the summative evaluator should all be different people.

There does not appear to be a reasonable solution to this problem. As mentioned previously, the assistance of an evaluator in designing a project can be valuable. However, few evaluators would be willing to invest the time to develop an evaluation plan, if they were not going to be offered the opportunity to conduct the evaluation. Therefore, it is unreasonable to expect the evaluator involved in program design and the one conducting the evaluation to be different people.

The Evaluator's Reputation. Throughout the paper, concern has been expressed for the evaluator's reputation which is, after all, his livelihood. There is some question as to how many projects which fail to develop in conformity with the guidelines set down in the proposal he can afford to be involved in before he seriously damages his reputation. The reputation of evaluation itself as a valuable adjunct to a project can also be damaged by conflict between the evaluator and management. However, there is also a question as to how far an evaluator should go in attempting to compromise conflict between his commitment to evaluation as a needed component of a project and his belief that management decisions are morally reprehensible.

Conclusion. Value conflicts are inherent in the very nature of evaluation. It is not possible to set absolute guidelines to apply to every project. Each situation will be unique and the evaluator will have to make judgments on his responsibilities for every project in which he is involved. However, the evaluator would be wise to at least consider what actions, if any, he should undertake if serious value conflicts arise during an evaluation.

Documentations.

1. Gooler, Dennis and Grotelueschen, A., "Process Accountability In Curriculum Development," in Worthern, Blaine and Sanders, James R., Educational Evaluation: Theory Into Practice, Charles A. Jones Publishing Company, Ohio, 1973, pp. 316-326.

2. Scriven, M., "The Methodology of Evaluation," obit. cit., pp. 60-104.

3. Stake, R.E., "The Contenance of Educational Evaluation," obit. cit., pp. 106-128.

4. Stufflebeam, D.L., "An Introduction to the PDK Book: Educational Evaluation and Decision Making," obit. cit., pp. 128-142.

5. Worthern, Blaine and Sanders, James, "Evaluation: The State of the Art," obit. cit., pp. 1-9.

CHAPTER 11.

PHILOSOPHICAL REMARKS ABOUT EDUCATIONAL EVALUATION: EVALUATION AND VALUES*

F. S. ELLET, JR.
G. D. FENSTERMACHER
B. SHUMENER

This essay presents a philosophical criticism of some of the major views of educational evaluation. In particular, we will argue that the major views have serious limitations that result from their lack of understanding of questions of value, especially ethical value. We will argue that current views of educational evaluation need to draw upon the philosophical writings on values in order for their views to be justifiable. We will argue that evaluation as a practical activity is grounded on empirical facts and theories of value.

Some Troubling Remarks

Alkin has facetiously stated that, surely, we are all aware of and "convinced of the value of evaluation," for he concludes his essay by stating that in certain situations "the context and decision factors are so predetermined that it can inevitably be said that no one needs it and no one cares" (Alkin, 1975, pp. 201, 211).

Now it is an important conceptual point that, in Western society at least, evaluation is a valued activity. It is an activity which people regard, rightly or wrongly, as being worthwhile. It is an activity which people look to for answers regarding the worth of the objects under study.

It is disturbing, therefore, to find that Alkin remarked elsewhere that "some evaluators readily accept the role of 'federal form filler-outer' and 'state statute satisfiers' and willingly do what is necessary to satisfy those requirements. That, too, is evaluation" (Alkin, 1976). If it were proper to identify as evaluation, activities which have dubious, or perhaps pernicious value, then an evaluation activity would not always be worthwhile. In some cases, at least, certain forms of evaluation would not be a good thing and could conceivably be a bad thing. This is especially true in those cases where the public awaits answers to questions of concern, yet receives completed federal forms instead. If Alkin is right, then one might properly conclude that certain forms of evaluation are not needed and that people are right in not caring about or in resisting such evaluations. Perhaps, then, people are wrong in thinking that evaluation is a good thing. Perhaps people ought to re-examine the limitations and the strengths of activities called evaluation.

---

*The research was conducted at The Center for the Study of Evaluation (University of California, Los Angeles) and was supported in part or in whole by the National Institute of Education, Department of HEW. However, the opinions expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the position or policy of the National Institute of Education, and no official endorsement by the National Institute of Education should be inferred.

Whether evaluation is a worthwhile activity depends in part on how evaluation is understood. Whether one should do evaluations is dependent in part on what the purpose of evaluation is. Is it helpful to say that mere federal form filling-out and state statute satisfying is evaluation? We turn now to address this and related questions.

The View of Stufflebeam and Guba

We shall begin by discussing the view which has come to be widely accepted by people writing about these things. (Many views of evaluation have been offered, and they do conflict with one another.)

In the monograph on evaluation produced by Phi Delta Kappa, Stufflebeam and Guba say that evaluation is the process of delineating, obtaining, and providing useful information for judging decision alternatives (Stufflebeam & Guba, 1971, p. xxv). The writers believed that this view of evaluation represents the essential or necessary features of evaluation, not just the accidental or contingent features. Stufflebeam and Guba were not merely offering their personal view of evaluation, i.e., they were not merely saying, "This is what we regard as evaluation." They were doing much more. What Stufflebeam and Guba attempted to do was to provide their reader with an explication of evaluation. Theirs was an attempt to delineate the kinds of activities which must take place whenever one evaluates.

That the writers believed that they were doing this is made clear by looking at the passages which follow:

> The basis for this definition (view of evaluation) is to be found in dictionary definitions of its key terms. Among other definitions, evaluation is defined as the ascertainment of value, and decision, as the act of making up of one's mind. The need to make up one's mind connotes the existence of competing alternatives and to select one over the other(s) requires ascertaining their relative values. Hence, evaluation is the process of ascertaining the relative values of competing alternatives. Although less specific, this definition of evaluation is consistent with the one proposed in this book (Stufflebeam & Guba, p. xxv).

Clearly, then, the writers believed that they were providing the essential or necessary characteristics of evaluation. Without such features or characteristics, an activity could not be an evaluation activity.

There are good reasons for trying to provide an explication of the essential features of evaluation. It is surely desirable from a theoretical point of view to have a clear idea--as clear an idea as possible--about the nature of evaluation activities. Otherwise, one's empirical studies and practical recommendations are likely to go astray. The second reason, which is related to the first, is that evaluation plays an important part in many activities of ordinary life. If one were merely to present his view of evaluation, there would be the ever-present danger that people would confuse the personal viewpoint with the more common or shared viewpoint. There are enough difficulties without adding the difficulties which might arise from such misunderstandings. It seems to us, then, that the writers were right in trying to provide, at least as a first step, the essential features of evaluation.

There are some problems, however, with the basis of the Stufflebeam-Guba view of evaluation. For the writers go on to state that the need to make up one's mind connotes the existence of competing alternatives and that to select one over the other(s) requires ascertaining their relative values. Thus, such a view implies that if one merely thinks he has alternatives before him he is not making up his mind--he is not making a decision. According to their view, a person can make a decision only if two (or more) alternatives actually exist. Now we think this point is well taken, but what about cases in which the alternatives exist but the person is not aware of them? Surely we would want to say that the person cannot make a decision if he is unaware of the alternatives. Therefore, Stufflebeam and Guba should add the necessary condition for deciding that the person must be aware of the alternatives. It is proper to say that a person has made a decision only if there are two (or more) alternatives actually open to him and only if he is aware of the two (or more) alternatives.

Second, and more importantly, they hold that deciding upon one alternative over the other(s) requires ascertaining their relative values. That is, one decides upon one of the alternatives only if he ascertains the relative values. Their view has the consequence that if one were to make a mistake about the relative values of the alternatives, then one could not be deciding upon one of the alternatives at all. The view holds, then, that it is inconceivable for someone to decide to do something when he has made a mistake in his attempt to ascertain the relative values. Now people make good decisions and bad decisions, but they make decisions nonetheless. To make a decision is in part to deliberate about taking alternative courses of action.

The reason for the mistake is that the writers have wrongly equated evaluation with deliberation. When one makes up one's mind--more precisely, when one deliberates--one tries, before acting, to determine which is the best course open to him with a view to entering on it. One is "ready," in some sense, to act upon the course which he thinks, after deliberation, is the best one. Needless to say, people can deliberate about which course of action is best and still not discover the best course. When one deliberates, he tries to evaluate the alternatives open to him, but he can deliberate and yet fail to determine the relative values of the alternatives, fail to evaluate the alternatives. When one deliberates, he is looking for what are the best reasons for and against the courses open to the agent. Looking is one thing; finding what one is looking for is another (Baier, 1965, p. 42).

Stufflebeam and Guba were entitled to conclude that deliberation is necessarily the process whereby one tries to determine the relative values of the alternatives. In deliberation, one tries, before acting, to evaluate the alternatives to determine the best course for him. Thus, an evaluation of the alternatives is what one tries to achieve in the process of deliberating about the courses of action open to the agent. It is important to notice two things about this statement. First, it is not a necessary or essential feature of evaluation; it is a necessary statement about the purpose of deliberation. One can do an evaluation without deciding what action to take. Second, unless the reader already knows full well what deliberation is, and hence he implicitly knows about evaluation, the statement will not help him understand evaluation. At best it will remind him of something he already knows. At worst, it will not increase his understanding at all. If someone were to ask you what a scientific theory is, it would probably not be helpful to tell him a scientific theory is what a scientist tries to achieve.

We conclude, therefore, that the basis offered in defense of the view of Stufflebeam and Guba is unsound. Rather than adequately explicating evaluation, it confuses evaluation with deliberation.

"Evaluation" and Supervenience

Upon completion of an evaluation, the person (or group) draws conclusions which in a rough way come to the following: the program is good (or bad), desirable (or undesirable), or worthwhile (or not worthwhile), and so on. When a person reaches such a conclusion, we are always entitled to ask, "What is good (or bad), say, about that?" This question must always admit of an answer. In philosophical jargon, "good" and related words refer to supervenient characteristics of a situation. One may always legitimately be asked when one has called something a "good" something, "What is good about that?" Now to answer this question is to give the properties in virtue of which we call it good. Sometimes we cannot specify just what it is that makes it good, but there must always be something (Hare, 1952, p. 131).

Because "good," say, is a supervenient epithet, one may always legitimately be asked when one has called something a "good" something, "What is good about that?" Ultimately, the answer appeals to certain standards, rules, or principles. Such standards or principles are often called ethical (or value) principles, or simply values. To be entitled to apply the word "good," then, a person must have a reason for thinking that the object is good. But reasons are no respectors of persons. There is a thrust toward objective justifiability. We are entitled to ask whether the person's reason is a good reason for calling the object good. Ultimately, his reason must show that the program satisfies certain ethical principles--that it has certain values. Our point, then, is that there is a conceptual connection between evaluation and value.

Another Argument in Favor of the View of Stufflebeam and Guba

At this point, one may grant that the basis offered by Stufflebeam and Guba is unsound, but one may argue that the view can be supported in another way.

Recall that their explication states that evaluation is the process of delineating, obtaining, and providing useful information for judging decision alternatives. According to their explication, the process of evaluation is concerned with judging alternative courses of action. Someone may point out in favor of their view that it does make the essential connection between evaluation and values. Furthermore, someone may point out that Stufflebeam and Guba's explication correctly identifies those standards, rules, or principles which are appropriate. Here is how Stufflebeam and Guba put it:

> If evaluation is a process that furnishes information useful in guiding decision making, the first operational step is the identification of the most useful information. Two things must be known:
>
> 1. What decision alternatives are to be considered (for it is about these alternatives that the information must be obtained).
>
> 2. What values or criteria will be applied (for the collected information must bear on these).
>
> These two sets of specifications can be obtained by the evaluator only in interaction with his client (Stufflebeam & Guba, 1971, p. 42).

Such a passage leads one to believe that it is the client's values or criteria which should be used. But the writers are unsure about this. They also write "that he need not accept the client's definition, no matter how foolish, or limit himself to the client's criteria, no matter how irrelevant. His task is to criticize the client's formulation" (Stufflebeam & Guba, p. 42). They fail, however, to specify which standards, principles, or criteria are to be applied here. And later they write about the "valuing process" this way:

> Value to whom? Obviously, to the client or decision maker. To the extent that the decision maker reflects a community of interest within and outside the institution he represents, his values may be a composite of various interests or reference groups. The political basis for arriving at value relates to system maintenance or power, so that

> decision makers, responsible for defining a value base, inevitably use those persons with a power stake in the system to define value (Stufflebeam & Guba, p. 112).

Apparently they believe that the appropriate principle is that one ought to serve the power structure. But why is such a view defensible? What if the community is committed to irrational and immoral practices? Don't those who lack power in the system deserve some consideration in the evaluation?

Their view is not helped by their specifying that at least four kinds of expectations should be considered: (1) the expectations (institutional values) of the Board of Education, (2) expectations of parents, (3) expectations of decision maker's co-workers, and (4) the personal or private values of the decision maker (Stufflebeam & Guba, p. 113). The same problems arise here, too.

According to Stufflebeam and Guba, then, the appropriate standards and criteria--values--are to be determined by finding out what certain groups of people expect, like, or prefer. It is important to realize that this view is shared by others. Popham expressed a similar view in the following way:

> The most popular educational needs-assessment models emphasize the accumulation of a considerable amount of preference data, typically from a variety of different educational clientele, such as pupils, teachers, and parents. This preference data deals with which educational goal various groups would most like to see a given instructional system achieve (Popham, 1975, p. 65).

Although Popham seems to disagree with Stufflebeam about which groups should be consulted, he does agree with Stufflebeam that to find the appropriate values and criteria one has to determine what certain people most like (Popham, 1975, p. 69). Popham did add, later on, that the decision maker didn't have to rely solely on such preference data. According to Popham, the decision maker should make a personal judgment as to the worth of the objectives under consideration, for he may be able to make "more enlightened judgments" as to the worth of various educational objectives (Popham, 1976, p. 69). As Stufflebeam and Guba had done, Popham, too, fails to specify what standards or criteria should be used to make a "more enlightened" judgment.

Worthen and Sanders do not believe that decision makers' preferences are always logical, rational, or intelligent revelations of value. According to their view of evaluation, the curriculum evaluator would first identify the curriculum goals, and using input from appropriate reference groups, determine whether or not the goals were good for the students, parents, and community served by the curriculum. But goodness is quickly equated with preference. And Worthen and Sanders wrote that "equating values with preference" had precedent in economics (Worthen and Sanders, 1973, pp. 21, 25, 26). Such a move by Worthen and Sanders shows a lack of understanding of economics and of the nature of values.

For surely it does matter in evaluation whether a person's preferences are informed, rational, or moral.

Stake has written that the evaluator ought to go beyond the stated objectives of the curriculum in order to find out from the people involved whether they see the project's objectives as highly appropriate (Stake, 1973, p. 314). Although Stake's position presents an interesting variation of the theme described above, his position is open to the same criticisms.

In a recent book on curriculum evaluation, Klein and Tyler wrote about values in the following way:

> Values permeate all thinking, feeling, and acting. Whether we are selecting a novel for a friend, thinking about the functioning of an institution, or feeling unhappy about a friend's behavior, our values are an integral part of our mental and psychological processes (Tyler & Klein, 1976, p. 26).

All of these writers share the belief that the appropriate values for evaluation can simply be identified with what a person (or a certain group) most likes or most prefers. They hold that when we speak of a value or of values, we refer to what is valued, felt to have value, desired, or thought to be good. The expressions "the group's values" and "his value system" refer to what a group and what a man value or think to to be good. Therefore, "value" means being valued (or preferred or desired), and "good" means being thought good or most desired.

We must make an important point about this use of the term "value" and its cognates. The term "value" can properly be used in such a way. The meaning of the term in one of its senses is such that to say that someone values something is to say that someone thinks highly of, esteems, or prizes that something. But we must remember that the term "value" is used in other ways. In particular, the term "value" is used to mean what has value or is valuable, or good, as opposed to what is regarded as good or valuable. Thus "values" means "things that have value," or "things that are good." A value is that which is desirable or worthy of esteem. To equate the former meaning of the term with the latter meaning of the term is to commit a form of the naturalistic fallacy. One cannot derive a valuable from a value.

The distinction between the two meanings of the term, then, is an important one. It is one we recognize in our daily lives. We sometimes value--regard as valuable--things we later come to see are not valuable. We sometimes make mistakes in our thinking or fail to think carefully about whether something is valuable, and upon reflection and comparison we come to see that we were wrong. Sometimes our views are uninformed; sometimes swayed by prejudice and bias. We are, or should be, careful to criticize our values to determine whether what we esteem is indeed worthy of esteem. This point may be summed up roughly by the slogan, "What interests the public may not be in the public interest."

In thinking about the nature of evaluation of actions, one should keep the following point well in mind.

> Every human action is in principle subject to practical and moral evaluation. It always makes sense to ask whether what human beings are doing (or going to do) is prudent or wise, satisfactory, intelligent, right or wrong. All action is directed, rightly or wrongly, correctly or mistakenly, towards ends held by the agent to be right. Accordingly, it always makes sense to ask whether these ends are properly evaluated or whether there is reason to suppose that their choice has been misguided or evil (Black, 1975).

It is always logically permissible, and sometimes ethically obligatory, to ask whether what the person values is really valuable. There is no logical barrier to going, and in some cases an obligation to go, beyond what the person thinks is valuable to ask whether it is valuable.

We conclude, therefore, that current writers on educational evaluation have committed a serious mistake by equating what people regard as valuable with what is valuable or worthy of esteem. Insofar as views similar to that of Stufflebeam and Guba imply that the appropriate value is what people regard as valuable, the view is mistaken and likely to be harmful to practice. Evaluation is not finding what people regard the value of something to be, but finding what is its value.

An Argument Concerned with Direct Impact

Those writers, such as Marvin Alkin, who are worried about the direct or immediate impact of evaluations, often suggest that the first and major job of the evaluator is to play to the major contextual "needs" of the given situation (Alkin, 1975, 1976). Instead of just looking at the decision alternatives, the evaluator is urged to look at the real purpose of doing the evaluation, at those who commissioned the evaluation, and at the range of actual possibilities for conducting an evaluation. According to this view, the important point is that if the evaluation is to in any way be useful--if it is to make a direct and immediate impact upon decision making--the evaluator must be aware of what is the major contextual starting point and he must "lay to" it. The evaluation is to be directed toward certain factors of the situation so that the evaluation will move the real decision maker, the agent in power.

Such suggestions are in some ways related to the Stufflebeam-Guba view which held that an evaluation, among other things, provides information which will be used by the decision maker. It follows from this view that if the information provided were not used, then the activity would not be an evaluation.

Clearly, there is something wrong with this view. We can provide somebody with good reasons, even conclusive reasons, for doing something, and yet the person can fail to act on them. If we criticize a governmental program because it brings about harmful results, our evaluation is still valid even if the government is unresponsive to the just criticism.

Perhaps Alkin is merely offering a view of evaluation which urges that the information provided be used. He does feel, however, that evaluators will be better prepared to provide the right kind of information if they understand who the real decision makers are, the decisions they make, and the constraints upon their decision making. The word "right" here, however, seems to mean little more than "useful in playing to the major contextual needs of the situation," to those in control (Alkin, 1975, p. 211).

A question which should immediately arise is whether an activity which "plays to the major contextual setting" is worth doing at all. That the evaluation "influenced" the decision process is, so far, not a good reason in favor of conducting such an activity. For what if the "evaluation" report were used by the existing powers to "legitimate" their denying educational opportunities to minority or disadvantaged students? The "evaluation" may well delineate, obtain, and provide information useful to those in power. Those in power may put the information to "good use" in the maintenance of their arbitrary privileges and authority. Surely such activities would not be justifiable or worthwhile. That policy which is justifiable must address more than the interests of those in authority and power, and it must consider those interests in a certain way.

Perhaps observations about the political realities led Campbell to the conclusion that evaluations should be conducted only where the political climate is propitious, where the political community is poised to move with the results (Campbell, 1975, p. 95). Apparently Campbell concluded that if the political community were not prepared to move with the justified conclusions of the evaluation, then the evaluation would not be worth doing. This view is mistaken for it assumes that an evaluation is worth doing only if the political community is ready to use the evaluation findings. Campbell has overlooked the fact that evaluations can have indirect effects. The evaluation may produce a public criticism of the institutions's practices that eventually will bring changes to the institution by social or legal means.

In certain cases information may be perceived as a good by those in power because of its usefulness for their purposes. Philosophers call such goods (or values) utility values. A utility value is a thing that is good because of its efficacy in reaching some end. But why should one stop an evaluation of a program when one has ascertained that the program has certain utility values or when one has ascertained that the evaluation will not be immediately acted on by those in power? Social criticism, as we know it, would cease to exist under such conditions. Many evaluations have indirect effects on institutional programs and structure. In situations where human needs are being neglected or where humans are being harmed, one is entitled and, indeed, one is morally obligated to evaluate those purposes which give rise to the utility values. Whether utility values are good or bad depends on whether the purposes being served are good or bad.

For example, some group may be using the educational institution not to educate but to control, in an arbitrary way, certain minority groups. Also, a program can, and sometimes should, be evaluated not only in terms of its intended purposes, but also in terms of its unintended consequences for others. Indeed, given such consequences, one should take them into account when evaluating the educational program. We concluded, therefore, that it is misleading, and perhaps pernicious, to say evaluation is merely an activity that provides information that plays to the major contextual setting. Such a view would misconstrue the significance of the major contextual setting and it would underemphasize, or ignore, the consequences of the program for the students and the community at large. Such an activity can rightly be censured for being partial in the extreme.

Sjoberg has argued that evaluators have as a matter of fact aligned themselves with the dominant groups in the system and meekly accept their "definitions" of program success and the public good (Sjoberg, 1975). He argued that the evaluator should adopt a "countersystem" position. Sjoberg is mistaken, however, in offering such a blanket prescription. His prescription is wise and justifiable only in cases where such "definitions" of program success and the public good are unjustifiable. Sjoberg overlooks the fact it is likely that an evaluator may well find a situation in which such "definitions" are justified. In the latter sort of case, the evaluator may rightly wish to "support" rather than counter the system.

Of course, empirical knowledge about the "major contextual setting" should be attained. But the empirical knowledge should not be used so that one can merely play to the "major contextual setting." Empirical knowledge plays a different role.

Here it is helpful to notice how social scientists view the role of their empirical findings. Paul Samuelson has written that the reason for doing economic analysis is that one's increased understanding of the system should aid in control and improvement (Samuelson, 1961, pp. 9-10). Robert Dahl has argued that political analysis helps one to understand the world he lives in so that he might make more intelligent, more rational, and more moral choices among the alternatives. According to Dahl, political evaluation is concerned with finding which of the political alternatives is best (Dah, 1970, pp. 1, 100). The political evaluator is not trying to have direct results; he is trying to accomplish something which will lead to improvement, directly or indirectly.

In the light of these remarks by Samuelson and Dahl, one should be troubled by the suggested division of evaluation by Ross and Cronbach. They suggested that we consider nontechnical and technical issues of evaluation and identify the technical issues with empirical research methodology matters. They seem to identify the nontechnical issues with either political science or political analysis (Ross and Cronbach, 1976, pp. 86, 94). They have overlooked what Dahl refers to as political evaluation. Political evaluation is essentially concerned with determining whether political institutions conform to certain ethical principles. Ross and Cronbach should not leave out questions about whether a practice is ethically defensible, regardless of the empirical or non-empirical nature of the practice.

Evaluation is a justifiable activity when it serves as a means of finding effective, ethical interventions. It has the task of determining whether a certain stragegy is effective as well as determining whether a certain strategy is ethically permissible or obligatory. Evaluation has an important and justifiable role to play, but its effects are often more indirect, more long range.

The Sorts of Theories of Value

As we have pointed out above, to evaluate something is to find or determine the value or worth of something. The concept of value (or worthwhileness), then, is logically prior to the concept of evaluation. A complete theory of evaluation logically depends on a theory of value. And here philosophers have an important contribution to make to the study of evaluation because of their detailed research into problems of values. Philosophers should remind us, for example, that the terms "value" and "valuation" and their cognates and compounds are used in confused and ambiguous ways, not only in economics and philosophy, but also in the social sciences and the humanities. Philosophical explication of these terms is required as a first step. For example, one should remember that the term "value" is sometimes used as an abstract noun (a) in a narrower sense to cover only that to which such terms as "good," "desirable," or "worthwhile" are properly applied, and (b) in a wider sense to cover, in addition, all kinds of rightness, obligation, virtue, beauty, truth, and holiness (Frankena, 1972, pp. 80-82).

In its widest sense, "value" is the generic noun for all kinds of critical or pro and con predicates, as opposed to descriptive ones, and is contrasted with existence or fact. In its narrower sense, "value" covers only certain kinds of critical predicates and is contrasted with descriptive predicates and even with other critical ones like rightness and obligation. The term "value" is a normative term and is to be contrasted with descriptive terms.

We can now see why it is misleading to say that the major function of evaluation is to provide information. To say that the program is a good one is not like saying that the program is a flexible one or that the program meets certain standards. In saying that the program is a good one, the person is doing something other than, or something more than, saying something true or false as one does in saying that the program is flexible, or in saying that the program meets certain standards. Saying that Jones has received a great education is logically different from saying that Jones scored in the 98 percentile on some standardized test. An evaluation does something other than, or something more than, providing information.

The Oxford English Dictionary says among other things that the word "good" is the most general adjective of commendation, implying the existence in a high, or at least satisfactory, degree of characteristic qualities which are either admirable in themselves, or useful for some purpose. Therefore, saying something is good is not quite prescribing that we do it or saying that we ought to bring it into existence, but rather commending it, with the implication that one is doing so on certain grounds (Brandt, 1959, p. 268; Frankena, 1972, pp. 81, 106).

Philosophical investigations have also produced various theories about the nature of value. The philosophical theories of value have been of two sorts (Brandt, 1959, pp. 4-10; Frankena, 1972, pp. 4-5; Hare, 1973, pp. 39-43). Normative theories make value judgments or valuations. They tell us what is good or what has value, what is bad, and so on. They answer the questions "Which value judgments are true or valid?" and "Why?" Such theories have usually been concerned only with general value judgments. The theoretician might try to find a set of fundamental (or basic), valid principles, which is complete in the sense that all true value judgments can be deduced from it (give an adequate stock of non-valuative or factual premises), and which is also as economical as possible, in distinct concepts and principles (Brandt, 1959, p. 5).

Metanormative theories analyze value, valuation, and good; they neither make value judgments nor tell us what is good or has value. They define what goodness and value are and what it means to say that something is good or has value. Sometimes philosophers also offer descriptive generalizations about what is valued or regarded as good in some culture or group cultures, and explanatory theories about why this is so valued or valuable. However, this is usually ancillary to their discussions of normative or metanormative questions. Descriptive and explanatory theories belong to anthropology, psychology, and sociology.

Metanormative theories also try to answer the question or set of questions which has to do with the justification or validity of value judgments and normative theories: Can they be justified or established with any certainty by some kind of rational or scientific inquiry? Can they be shown to have objective validity in any way? If so, how? What is the logic of reasoning in such matters? Those who state that values are arbitrary--that there is no way to establish objectively the validity of certain value judgments--are making a statement which belongs in a metanormative theory.

There is much questioning about whether such a theory of value has practical use. In certain branches of the social sciences, the theory of value is a logical foundation. Robert Dahl regards political analysis as serving the task of political evaluation. One does political analysis so that one can improve the situation. Paul Samuelson holds a similar view about economic analysis. Certain economists see the task of economic theory as one of making sound proposals about the means to maximize human welfare. Political analysis and economics, then, are essentially specialized continuations of that branch of normative ethics that consists of the critique and justification of institutions.

According to Richard Brandt, some confusions of social scientists today are a result of ignorance of ethical theory. For example, he points out that some social scientists do not distinguish the question of whether any ethical statements can be justified as correct for everybody from the question of whether in fact now, as opinions stand (criticized or uncriticized, informed or uninformed), people hold different views about ethical matters. They then proceed, Brandt says, from observations of variant ethical opinions among different peoples, to a wholly unjustified inference about the impossibility of making objective assessments as to whether progress has occurred or as to the comparative merits of different institutions and customs. Hence, they conclude with a dubious theory about the logical structure of the social sciences (Brandt, 1959, p. 11).

There are writers on educational evaluation who have stated that values are essentially arbitrary and that it is quickly apparent that no adequate methodology exists for the determination of values (Stufflebeam & Guba, pp. 26, 78). Those who hold that values are essentially arbitrary are committed to holding that evaluation is no better than superstition and that there can be no justification for performing any form of evaluation. Can evaluators be nothing more than smooth-talking, modern-day sophists or modern-day apologists?

Such writers would do well to consider, for example, the work of Richard Brandt and Bernard Williams. Williams wrote that relationism, the anthropologists' heresy, is possibly the most absurd view to have been advanced even in moral philosophy (Williams, 1972, p. 20). In its vulgar and unregenerate form, he said it consists of three propositions:

> 1. That "right" means (can only be coherently understood as meaning) "right for a given society";
>
> 2. That "right for a given society" is to be understood in a functionalist sense; and
>
> 3. That (therefore) it is wrong for people in one society to condemn, interfere with, etc., the values of another society.

As Steven Lukes noted, "Williams easily shows the inconsistency of this composite doctrine: the third proposition uses a non-relative sense of 'wrong' not allowed for in the first proposition" (Luke, 1974, p. 174).

Is value theory, then, of serious practical importance? The answer is clearly yes. If the conclusions of normative ethics about the ultimately worthwhile, about duties and rights, and about the critique of institutions are well established, then value theory is of the highest practical importance.

Following Brandt, we believe that the most important thing we have to gain from the tradition of ethical (value) theory is a model for a value system--what are the criteria for a tenable system of value judgments (Brandt, 1959, p. 14).

We hope it is clear, then, that anything which aspires to be a complete theory of evaluation must also concern itself with theories of value. Philosophical inquiries into the nature of value have the greatest relevance to such theory building.

Empirical Aspects

If we incorporate the philosophers' two sorts of theories, is the task of building a tenable evaluation theory complete? The answer is no. Evaluation may have as a main purpose the criticism and justification of institutions and policies of society, and evaluation may provide us with principles and criteria to guide our conduct. Still, more is needed.

The mistaken claim that evaluation has as its prime function the providing of useful information serves to remind us of a very important point. For we need to understand our current institutions so that we can properly evaluate them on the basis of relevant facts. It may be that we need to understand how our institutions work so that we can effectively restructure them to serve our ultimate principles. At any rate, we need reliable information in order to apply intelligently our principles of criticism and justification. We need to understand the strengths and weaknesses of our actual and possible institutions and of the people who are involved in them so that our institutions can serve legitimate human values. We need to know which of the possible strategies are justifiable and will lead to an improved situation.

Such matters can be settled, in principle, by the empirical methods of the social sciences. It is a matter of fact whether a given institutional structure will serve a certain end better than another institutional structure. Empirical theories and generalizations will tell us which of certain conditions are necessary or sufficient for securing given ends.

Should we say, then, that evaluation theory, as a practical science or art consists of two branches: the normative and the descriptive branch? Or should we say that only the normative aspect deserves the title of evaluation theory?

Because of the complexity of the institutions of society, especially the educational institutions, we believe it is better to say the former: educational evaluation theory has two branches, the normative and the descriptive. And each of these branches, as we have seen, has its own kind of theories. The normative branch has the normative and the metanormative theories, and the descriptive branch has the empirical theories. (It should be remembered that the empirical theories also have their metatheories--namely, the philosophy of the social sciences.) Practical evaluations need to be grounded on the principles and facts of the normative and the descriptive branch.

To have principles without grasping the facts is to be unrealistic and unable to apply properly the principles. To have facts without having principles is to be directionless. Sidney Hook has put it nicely. No wise policy can be formulated independently of the facts, but no mere recital of the facts alone determines policy (Hook, 1973, p. 113).

Conclusion

We have examined some of the major views of educational evaluation. We have offered philosophical criticism of the views about the nature of educational evaluation. We have tried to show the advantages and the disadvantages of such views.

In offering these remarks about the nature of evaluation, we have argued for the following. In its central case, to evaluate something is to determine or find the value or worth of something. Evaluation is essentially a normative activity which has as its logical foundation both ethical (or value) principles and empirical knowledge. Evaluation theory is comprised of theories of value and theories of social reality. Philosophers have an important contribution to make with regard to theories of value. The essential purpose of educational evaluation is the criticism and justification of certain social institiutions. The practice of evaluation, properly understood, is of the greatest practical importance.

In closing, let us remind the reader that our work has only laid down the general outlines of a defensible theory of educational evaluation. To have practical use, more details and concreteness must be added to the general conception. For example, given that we have correctly laid out the general conception of evaluation, how should our institutions and our evaluation teams be constructed so that the purpose of evaluation can be achieved? It should be clear that justifying an educational evaluation theory requires the combined efforts of social scientists and philosophers.

The value of our effort here is that it has laid the general, logical foundations upon which fruitful theorizing can build. In the end, a good theory is in everyone's interests. As one group of writers has recently put it:

> As it becomes clearer what epistemological stance, what view of the political system, or what assumption about the purposes of evaluation leads to each of the divergent positions taken by evaluators, researchers, and decision-makers, babble may be replaced by the kind of argument that brings the field to maturity--maturity in service, as well as of internal clarity (Ross & Cronbach, 1976, p. 106).

We must add that not only do epistemological questions need to be answered, but also ethical or value questions need to be answered. Evaluation as a practical activity is grounded on empirical facts and ethical principles.

Documentations.

1. M. Alkin, "Evaluation: Who Needs It? Who Cares?" *Studies in Educational Evaluation*, Winter 1975, *3*, 201-211.

2. M. Alkin, The title of this speech is.... Keynote Speech, Annual Meeting of California Educational Research Association, Burlingame, California, November 18, 1976.

3. K. Baier, The Moral Point of View, New York: Random House, 1965.

4. M. Black, Is Scientific Neutrality a Myth? Public Lecture, Annual Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, New York, January 1975.

5. R. Brandt, *Ethical Theory*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1959.

6. D. Campbell, Reforms as Experiments, In M. Guttentag & E. L. Struening (Eds.), *Handbook of Evaluation Research*, 1975.

7. R. Dahl, *Modern Political Analysis* (2nd ed.), Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970.

8. W. Frankena, *Ethics* (2nd ed.), Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972.

9. M. Guttentag & E. L. Struening, (Eds.), *Handbook of Evaluation Research*, Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1975.

10. R. M. Hare, *The Language of Morals*, Oxford University Press, 1952.

11. R. M. Hare, "Ethics," In *Essays on the Moral Concepts*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973, 39-54.

12. S. Hook, *Education and the Taming of Power*, La Salle, Ill.: Open Court Publications, 1973.

13. S. Lukes, "Relativism: Cognitive and Moral," *The Aristotelian Society*, 1974, sup. vol. *48*, 165-189.

14. W. J. Popham, *Educational Evaluation*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1975.

15. L. Ross & L.J. Cronbach, Book Review of *Handbook of Evaluation Research*, M. Guttentag & E. L. Struening (Eds.). *Proceedings of the National Acedemy of Education*, *3*, 81-107.

16. P. A. Samuelson, *Economics: An Introductory Analysis* (5th ed.), New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961.

17. G. Sjoberg, In M. Guttentag & E. L. Struening (Eds), *Handbook of Evaluation Research*, 1975, *2*, 29-51.

18. R. Stake, "Considerations in Planning Evaluation Studies," In B. F. Worthen & J. R. Sanders (Eds.), *Educational Evaluation in Theory and Practice*, 1973, 303-316.

19. D. Stufflebeam & E. Guba, et al., *Educational Evaluation and Decision Making*, Itasca, Ill.: Peacock, 1971.

20. L. Tyler & F. Klein, Associates, *Evaluating and Choosing Curriculum and Instructional Materials*, Los Angeles: Educational Research Association, 1976.

21. B. Williams, *Morality*, New York: Harper & Row, 1972.

22. B. F. Worthen & J. R. Sanders, *Educational Evaluation in Theory and Practice*, Worthington, Ohio: Charles A. Jones, 1973.

CHAPTER 12.

A THEORY FOR THE EVALUATION OF STUDENT TERM PAPERS: PLATO'S DIVIDED LINE REVISITED.

MICHAEL PRAETORIUS

Some time ago I had an experience which I am sure is not unknown to most teachers: A former student who had since graduated stopped by my office. "Dr. P.," he announced enthusiastically, "I now see what Plato was talking about!" And indeed it seems he did. What followed was a conversation about the nature of human excellence of which I think Plato would have been pleased: Two friends engaged in the joint work of discovering truth together through dialogue.

Later I checked my gradebook. That former student had received a "C" on each of the four short papers he had written for the course on Plato he had taken with five years before--and a "C" in the course. But his present level of understanding clearly was "A".

How could I comprehend such a clear improvement in understanding? In order to try, I turned to Plato's familiar Analogy of the Divided Line and Allegory of the Cave in the Republic, the primary purpose of which is to help us "picture the enlightenment or ignorance of our human condition." (1) The investigations which followed led not only to some insight into the change I had observed in my former student, but also the theory offered below.

In this paper I propose to present a theory of evaluation for the grading of student term papers based on the model of human understanding offered by Plato through the Divided Line Analogy. The theory can be summarized as follows: Understanding is not a continuum which the instructor must arbitrarily divide into segments, "A-F," when he evaluates a student's work. On the contrary, there are four qualitatively different types of mental activity and four corresponding levels of understanding which, although they are related and depend upon each other to some extent, are objectively different and can serve as a rational basis for assigning grades. Although I can speak only about my own experience as a teacher of Philosophy, I suspect that any body of thought can be understood at each of these levels. Our goal in the search for truth is a qualitative improvement in understanding rather than mere quantitative increase in knowledge; it is to be able to use the highest type of mental activity and thus attain the highest order of understanding.

We turn now to the Divided Line.

Plato tells us to take a line divided into two unequal parts and divide each part again in the same proportion. This gives us a line with four sections which symbolize degrees of "comparative clearness or obscurity" of understanding by their length; the shorter the segment the less clarity. (2) Each section stands for a distinct type of understanding: ". . . [C]orresponding to the four sections of the line [are] these four states of mind; to the top section intelligence, to the second reason, to the third belief, and to the last illusion." (3) Moreover, says Plato, the upper two sections represent knowledge while the lower two represent opinion.



The most significant feature of the Line is that it portrays four different states of mind--four qualitatively different types of mental activity; and four qualitatively different levels of understanding. Let us now look more closely at Plato's discussion of the Line to discover just what these four states of mind are; and, using that as a model, see how we might be able to detect four qualitatively different levels in the written work submitted by students.

A person thinking on the lowest level, level-D, illusion, is like the prisoner described in the Allegory of the Cave. He has opinions about the subject at hand which may contain some truth but are ill-formed and unclear. They are shadows, distorted images, of true opinion. His understanding of his subject is analogous to the understanding one has of a cow when he sees the shadow of a cow. Worse, however, is the fact that he is not aware of the degree of his own ignorance. He thinks his opinions are quite sound, that he understands what is significant about the subject. Like the prisoner in the Cave, he believes that the shadows of the objects he sees on the wall before him are "the whole truth" or "the most real." (4)

Now suppose the person operating on this level is confronted (for example, in a Philosophy class) with facts or reasoned arguments which conflict with his opinion. Plato suggests that we can expect him to react like the prisoner who is let loose from the bonds which forced him to sit facing the wall at the end of the cave "and suddenly compelled to stand up and turn his head and look and walk toward the fire [and the objects which have been casting the shadows by firelight on the wall]": He would be confused--blinded by the fire--and want to "turn back and retreat to the things which he could see properly, which he would think really clearer than the things being shown him." This would be his response even if he were "told that what he used to see was so much empty nonsense and that he was now nearer reality and seeing more correctly . . ." (5)

The essential features of the level-D state of mind, then, are first, the inability to understand the more reasoned, more clear, ideas presented (perhaps, as Plato explains it, because he is not accustomed to looking at objects of their relative "brightness"); and second, the conviction that his present "shadowy" opinion is correct and sufficient.

What sort of term paper will a student functioning on level-D submit? It will be one marked by confusion and misunderstanding of the subject he is discussing, indicated by serious misrepresentations of the opinions of others (the philosopher he is examining, the text, or the lecturer). Further, his discussion will be punctuated by bare statements of opinion (usually, "I feel that . . .") unsupported by evidence or reasoned argument.

The appropriate grade for this level of mental activity is "D". Since Whittier College uses the "ABC/No Credit" grading system, I return papers written at this level for rewriting, in the hope that the student will be compelled, like the prisoner in the cave, to gaze at the body of thought presented to him in text and lecture until he sees it more clearly, and begins to think about what reasons he might give to support his own opinions. There usually is an improvement when it is resubmitted.

The next level of understanding represented in the Divided Line is "belief," level-C. The difference between the understanding one attains through mental activity in this state of mind and that of illusion is analogous to the difference between the knowledge one has of a cow by looking directly at it and that one has by looking at its shadow. The freed prisoner in the cave is in this state of mind when he can clearly see the fire and the objects which cast the shadows in the cave without being blinded by their relative brightness. A student is at this level when he can grasp the facts and theories as presented by text or instructor.

The intellectual goal at this level is to gain as much information as possible about "who said what": What Plato said about justice; what Plato said about friendship; what Plato said about the soul; what Plato said about the ideal state . . . What Toynbee thought history is . . . What the biology text says the parts of a cell are . . . and so on, endlessly. Quantity is the standard; the more facts, data, "knowledge" one has the better. If one studies hard and has a good memory he becomes an expert on the opinions of others; he is the College Bowl champion. Though we sometimes carelessly call a person's understanding at this level "knowledge," Plato calls it "opinion," because the person functioning at level-C has not yet examined and personally verified it (an activity which begins at level-B). He merely accepts it as "fact." The so-called "knowledge explosion" is submerging us in ideas to be examined--level-C opinion.

The characteristic ability and attitude of the person functioning on this level are, first, the ability to receive, remember, and repeat back ("regurgitate") what has been given to him in the way of facts and theories, and, second neutrality or "objectivity." His concern is to "get the facts straight." If he recognizes any relation between them and his own beliefs he tends to try to keep them separate. His attitude is expressed in statements like, "One's own values interfere with the objective, impartial, unbiased grasp of the facts." Or, the all too common, "Everyone is entitled to their [sic] own opinion; Plato has his and I have mine."

Unlike the mental activities represented by the two lower sections of the Divided Line, those of the upper two sections are directed toward the evaluation and personal verification of the opinions already grasped by the mind at level-C. The attitude of the mind in the upper levels is well represented by the following comment, so typical of Socrates:

"Fine, Euthyphro. Now you have given me the answer that I wanted [i.e., a clear opinion about the meaning of 'piety']. Whether what you say is true, I do not know yet. But, of course, you will go on to prove that it is true . . . Come, then let us examine our statement." (6)

Or again:

"Are we to examine this definition, Euthyphro, and see if it is a good one? Or are we to be content to accept the bare statements of other men or of ourselves without asking any questions? Or must we examine the statements?" (7)

The process of evaluation of given opinions makes use of "reasoning" when the mind is operating at the level symbolized by level-B. Reasoning here means, essentially, discovering the implications of a given set of propositions. According to Plato, the reasoning mind "has to base its inquires on assumptions and proceed from them . . . to a conclusion." (8) The mind here is "unable to depart from and rise above its assumptions . . ." (9) The assumptions may be universally well-accepted, such as the first principles of mathematics or the sciences (e.g., Every event has a cause. Space and time are linear and continuous. The shortest distance between two points on a place is a line.); or they may be our own or someone else's opinion about something (e.g., one of Euthyphro's definitions of piety, or the claims about human rights in the Declaration of Independence).

It is important to notice that, for Plato, the examination of a proposition (an opinion with which one is presented) begins with the acceptance of a set of propositions, including the one to be examined, as true, at least for the sake of argument. One cannot examine a proposition which one does not accept as true, at least hypothetically. Reasoning, the mental activity of level-B, thus takes the form of testing an hypothesis. This is why Socrates' response to Euthyphro in the first quotation cited above ends with, "Come, let us examine our statement."

Since reasoning always begins with unexamined but accepted assumptions and proceeds "down" to a conclusion, the best one can attain with level-B reasoning is either conditional knowledge, showing that a certain conclusion is true *if* the assumptions are true; or a proof of falsity, showing that at least one of the assumptions is false because the set of assumptions implies a contradiction. Thus, reasoning may be able to show that a statement is false, but not (except conditionally) that one is true. The former is more certain but is not enlightening in itself, since it is only knowledge of what is not true. It is because Socrates used the method of showing what is false in his dialogues with others (as reported by Plato) that he claimed that he knew nothing that is really worth knowing (10) and yet gained the reputation of being an expert at destroying the arguments of others.

What has been called "conditional knowledge" above seems to fit under the proposed definition of knowledge considered by Socrates in *Theaetetus*, "Knowledge is true belief with the addition of an account or explanation [*logos*]." (11) The explanation is a reason why the belief is true, an argument in support of the belief. Thus, when a person not only knows "who said what" but also, as a result of his own examination of what they said, can say *why* his own opinion (about what they think) is true, he is functioning on level-B of the Divided Line. A person who merely knows someone else's reasons for asserting the truth of an opinion is not functioning on level-B; he still is on level-C. He has not made the opinion his own reasoned opinion.

A student is functioning on the reasoning level when he is drawing implications--seeing logical connections between ideas (whether they be his own ideas or those of someone else). He is not merely remembering the arguments others give for their opinion but developing his own. His attitude will be such that he is not satisfied with simply stating his own opinions, but feels compelled from within to give better and better reasons for them. The sorts of statements one expects from him are "This implies that . . ." and "This is true because . . ." A student paper in which this ability and attitude are reflected deserves a grade of "B."

We come finally to level-A of the Divided Line, "intelligence." The following is Socrates' description of the sort of mental activity in which one engages at this level:

"[Here the process of argument] treats assumptions not as principles, but as assumptions in the true sense, that is, as starting points and steps in the ascent to something which involves no assumption and is the first principle of everything; when it has grasped that principle it can again descend, by keeping to the consequences that follow from it, to a conclusion." (12)

This activity of transcending assumptions and "grasping the first principle of everything" is more vividly described in a letter Plato wrote to "the friends and companions of Dion":

"Acquaintance with philosophy must come after a long period of instruction in the subject and of close companionship, when, suddenly, like a blaze kindled by a leaping spark, it is generated in the soul and at once becomes self-sustaining . . .

"The study of virtue and vice must be accompanied by an inquiry into what is false and true of existence in general and must be carried on by constant practice throughout a long period. After practicing detailed comparisons of names and definitions and visual and other sense perceptions, after scrutinizing them in kindly argument by the use of question and answer without jealousy--at last, in a flash, understanding of each blazes up; and the mind, as it exerts all its powers to the limit of human capacity, is flooded with light." (13)

To understand how this transcendence occurs and apply the idea to the theory of evaluation, we must reconsider level-B. An essential characteristic of level-B, it will be remembered, is that assumptions used in reasoning are unquestioned. Even the person who is performing excellently at this level (let us call him "B+") fails to question them. His excellence lies in his ability to recognize that he is accepting them and his ability to draw inferences which, ultimately, depend upon them. Thus, level-B is the system-building level. Here one discovers truths and painstakingly connects them logically until they begin to constitute a coherent system--a system which is seen to consist of a collection of interrelated parts. But such a constructed system would never be complete; for any whole is greater than the sum of the parts. Knowledge of the parts and their relations is different from knowledge of the whole.

The operation of the mind at level-A is the reverse. Here the whole is grasped intuitively as a whole; and level-A analysis then consists of explaining the parts of an already apprehended whole. The intuited whole is not a system constructed by level-B reasoning. On the contrary, when the whole is intuitively grasped, the assumptions which grounded the system being generated on level-B are "destroyed" as first principles.(14) One now knows how the parts relate not merely because he sees the individual logical connections between them, but because he understands them as parts of a whole which he apprehends prior to his recognition of many of the parts as parts. It is one thing to realize that A implies B; it is quite another to realize that A and B are what they are and are related as they are because they belong to a larger whole which is already apprehended. Thus, the apprehension of the whole (e.g., Plato's view of man as expressed in the Republic) is not a direct function of the quantity of level-C information one has absorbed; neither is it a direct function of the amount of level-B reasoning one has done, although these are necessary preparation. It is the result of an intuition or insight, which is a qualitatively different mental activity.

How is level-A understanding manifested? By a person's ability to "see how everything fits." In a term paper, the level-A student relates the ideas he is discussing to a range of personal experience and knowledge in other areas which extends far beyond the ideas which provide the basis for his paper: He sees, for example, that Plato's theory of justice can be related to contemporary political issues, to contemporary psychological theories, to his own activities as a leader in student government, to his relations with his roommate, to the question of whether he should drop out of school or not, etc. Whitehead seems to be speaking of this sort of understanding when, in a discussion of wisdom, he says: "That knowledge which adds greatness to character is knowledge so handled as to transform every phase of immediate experience." (15)

Further, the level-A student's paper contains insights into his subject which he is able to explain with a variety of examples and lines of argument. He easily and concisely weaves together a wide range of ideas. The material he is discussing "makes sense" to him as a whole, and his concern is to go beyond it, while at the three lower levels the student is still trying to discover what sense the parts make.

At last we have come to the end of the Line. The argument has been that there are four qualitatively different levels of mental activity and understanding, and that these levels provide a rational basis for assigning grades to the written work submitted by students. The levels can be summarized as follows:

--The grade of "D" (or "No Credit") is appropriate when the student's understanding of the ideas presented to him is so fuzzy that he cannot say clearly what they are. He misunderstands and misrepresents the facts.

--The grade of "C" is appropriate when the student shows that he grasps the course material as presented. He knows "who said what," including the reasons that someone else gives for his views.

--The grade of "B" is appropriate when the student is able to draw logical connections between ideas (both his own and those presented to him), and is able to develop his own reasons for claiming the truth of his opinions.

--The grade of "A" is appropriate when the student seems to grasp and appreciate the whole of a body of thought, from which he seems to be able to explain the significance of any particular idea in it, and into which he is able to draw a wide range of knowledge and experience.

Some wag is probably wondering now about the grade of "F." What else could that be but what is appropriate for the person who has refused to turn around and look at the fire in the cave. He slept through so many classes that he cannot even give a distorted description of it.

Whatever is said about grading has implications for teaching. The teacher's expectations and requirements must match his theory of grading. If my expectations were that the students in my classes were there simply to "learn the facts" and my tests and papers merely required them to show that they know "who said what," I could not assign grades as proposed above: All I would be asking of them would be level-C understanding.

If grades are to be assigned using the model provided by Plato's Divided Line, my goal must be to help students develop the highest type of mental activity. My assignments must assume that they will transcend level-C insofar as that is possible for them. What this means in practice is that the assignments must be formulated so that level-B work is expected. (Level-A understanding of the whole cannot be expected because level-A mental activity cannot be deliberately practiced; when it comes, it comes as a "flash," which is a gift to both the student and his teacher. Anyway, a good deal of level-B work is required before the leve-A insight.)

Two examples from my own teaching will illustrate the difference between a level-C and a level-B assignment for a paper. In both cases the basic assignment was to discuss a quotation from a philosopher we were studying. In both cases the student was to choose the quotation on which he would comment.

--Level-C Assignment: Begin your paper with the following question and answer it: What does (the philosopher) mean and why does he say that (quotation ?

--Level-B Assignment: Begin with a quotation. Explain briefly what the quotation means, if it seems necessary. State your own opinion about the quotation as directly and precisely as possible. Then explain why your opinion about the philosopher's statement is correct. (This explanation will constitute the bulk of your paper.)

The level-C assignment asks only for an exposition of the philosopher's view and his argument; it does not encourage level-B work. I no longer use it. The level-B assignment expects both level-C understanding and also the ability to formulate one's own argument. The "explanation why" can take the form of either level-B inference from assumptions or level-A global discussion.

There is another implication of this theory of evaluation for teaching, one which I dare to mention only because I must. It deserves another paper. The levels of understanding correspond to levels of being. Thus, my ability as a teacher to see the four levels of mental activity in my students and help them raise their level depends on my ability to function at level-A. Abraham H. Maslow describes the situation well:

"As Emerson said, 'What we are, that only we can see.' But we must now add that what we see tends in turn to make us what it is and what we are . . . A higher order of persons can understand a higher order of knowledge; but also a higher order of environment tends to lift the level of the person, just as a lower order of environment tends to lower it. They make each other more like each other." (16)

The teacher cannot lead his student any farther out of the cave than he himself has already gone. Thus, if I am to undertake the responsibility of assigning grades under this theory seriously, I had better be asking myself, "What am I doing to raise my level of being?"

Documentations.

1. Plato, *The Republic*, trans. H. D. P. Lee, Penguin, Baltimore, 1974, p. 317 (514a).

2. *Ibid*., p. 312 (510a).

3. *Ibid*., p. 316 (511e).

4. *Ibid*., p. 318 (515d).

5. *Ibid*.

6. Plato, *Euthyphro, Apology and Crito*, trans. F. J. Church, Bobbs-Merill, New York, 1956, p. 7 (7a).

7. *Ibid*., p. 11 (9e).

8. Plato, *The Republic*, p. 313 (510b).

9. *Ibid*., p. 314 (511a).

10. Plato, *Euthyphro, Apology and Crito*, p. 26 (21d).

11. Plato, *Theaetetus* in Francis McDonald Cornford, *Plato's Theory of Knowledge*, Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1957, p. 142 (201d).

12. Plato, *The Republic*, p. 314 (511b).

13. Plato, "Letter VII" in *Plato: The Collected Dialogues*, ed., Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, Pantheon, New York, 1964, pp. 1589-91 (341d-344b).

14. Plato, *The Republic*, p. 344 (533d).

15. Alfred North Whitehead, *The Aims of Education*, Mentor, New York, 1958, p. 43.

16. Abraham H. Maslow, "Ismorphic Interrelationships Between Knower and Known" in *Sign, Image, Symbol*, ed., Gyorgy Kepes, George Braziller, New York, 1966, p. 143.

CHAPTER 13.

EVALUATING THE COMPETENCY OF HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS: AN ARBITRARY MATTER?

LOIS WEINBERG

A current debate in the evaluation community centers on the defensibility of setting standards of competency or proficiency for purposes of determining who should receive a high school diploma. The chief academic rivals in this debate are Gene V. Glass, University of Colorado, and W. James Popham, UCLA. Glass has done seminal work on this problem (1977; 1978). In his papers, he contends that standards of proficiency or competency cannot be determined other than arbitrarily. Furthermore, he stresses that the consequences of these arbitrarily determined standards have grave effects on students; namely, those who do not meet the set standards of competency or proficiency are denied high school diplomas. Popham, in a recent paper (1978), attempts to rebut many of Glass's claims. Popham's primary assertion is that while competency or proficiency standards must be set judgmentally, the judgment need not be an arbitrary one.

In this paper, I will show that the position taken by Glass is basically an untenable one. Although, he is quite correct in his contention that setting standards is not fundamentally a task of the psychometrician. While Popham is on the right track in denying the necessity of arbitrary standards, he presents a superficial treatment of the issue. Moreover, he does not show the practical implications of his position for test constructors or test users. It is my intention to expand on the issues presented in Popham's rebuttal which pertain to the judgmental nature of determining standards by focusing specifically on what is meant by the concept of judging. Since setting standards, if done with regards to relevant reasons, grounds, or evidence, is an act of judgment, this direction seems fruitful for bringing insight to the issues involved in the controversy.

Before embarking on an analysis of 'judging' as it relates to setting standards, a little background on the current use of competency or proficiency tests and their consequences might prove relevantly informative. Recently, "minimum-competency" testing programs have been implemented in many states in the US. Such programs have been implemented, according to Popham, "as a way of halting what is perceived as a continuing devaluation of the high school diploma." (1978, p. 2) But what has happened, in at least some states where "minimum-competency" testing programs have been established for purposes of conferring diplomas, is that there has been a tremendous failure rate among students. Glass (1978) focuses on what he calls the embarrassing situation which occurred in the state of Florida after a functional literacy test was administered to high school juniors in accord with an order by the state legislators. In one county, which includes Jacksonville, 45% of the juniors failed the math section and 14% failed the reading and grammar part. Furthermore, only 6% of the juniors at Jacksonville's major black high school passed the math section. In Florida, those who do not pass the literacy test in their junior year are placed in remedial classes. These students then are allowed two more attempts to pass the test. If after these additional attempts to pass the test they do not meet the minimal acceptable standards, such students are not awarded a high school diploma.

The Nature of Judgments

In Glass's work it is often unclear what he perceives to be arbitrary in the setting of standards for proficiency or competency tests. Sometimes he writes as if all standard-setting must be arbitrary, that there is a logical necessity that it occur by whim or caprice. I argue that this position is patently wrong. To claim that all judgments are capricious or whimsical is to misconstrue the nature of judgments. At one point in his paper, Glass writes:

> To my knowledge, every attempt to derive a criterion score is either blatantly arbitrary or derives from a set of arbitrary premises. (1977, p. 42)

One might argue that just because Glass claims that every attempt to derive a criterion score (i.e., set a standard) is arbitrary, this does not show that he believes that setting standards is necessarily an arbitrary activity. It simply might be that the way standards have been set in the past has been inadequate, that the grounds on which judgments have been made have been poor. But if this were the case, it would seem that Glass would recommend looking for better grounds to justify particular standards. What he does instead is to recommend abandoning the setting of standards of proficiency or competency completely on the assumption that it is an impossible task. Popham quite correctly points out in his rebuttal:

> There are instances galore in which human beings exercise their judgmental skills to reach highly consistent and defensible conclusions. For example, there is considerable agreement among qualified wine-tasters and art critics when judging the merits of even exotic wines and watercolors. (1978, p. 3)

What Popham has neglected to say, however, is that the reason that wine tasters and art critics in many cases are able to reach consisitent and defensible conclusions is because judgments, by their nature, are made on the basis of certain grounds. In making a judgment, one makes decisions in accordance with what one considers to be sound thinking and discriminating appraisals. Therefore, it does not make sense to claim that judgments are arbitrary, in the sense that they are based upon whim or caprice.

In criticizing Glass's paper, Popham has focused on what might be called the ranking or grading sense of making a judgment. The examples of judging wine or works of art are quite appropriate in this context. Grounds may be advanced as to why certain wines or works of art are judged superior or inferior to others. One also might judge the relative competence of wine-makers or artists. Yet, it is not only the ranking or grading sense of making a judgment that is used by Glass to support his claim of arbitrariness; he particularly focuses on what might be called the predicting sense of making a judgment. He uses this sense of making a judgment in his discussion of minimal-competency.

> What is the minimum level of skill required in this society to be a citizen, parent, carpenter, college professor, key-punch operator? If anyone would dare specify the highest level of reading performance below which no person could succeed in life as a parent, counter-examples of persons whose reading performance is below the "minimal" level yet who are regarded as successful parents could be supplied in abundance. (1977, p. 29)

The predicting sense of making a judgment is the making of some sort of determination in advance on the basis of what one believes are relevant grounds. Predictions of this sort are made all the time. Bankers, for example, make predicting judgments when considering persons for loans. Reliability may be considered an appropriate ground for granting a loan. In order to judge whether a potential borrower is and will continue to be reliable, bankers rely on certain types of evidence. They presumably rely upon their own past experience with borrowers of a certain type and upon past records of the particular borrower in question. It may be that a banker relies on unsupported evidence or makes unwarranted assumptions, and as a result makes a bad judgment, but this is a different situation from a banker who uses no grounds or evidence at all, or none which are relevant to the judgment. The banker who does not use grounds or evidence, or does not use relevant ones, may be said to make arbitrary decisions in granting or denying loans. It is important to point out that whether a judgment is of the ranking or the predicting type, the making of a judgment per se implies the application of some relevant grounds or evidence. Consequently, when a determination is made about the quality of a wine or the competence of a student, if relevant grounds or evidence are advanced to substantiate the judgment it would be incorrect to assert that the determination was an arbitrary one.

A good portion of Glass's paper (1977) is devoted to demonstrating the methods by which standards of competency are determined for various competency or proficiency tests. Unfortunately, none of the methods explicated involve any sort of defense which includes such factors as subject matter considerations, immediate and long range effects on students, or potential consequences to society. In the setting of standards, value positions should be made clear, as well as any relevant empirical considerations. What the methods described by Glass offer instead are mathematical techniques for arriving at a standard on any given criterion-referenced test. These techniques do not rely on what would seem to be relevant reasons, grounds, or evidence in this matter. From the examples presented of how standards currently are being set, Glass indeed should be distressed, but he is wrong to conclude that the setting of standards is necessarily an arbitrary activity.

Precision and Arbitrariness

One of Glass's major concerns with contemporary competency and proficiency tests is that judgments of competency or proficiency may not be precise and exact. Glass states his concern in this way:

> I am maintaining, however, that these tests permit no sensible, nonarbitrary demarcation of scores into two categories described by words and ideas like "competent vs. incompetent," "skilled vs. unskilled," "knowledgeable vs. unknowledgeable." (1978, p. 20)

On this point, Glass is quite correct; most judgments cannot be made with perfect precision and exactness. In fact, it is in the nature of judgments that some degree of precision and exactness is lacking. A lack of some degree of certitude is what differentiates 'judging' from 'knowing' (Green, 1971, p. 176). But what Glass does not seem to understand is that because a judgment about a person's competency or proficiency in a subject may lack a certain degree of certitude, this does not imply that such a judgment is an arbitrary one. If a judgment is made, it must rest upon some grounds or evidence. On this matter, Green tells us:

> But the grounds of judgment are never conclusive, and therefore it is perfectly possible for different men to give different judgments on the same matter and even in relation to the same grounds; and it may also be the case that such different judgments are equally reasonable . . . . The fact that reasonable men may differ in their judgments does not imply that they are merely expressing some personal preference or a mere groundless opinion. It implies only that the subject matter of their views is appropriate for judgment rather than knowledge. (1971, p. 178)

Practical Implications

Glass has a legitimate gripe against psychometricians who appear to make the setting of a cut-off score a mathematical, rather than a judgmental task. If a mathematical formula is to be used in determining a cut-off score, it should be related to grounds which are relevant to the judgment at issue. It is of utmost importance that those involved in the making and the use of criterion-referenced tests realize that the setting of cut-off or criterion level scores is a judgmental act fundamentally. Therefore, when there are differences of judgment as to what constitutes an acceptable cut-off score, it would seem that all those involved in determining the cut-off score should present their reasons for their judgments. In fact, it seems that, on moral grounds, those who are compelled to take proficiency or competency tests should have access to the grounds underlying subject matter inclusion on the tests as well as to those underlying the setting of criterion or cut-off scores. Access to the grounds underlying these judgments would be particularly important, it seems to those whose lives may be affected quite seriously by the outcome of the competency or proficiency tests. If the reasons for including particular subject matter on these tests were made known as well as the reasons for the setting of a particular cut-off or criterion level score, then not only might students have a greater understanding of why they had to pass particular tests at a certain criterion level, but also challenges could be leveled by those who do not agree with the thinking involved in the judgments. Another benefit of making the grounds known, it seems, would be that the test makers and users would be required to think clearly about their decisions.

In conclusion, it is not the case, as Glass implies, that the setting of a cut-off score is necessarily an arbitrary activity. However, it does appear that the way cut-off scores currently are determined for competency or proficiency tests is either capricious or the grounds used in making the judgments are irrelevant. Popham's responsibility, along with others who wish to use competency or proficiency tests for purposes of conferring or denying high school diplomas, should be to justify what is included in these tests and the scores designated as cut-offs. The morality of such test utilization only can be assessed in this way.

Documentations.

1. Gene V. Glass, "Standards and Criteria." Monograph prepared under a grant from the Carnegie Corporation, December 1977.

2. Gene V. Glass, "Postscript to 'Standards and Criteria.'" Paper presented at the 1977-78 Winter Conference on Measurement and Methodology of the Center for the Study of Evaluation, University of California, Los Angeles, 4 January 1978.

3. Thomas F. Green, The Activities of Teaching (N.Y.: McGraw Hill, 1971).

4. James W. Popham, "As Always, Provocative." 1978.

CHAPTER 14.

OUR EDUCATIONAL QUANDARY

JOHN CONNELY

I Introduction

Many of the problems we face today in education have been exacerbated and made seemingly impenetrable and more intrasigent because of vague, overvalued and unrealistic goals and beliefs. Continuing as we have been, or even doubling or trebling our efforts, will be of little avail if clearer insight is not gained. Without better understanding we can expect, indeed must expect, increasing frustration, disillusionment, erosion of public support and sagging of teacher morale as our perceptions deviate ever more from our expectations.

II Vague Goals

Vague goals, although of possible value to gloss over fundamental differences of belief, make it difficult to plan intelligently, to effectively measure progress or to evaluate technique. Such goals not only seem elusive, but obscure any possible clear-cut success or failure. A person or institution may be doing poorly or, contrariwise, rather well, and there is often no way to validly determine either result. There may be a sense of achievement in specific actions, but no idea whether some larger goal is being reached or even approached. Behavior may come to consist mainly of a discontinuous, inconsistent series of actions motivated by habit or of ongoing ad hoc responses to the necessity of having to do something.

The vagueness may not be readily apparent, nor may a need for greater specificity always be felt. Often our curriculums seem, if anything, too specific. A curriculum guide or textbook may be exhausting in detail with such superabundance of material that no one class can ever cover it all--let alone learn or understand it. The vagueness, however, comes to the fore when the individual teacher, faced with a particular class, has to decide what to teach, what the class is to learn, and what he means by "learn." If, as is too often the case, there are no criteria available for any of these decisions beyond the teacher's personal opinion, then a situation has been allowed to emerge where any and every teacher is the primary or sole judge of what is to be learned and not learned, what adequate learning is, and to what extent it is occurring. Hence grades no longer can be viewed as either a measure of achievement or even an indication that certain assumed material has been covered, but are rather largely an expression of some particular person's approbation or, more rarely today, opprobrium.

Even if curriculums were much better delineated and adhered to than they are, without some sort of epistemological agreement or understanding, neither teaching, nor learning, nor testing can be adequately undertaken or evaluated. Simply put, it is often not at all clear what really is meant by "knowing" something. What do we mean when we say that a student should know about mathematics, the U.S. Civil War, physics and chemistry? Defining our subjects more specifically does help, but not as much as is usually supposed. If instead of mathematics is substituted "the binomial theorem," the problem still exists as to what type of behavior will give valid evidence that the student knows the binomial theorem. What we are vague about is the concept of knowledge. Thus, it is not clear how to test for it. As a result of such epistemological vagueness it is often questionable whether test scores are even circumstantial evidence of genuine knowledge and understanding.

The vagueness of our goals is a root problem contributing significantly to the never-ceasing question of "Why Can't Johnny Read?". It is almost never clarified what is meant by "reading" nor what can be or should be expected of whom at what level of development. Adler and Van Doren, for instance, in How to Read a Book, discuss four distinctly different levels of reading skill. When the claim is made that masses of young people can't read, what level are we discussing? What percentage of people should or can read at what level and by what age?

The vagueness surrounding the concept of reading has many ramifications. If we are not sure what it is then how do we develop the skills? How do we structure our lesson plans and examinations to require the development and use of these skills? How are we even to determine whether we are contributing to a solution of the problem at all? We might just be making it worse. Such questions as these come to mind when college faculty are heard to bemoan the low reading levels of their students, but may require tests in which there are few or no assigned readings and often give examinations which concentrate substantially or wholly on the recognition of discrete data which can be gleaned entirely from the lectures.

III Overvalued Goals

Overvalued goals have the pernicious effect of excluding any alternative to complete success or failure. Success becomes indispensable as failure appears catastrophic. In this two-valued universe people are equal or unequal, schools are democratic or undemocratic, and a student is a high school graduate or uneducated. The last either-or has the dubious virtue, in this case, of being quantifiable, but it, too, masks the deeper problem that people are equal in some ways and unequal in others, that the concept of democracy may have more or less relevancy to different situations and individuals, and that high school graduation may have little or nothing to do with the appropriatenenss and importance of a particular high school experience for the individuals involved. We have forced a simplistic two-valued orientation on a complex multivalued reality.

The determination of high school graduation is often of dubious merit because we as a society have placed so much value in the name of democracy on equality and commonalty of experience, at least through the twelfth grade, that little place has been left for the inequalities among all human beings and justifiable needs for un-common experiences. We are faced with young people with different present and future needs, ambitions, and abilities; yet we act as if the only democratic solution is a Procrustean one. Thus, instead of seeking out educational experiences which better meet individual needs and differences, we utilize our schools as a means of attempting to coerce a bland, necessarily mediocre at best, equality.

We have come to cherish this single value beyond all others. We have come to cherish it so much that the raison d'etre of public schools has often become keeping young people involved in doing something, anything to keep them together, until they can be graduated for accumulated seat time. This has brought about the proliferation of electives and the progressive lowering of standards precisely because only in such a way did it appear that such a large heterogeneous group could be catered to, but the fact of the matter may be that no single institution will be able to meet the variety of legitimate needs of American youth. The thinner we make the common gruel in our frenetic effort to make it go around and suit everyone, the less nourishing it may become for anyone. As our goal of equality continues to elude us, we must make ever greater efforts--whatever the cost to other values. We are on a merry-go-round on which we may be able to go faster or slower, but we never seem to get anywhere.

IV Unrealistic Goals

Finally, there are goals which are specifically defined--thus not vague--and not overvalued in the sense that they do not necessarily progressively come to push all other values aside and thus claim an undue share of our effort. Such goals may, however, be unrealistic. The odds against achieving them are too high. This is not to imply that progress toward such a goal is not desirable, but that there should be acceptable stopping places on the way so that frustration and demoralization are reduced.

A prime example of such a goal is based on the assumption that the public schools are such a potent socializing force that they can overcome all other negative or positive influences in a person's life. Schools are to civilize, motivate, equalize, and educate. They are to do this hopefully with the benign docility of their young charges, but if necessary, in the face of contempt, apathy, and stubborn individuality. When an incredible range of abilities and potentials is taken into consideration, along with a heterogeneous society with often contradictory and conflicting values and behaviors, the odds are indeed great against achieving the desired results.

Many of our curriculum goals may be unrealistic, either in regard to specific young people or in regard to great numbers of them. Testing results going back to the turn of the century seem to support the statement that there never was a golden age of American schooling when all in attendance mastered or, at least, adequately learned what was presented. This is not to say we are doing better today or as well as we used to or as well as we should, but that we should pause to consider whether our aspirations for many children vis-a-vis the stated curriculum are realistic.

It may be unrealistic to expect young people to read more or enjoy reading more than the adult society with whom they associate and from whom they absorb their concepts of useful and desirable behavior. It may be unrealistic to expect many students to study for the pure enjoyment of learning when few adults seem to do so. It may be unrealistic to expect students to obey teachers or study for tests without fear of punishment or failure when often adults seem to have to be coerced into obeying authority and acting in circumscribed ways through threat of punishment and the offer of rewards. It may be unrealistic to expect that young people will self-modify their behavior by means of rational discussion when much of the adult world is apparently more motivated through emotion, habits, and the reciprocal respect for and desire for authority and power.

V Feedback

It is clear that monitoring and modifying and controlling any endeavor requires feedback. We walk down the street or manipulate a fork guided by feedback. A blind man learns his way around the house by interpreting feedback. It is such a truism that at first glance one is puzzled by the lack of feedback or perhaps even the lack of widespread concern for feedback in education--at least feedback of a particular kind.

For there is a demand for auditing attendance, monies spent, the number of books in libraries, the structural soundness of buildings, ethnic percentages, average class sizes and teachers' credentials and degrees. There is, however, almost no persistent, meaningful demand for information concerning the point of the entire enterprise--how much and what kind of learning has actually taken place.

This lack is at the same time both a cause and a consequence of having vague, overvalued and unrealistic goals. It is a cause because just as the blind man may develop ever more unrealistic and vague ideas of reality without relevant data, so, too, teachers, administrators and the general public are set free to luxuriate in a lush growth of subjective wish fulfillment when their ideas need not be continually warranted through experience.

The lack of feedback is also a consequence of holding vague and unrealistic ideas, not because data may not be available in some form, but because one's ideas determine what to look for and what the meaning is of what is found. Even more, one's ideas tend to modify subsequent behavior so that the data needed may be created through the activities that have come about through the act of seeking the data.

In a different vein, there may be very understandable psychological reasons why adequate and accurate feedback concerning human activity may be deviously or even honestly shunned. There may be such a fear of negative results, of implied responsibility and of threatened future control or loss of control that one might speak of a Zeitgeist by which many impulses converge to allow what amounts to a conspiracy of silence--no one will get hurt if everybody agrees to mind his own business.

VI Conclusion

If, as I have argued, a significant part of our educational woes are due to our confused and inadequate concepts, then clearly recovery cannot be expected through doing more of the same thing.

What we do need are clearly stated goals and subgoals differentiated to meet the needs of diverse elements of our young population and within reach of the subgroups for whom they are established. We need yearly feedback in the form of valid testing to ascertain whether these goals are functioning properly or need modification and whether the means chosen are working effectively or not. And as a sine qua non, we need the authority to insist that these goals are upheld.

In the words of an earlier time, we need standards which are meaningful and reasonably rigorously upheld. It is the lack of such standards which is one important key to our present quandary. For without enforceable and enforced standards the public finds it difficult to adequately evaluate the schools, administrators have little means by which to evaluate and direct teacher behavior, the teachers can only fall back on what they as individuals subjectively feel children should do, and the children quite naturally come to feel that school is a game where one does as little as possible for an acceptable grade--and that often has turned out to be little indeed.

What we need is a commitment to the honest evaluation of authentic learning.

CHAPTER 15.

TEACHER-EVALUATORS AS "IDEAL OBSERVERS"

EKDAL J. BUYS, JR.

An individual who is responsible for evaluating other individuals is expected to be properly qualified for that responsibility He is supposed to have several qualities or dispositions which guard against his judgments being tainted by unsuitable attitudes or procedures. He is also expected to have knowledge of the performances and persons he is evaluating.

It may be too much to ask that a mere mortal be perfectly qualified to evaluate anything. It is possible, however, for imperfect creatures to propose, perhaps even agree on, a set of qualities which defines a kind of "ideally qualified evaluator," intending to model themselves after that ideal. Teachers, as evaluators, might, then, identify and emulate those qualities which characterize the "ideal-teacher-evaluator." That which follows is an attempt to describe just such an "ideal teacher-evaluator."

Fortunately, we need not begin at the beginning. Evaluation of most, if not all, student behavior in an educational context is a species of moral evaluation. Much work already has been done in moral philosophy, metaethics in particular, on the subject of the nonmoral qualities of an ideally qualified "moral" decision-maker. If a composite ideal "moral" decision-maker can be, and I believe it can be, synthesized from the contributions of ethicists who have addressed this subject, then we may have in hand a model after which teacher-evaluators may pattern themselves. (1)

The Nature and Function of an "Ideal Observer."

The several metaethical analyses from which we can obtain the qualities which may describe a model teacher-evaluator are known as "ideal observer" theories. The model "moral" legislators of "ideal observer" theorists are called "observers" to emphasize that they are intended to exemplify the nonmoral qualities, not the substantive moral attributes, of a properly qualified "moral" decision-maker. ("Legislators," "observers," "decision-makers," are equivalent herein.) However, we are assured by "ideal observer" theorists that their "observers" nonmoral qualities qualify them to make the best possible substantive moral judgments. Indeed, their judgments may actually define moral right and wrong.

The notion of an "ideal observer" need not be restricted to philosophy. "Ideal observers" in metaethical theory are parallel to "ideal observers," although they are not so labelled, in other fields of human endeavor, e.g., "Ideal observers," as hypothetical entities constructed from criticized received opinion, are not themselves actually originators of substantive knowledge; they neither offer nor are intended to offer original answers to substantial legal or scientific questions. And yet, if a person were to exhibit all the qualities of an "ideal observer" in any discipline, he would be expected to be able to provide unprecedented substantive insight into that discipline. The expectations for him would be so high, because he would be that person best able to sort out and select from his experiences with unsurpassing clarity. That is the kind of person, I take it, we would want to see in an instructional or research capacity. We turn our attention, then, to "ideal observer" theories which may help us identify the qualities which define an "ideal teacher-evaluator," thereby partially identifying an "ideal educator."

"Ideal Observer" Theories.

The idea of an "ideal observer" is hardly a recent contribution to moral philosophy. It is likely to be found implicitly in any in-depth mataethical or ethical proposal, e.g., the nonmoral virtues of a model "moral" decision-maker as identified by Aristotle in the Sixth Book of his Nichomachean Ethics. (2) A kind of "ideal observer" is occasionally explicitly identified. Adam Smith explains 'right' as that which a properly qualified spectator would endorse. (3) In recent years, there have been several updated proposals in accord with "ideal observer" theory.

F. C. Sharp, in an article entitled "Voluntarism and Objectivity in Ethics" (1941) and later in the fifth chapter of his Good Will and Ill Will (1950), analyzes the meaning of moral terms, expecially 'right.' He concludes that "a moral judgment is correct or valid when it applies the predicate 'right' to an act complete acquaintance with which would evoke impersonal approval." (4) Dropping the negative term 'impersonal' and attributing the statement to a properly qualified observer, Sharp claims "'right' characterizes the kind of action he would want all human beings to perform under the given conditions if he had a complete acquaintance with all the relevant consequences." (5) The requirement of "complete acquaintance" refers to the possession of all relevant facts, i.e., those which would make a difference to the "observer's" judgment. (6) Some of the facts which are relevant are the interests of all persons who would be affected by the judgment. And the interests of those persons can only be brought home to the observer" if he has a vivid imagination. (7)

Universality, consistency, and impartiality are all brought into play by Sharp's notion of "impersonality." The universality of the "observer's" judgment is just the previously stated requirement that the "act is one that he would approve of anyone performing under the same conditions." (8) Inherent in this requirement is consistency from case to case when the cases are similar in all relevant respects. Impartiality is guaranteed by the "impersonal" nature of the judgment in the sense that the judgment "is not determined by his (the "observer's") egoistic interests or by any purely personal relations to the parties concerned." (9) Sharp's "ideal observer" is, in sum, a person who approves or disapproves of an act on the basis of imaginatively and otherwise acquired information about the act, and who does so in a universal, consistent, impartial, and unselfish (non-egoistic) manner.

William Kneale, leaning heavily on Adam Smith, supports an "ideal observer" theory in "Objectivity in Morals," an article published in 1950 in Philosophy. (10) Kneale builds a case for this guarded conclusion:

> When we say that the moral law is the legislation of the reasonable man, we seem . . . to mean that it is, as Adam Smith suggested, a set of commands such as would be given by an impartial spectator who was endowed with sympathy and intelligence and possessed all relevant information. (11)

Kneale especially emphasizes the importance of reason in moral deliberations. He says, "We do not think that the accidental agreement of any number of men is sufficient to make what they will a moral law." (12) An "ideal observer" must be prepared to consider reasons even when the reasons undermine his own positions. (13) He must be consistent and impartial. (14) And he must be willing to universalize his moral judgments, universalization being equivalent to one of Kneale's uses of 'consistency'. (15)

Kneale's "impartially sympathetic spectator," i.e., his "ideal observer," is also interested, imaginative, and informed. "We must suppose," Kneale states, "that he has some interest, however impersonal, in what is about to take place and wishes for one result rather than another." (16) Without some interest in a situation the "spectator" would have no motivation for issuing a command to those involved in the situation.

A person is in no position to issue moral commands, according to Kneale, unless he has cultivated his imagination through "the study of history and the hearing or reading of fiction" to the point that he can imaginately take on the interests, etc. of those who would be affected by his commands. (17) Imagined data are important parts of the total information relevant to the moral issue under consideration. (18) Kneale's "observer," then, is rational, consistent, impartial, interested, imaginative, and informed when he considers issuing a universalized command.

The "observers" of Sharp and Kneale are quite similar in respect to the characteristics they possess, possibly in part because both Sharp and Kneale portray their "observers" by using broad strokes. They leave aside the minutiae of linguistic and logical analyses of central concepts in their portrayals. Roderick Firth, in contrast, attends to matters of language and logical analysis in some detail as he draws a fine-lined portrait of his "ideal observer" in an article entitled "Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer" (1952). (19) The result is an "observer" who is in several respects significantly different from the "observers" of Sharp and Kneale.

Firth's "ideal observer" is "omniscient with respect to nonethical facts," omnipercipient, disinterested, dispassionate, consistent, and "in some respects normal." (20) . Firth emphasized that the facts which his observer would possess would be nonethical because he believes that an "ideal observer" must be in a position to identify fundamental ethical principles, those which cannot be supported by appeal to ethical premises. (21) The "observer" would probably possess irrelevant information although we cannot be sure at just what point additional data will no longer matter. The possession of superfluous information should not prevent the "observer" from identifying the proper moral principles.

Firth's "omnipercipience" is similar to the requirement of a vivid imagination included in the descriptions of an "ideal observer" by Sharp and Kneale. Firth acknowledges that imaginative data may be considered a kind of factual data already accounted for by the characteristic of omniscience. And yet, he prefers to add the quality of omnipercipience. It guarantees that the "ideal observer" not only possesses the facts but also is able simultaneously" to *visualize* all actual facts, and the consequences of all possible acts in any given situation, just as *vividly* as he would if he were actually perceiving them all." (23) (Italics mine.)

Firth takes care to distinguish between consistency and impartiality:

> To say that an ideal observer is consistent is to say something about the uniformity of his ethically-significant reactions, whereas to say that he is impartial is to say something about the factors which *influence* his reactions. (24)

He points out that "it is not self-contradictory to say that a person . . . is consistently partial." (25) For example, a person may consistently be partial toward those of his own nationality.

Consistency, unlike impartiality in Firth's analysis, is a derivative property of an "ideal observer." Consistency is guaranteed by other characteristics of an "ideal observer." Firth explains:

> In attributing omniscience, disinterestedness, and other such characteristics to an ideal observer . . . we are eliminating from the personality of the ideal observer, so to speak, various factors which actually cause certain people to differ in their ethically significant reactions from other people - such factors, for example, as selfish desires and ignorance of the facts of the case. (26)

We are thus guaranteed that in practice an "ideal observer" would always react in the same way to a particular act.

Firth believes that by treating 'consistency' as a derivative property applicable only to particular acts he avoids subtly bringing into play substantive ethical considerations or making a logically valid but unhelpful claim. 'Consistency', according to Firth, carries with it substantive ethical considerations when it requires that an ethical principle be applied to two similar cases, X and Y, because that principle generates the correct ethically significant reactions to X and Y. He warns that 'consistency' is vacuous ethically, although not logically, when it is taken to mean that ethical utterances about similar but still different particular events must be logically consistent. Any self-consistent statements referring to different events are logically consistent with one another.

To say that an "ideal observer" is impartial is, in Firth's view, to claim that he is not influenced by any particular interests, i.e., those interests which are a function of properties of an act which can be defined only by using a proper name or referring to a specific time, e.g., 'now', or place, e.g., 'here'. An "ideal observer" reacts only to the general properties of events. (27) To help guarantee the disinterestedness or impartiality of an "ideal observer," Firth contends that the "observer" must not have even suppressed particular interests, i.e., the "observer" must have no particular interests whatsoever.

Indeed, his "ideal observer" is to be completely dispassionate. He is to remain unaffected by emotions as well as by particular interests, assuming that emotions may not always be consequents of or companions to interests. (28) Firth claims that love and compassion, as examples, are irrelevant to the ethically significant reactions of an "observer" who is omniscient and omnipercipient.

Finally, Firth's model "moral" decision-maker must be normal in other respects, not that he claims to define 'normal' clearly. (29) Firth calls 'normality' a Gestalt concept, apparently meaning something to the effect that 'normality' is more than the sum of its parts. However, that does not make it an incomprehensible or useless notion. There are kinds of abnormality which, if attributed to an observer, generally would disqualify him as an "ideal" decision-maker, e.g., "mental fatigue, distracting sensory stimuli, and lack of experience." (30) Firth's "ideal observer," then, unlike the "ideal observers" of Sharp and Kneale, is omniscient regarding nonethical facts, omnipercipient, dispassionate, and like Sharp's and Kneale's "ideal observers," impartial, consistent, and otherwise normal.

Richard Brandt, at one time a colleague of Firth's at Swarthmore, responds to Firth's notion of an "ideal observer" by contending that consistency can be attributed to an "ideal observer" without circularity, that is, without introducing substantive moral criteria as the grounds for his reacting in similar ways to similar cases.

Brandt suggests that we say

> a person is not an "ideal observer" at the time of reacting ethically to some action A if, had he been reacting at that time to another action B, his reaction to B would have been different from or opposed to the reaction he has to A, unless he believed one of them to have a property which the other had not--such that the belief in the presence or absence of this property would have made a corresponding difference to his ethical reaction with respect to any action he might at the time have been considering. (31)

However, he also believes that it would be likely that "ideal observers" as portrayed by Firth would have different ethically significant reactions to the same situation, because they would have different desires or have been subject to different psychological and social conditioning. Consequently, Brandt finds an absolutistic version of "ideal observer" theory like Firth's untenable. To Brandt, Firth's "ideal observer" becomes too nonhuman when he is considered to be omniscient, omnipercipient, and dispassionate. He wonders, considering that Firth's "ideal observer" is ostensibly otherwise normal, "how much of him there could be which really is normal." (32)
In a text entitled Ethical Theory (1959) Brandt lists and elaborates upon the qualities of his own version of an "ideal observer." (33) Although he prefers not to call his model decision-maker an "ideal observer," it will be construed as one here. (34) He writes than an "ideal observer" theory

> supposes that ethical statements assert about their subject-term (the person or act being evaluated morally) that any person who fulfilled certain qualifications at the time would experience a certain reaction toward the subject term. (35)

In a relativist form an "ideal observer" theory might take "x is better than y" to mean something like "if I (the speaker) were, at the time with respect to x and y, fully informed and vividly imaginative, impartial, in a calm frame of mind and otherwise normal, I would prefer x to y." (36) "Fully informed and vividly imaginative" means that the "observer" "has all true non-ethical beliefs and lacks all false non-ethical beliefs that would affect his reaction of feeling or desire; and . . . he has these beliefs in mind as vividly as if he were perceiving the facts believed"; "impartial" means the "observer's" reaction "would have been the same no matter what other individuals or groups were involved, so long as they had the same abstract properties"; and "in a calm frame of mind and otherwise normal" means he "is not influenced by prior states of anger, depression, grief, and so on." (37)

Brandt's "ideal observer," in addition to having the qualities just noted, is prepared to generalize an ethical judgment to all relevantly similar cases in a logically consistent way. (38) He neither will have different attitudes (properly qualified attitudes being the basis for his moral judgments) toward similar cases nor will endorse a particular attitude which upon analysis conflicts with another attitude or other attitudes he has endorsed. And Brandt believes that sometimes some persons actually are "ideal observers"--fully informed, vividly imaginative, impartial, normal and consistent. (39)

The Characteristics of a Composite "Ideal Observer."

Rationality, consistency, impartiality, a sympathetic imagination, relevant nonmoral knowledge, and a willingness to universalize are oft-noted qualities of an "ideal observer" (See Figure 1, p. 133.) He must reason as he ponders a moral question whether he reasons deductively or inductively, or both. Purely intuitive, revelatory, or existential attacks on moral questions are not compatible with "ideal observer" theories. At the very minimum an "ideal observer" must be able to reason well enough to issue endorsements, orders, or prescriptions which are internally consistent and consistent with one another, and to be able to identify the universal principles implicit in particular judgments. Thus, rationality, most especially rational consistency (one, if not the major, factor in rationality), is a primary attribute of an "ideal observer."

Impartiality is another salient attribute of "ideal observers" and is generally wedded to the requirements that the "observer" have a vivid, sympathetic imagination and that he be consistent. An "ideal observer" is expected to be able to so exercise his imagination that he gains a sympathetic appreciation for the interests and emotions of everyone (or at least a representative sample) involved in a moral dispute. Vivid imagination to provide data is a special quality in the relevant information package which "ideal observer" theorists include in their definitions of an "ideal observer," because the data are products of imagination and not straightforward observation. Any unimaginative, unsympathetic "observer" who knows only his own interests and emotions or knows the interests and emotions of others but only at a distance, i.e., who does not feel them with full and immediate intensity, can be expected to be partial.

Of course, an "ideal observer" could, even when sympathetically aware of the interests and emotions of others, still choose to be partial. But he would then be particularizing his principles by giving precedence to his own interests and emotions simply because they were his. As an "ideal observer" he cannot do that, because he would be committing himself to the general principle that each person ought to give preference to his own interests and ideals simply because they are his. That would lead to inconsistency, for the "partial observer" logically would have to be prepared to endorse conflicting, even contradictory, bits of advice, e.g., 'X (the finder of a billfold), because of your interests, you ought to keep the billfold' and 'Y (the owner of the billfold), because of your interests, you ought to reclaim your billfold.' Continuing the example, Z, as a moral agent believing everyone ought to pursue his own interests, would be in the position of advising X to keep the billfold (X's interests) and X not to keep the billfold (Y's interests). Such conflicting and contradictory pieces of advice are self-defeating, hardly the kind of reactions one would expect from an "ideal observer."

Thus, Sharp, Kneale, Firth, and Brandt implicitly or explicitly expect an "ideal observer" to be prepared to universalize or generalize his ethically significant reactions. Brandt explicitly expects universalization and generalization from his "ideal observers." Sharp, Kneale, and Firth implicitly recognize in the formulae for their "ideal observers" the willingness to universalize and/or generalize. (40) Whether explicitly or implicitly, they all expect their "ideal observers" would be prepared to subscribe the the non-particular, i.e., universal, less specific, more general, moral principle which must, at least implicitly and always logically, accompany the "observer's" particular and specific ethically significant reactions. To return again to the lost billfold, an "ideal observer" who endorsed the particular and specific judgment that 'X (the finder of the billfold) ought to return the billfold to Y (the owner of the billfold)' would be logically obliged to endorse a principle such as 'People who find lost articles ought to return them to their owners,' a universal (no particulars are mentioned) and general (applicable to people and lost articles, not just to boys and billfolds) principle.

Although not always identified as such by "ideal observer" theorists, normality, volitional freedom and some kind of interestedness or disinterestedness help in all their theories to define "ideal observers." The requirement of normality is specifically identified by Firth and Brandt and is implicit in the formulae of other "ideal observer" theorists. It would not do to have an "ideal observer" unable to employ his rational powers because of, say, mental or physical fatigue or illness. Nor would it do to have a too nonhuman "ideal observer," one unable to identify with the hopes, joys, and fears of normal persons, because he had never actually experienced such emotions. He would not even have had the experience necessary to know them vicariously.

Volitional freedom is not directly attributed to the person of an "ideal observer" by Sharp, Kneale, Firth, or Brandt. Nevertheless, it must be one of the attributes of any "ideal observer." An observer who provides advice, gives orders, or has any other kind of ethically significant reaction while under duress or subject to manipulation by God, man, beast, or circumstance is not ideal. He is not even responsible for, i.e., does not autonomously generate, the remarks he makes. Thus, an "ideal observer" must have freedom in a contra-causal sense. He must be the sole author of his moral legislation. Freedom is such an integral part of what it means to be an "ideal observer" that Sharp, Kneale, Firth, and Brandt would be unlikely to object to making it explicitly a part of their theories. Perhaps they considered the freedom of an "ideal observer" so obvious that it did not need to be mentioned.

The last characteristic which we find in one form or another in "ideal observer" theories is disinterestedness. Taking 'disinterestedness' to mean minimally that a person does not allow his self-interest to ride roughshod over other considerations when reasoning about moral issues, all our "ideal observer" theorists count disinterestedness among the qualities of their "observers." Sharp describes his "ideal observer" as "non-egoistic." (41) Kneale's "observer" is required to have an interest in a moral issue as the source of motivation for issuing an order regarding that issue, but the interest is to be an impersonal one. (42) Brandt's well qualified "moral" decision-maker, when confronted with an ethical problem, consults conventional moral principles and criticizes them in light of his properly qualified attitudes--those attitudes which are impartial, informed, stem from a normal state of mind, and are compatible with a system of consistent and general principles ("qualified attitude method"). He apparently subordinates his own interests to the principles resulting from his use of the "qualified attitude method" whenever those principles so require. (44)

An "Ideal Teacher-Evaluator?"

Brief summaries and analyses of the "ideal observer" theories of Sharp, Kneale, Firth, and Brandt have led to the construction of a composite "ideal observer" characterized by the following qualities: (1) rationality, (2) consistency, (3) impartiality, (4) a sympathetic imagination, (5) relevant nonmoral knowledge, (6) the willingness to universalize and/or generalize particular moral judgments, (7) normality, (8) freedom, and (9) disinterestedness. These serve as the defining properties of a composite "ideal observer."

Teachers, as moral evaluators, may be well advised to model themselves after our composite "ideal observer," for our "observer" simply makes explicit the expectations we have for anyone who is burdened with making moral decisions. An "ideal teacher-evaluator" could, for example, determine the course grades for students in a variety of ways, but whatever the content of the course, the nature of his examinations, or the method of grade determination, he would be expected to provide reasons to support the grading judgments he has made (rationality); to assign the same grade to similar students who perform in similar ways (consistency); to discriminate among student performances only on the basis of factors relevant to those performances (impartiality); to be able to imagine himself in the places of his students and of other persons who may employ grades as guidelines for making decisions, say employers (a sympathetic imagination); to have gathered all information concerning his students and their performances relevant to his grading responsibilities (relevant nonmoral knowledge); to be aware of and prepared to subscribe to the universal principles implicit in his particular grading decisions (the willingness to universalize and/or generalize particular moral judgments); to be free of physical or psychological problems which would impair the clarity of his thinking or restrict the range or intensity of his feelings (normality); to be free of student, colleague, or community pressures to give unwarranted special consideration to individuals or groups (freedom); and to give precedence, in light of the universal moral principles to which he subscribes, to the interests of his students when those interests and his own conflict (disinterestedness).

These I submit, are actually commonplace, though seldom articulated, criteria for discriminating between competent and incompetent teacher-evaluators. Teachers may ignore the expectations founded on the aforementioned criteria, and the qualities of an "ideal teacher-evaluator" from which those criteria are derived, but only at great risk to their personal integrity and professional credibility.

SHARP	KNEALE	FIRTH	BRANDT	A COMPOSITE "IDEAL OBSERVER"
impersonal	rational	impartial	prepared to generalize principles	rational
non-egoistic	impartial	consistent (derivatively)	impartial	prepared to universalize/generalize principles
imaginative	consistent	disinterested	consistent	impartial
completely informed about situation in question	impersonally interested	omnipercipient	vividly imaginative	consistent
	imaginative	dispassionate	fully informed (all relevant facts)	sympathetically imaginative
	sympathetic	omniscient regarding nonethical facts	normal in other respects	informed (all relevant data)
	fully informed (all relevant facts)	in other respects normal		free
				disinterested (willing to thwart self-interest if principles so require)
				normal in other respects

Figure 1. The Characteristics of "Ideal Observers"

Documentations.

1. For the purposes of this paper, moral principles are understood to be our most basic, universalized prescriptions (action guiding or value ranking). They may also have social implications, be issued by autonomous beings, be uncodified, transcend prudence, or be associated with certain ways of feeling. A moral judgment is made as one decides what moral principle, if any, is applicable in a given factual setting. The moral judgment serves as the reasoned ground for a moral directive or bits of moral advice. For instance, a teacher who notices a student intermittently peering intently at another student's answer sheet during an examination may judge that the moral principle, "Cheating is wrong," is applicable to the situation. The teacher may then direct or advise the suspect to mend his ways. Teachers thus work to strengthen the moral fiber of their students, to dispose them to act in accord with moral principles, to exemplify moral attributes such as honesty, responsibility, and tolerance.

We may reject the claim that teachers are always or usually making moral judgments when evaluating students without rendering vacuous the thesis of this paper. If teachers as educators make any moral judgments at all, then they may find useful a set of criteria for assessing themselves as "moral" decision-makers. They even may discover that the qualities of a model "moral" decision-maker apply to and clarify other kinds of decision-making roles they play.

2. Aristotle Nichomachean Ethics 6.

3. A. Selby-Bigge, Ed., British Moralists, vol. 1, Moral Sentiments, by Adam Smith, Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, 1964, pp. 259, 302, 317.

4. F. C. Sharp, "Voluntarism and Objectivity in Ethics," The Philosophical Review 50:262, 1941.

5. Idem, Good Will and Ill Will, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1950, p. 162.

6. Idem, "Voluntarism and Objectivity in Ethics," p. 258.

7. Ibid., p. 256.

8. Ibid., p. 257.

9. Ibid.

10. W. C. Kneale, "Objectivity in Morals," Philosophy, 25:149-66, 1950.

11. Ibid., p. 162

135.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 161.

13. *Ibid.*

14. *Ibid.*

15. *Ibid.*

16. *Ibid.*

17. *Ibid.*, p. 162.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 159.

19. Roderick Firth, "Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 12:317-45, 1952.

20. *Ibid.*, pp. 333-45.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 333.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 334.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 335.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 336.

25. *Ibid.*

26. *Ibid.*, p. 343. Also see Roderick Firth, "Discussion: Reply to Professor Brandt," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 15:411, 1955.

27. Firth, "Ethical Absolutism," pp. 338-39.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 340.

29. *Ibid.*, pp. 344-45.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 344.

31. Richard B. Brandt, "Discussion: The Definition of an 'Ideal Observer' Theory in Ethics," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 15:411, 1955.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 410.

33. Richard B. Brandt, *Ethical Theory*, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1959.

34. Jonathan Harrison, reacting, like Brandt, to Firth's notion of an "ideal observer," finds "ideal observer" theory to be a plausible approach to metaethics. However, Harrison's "ideal observer" theory is very much like Brandt's and therefore will not receive separate treatment. Jonathan Harrison, "Discussion: Some Comments on Professor Firth's Ideal Observer Theory," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 17:256-62, 1956.

35. Brandt, Ethical Theory, p. 173.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid., p. 174.

38. Ibid., pp. 249-250.

39. Ibid., p. 174.

40. See Sharp's discussion of 'impersonality' (Voluntarism and Objectivity in Ethics," p. 257), Kneale's account of 'rationality' ("Objectivity in Morals," p. 161.), and Firth's explanation of 'disinterestedness' ("Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer," pp. 335-40).

41. Sharp, "Voluntarism and Objectivity in Ethics," p. 257.

42. Kneale, "Objectivity in Morals," p. 161.

43. Firth, "Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer," p. 339.

44. Brandt, Ethical Theory, p. 250.

CHAPTER 16.

SEXISM IN EDUCATION: MYTH OR REALITY?

ALETA YOU MASTNY

The question of sexism in education is a subject that dates back to antiquity.[1] Although Plato advocated equal educational treatment for both men and women, he ultimately believed that the "native disposition" of women was inferior to men.[2]

Sexism in education is clearly a value-laden issue. In defining sexism I shall use the definition adapted by Roby[3] from Bernard's Women and the Public Interest.

"Sexism is the assumption that male standards, values, and arts are the best, if not the only worthwhile, ones. Like racism, sexism is the unconscious, taken-for-granted, unquestioned, unexamined, and unchallenged acceptance of the belief that the world as it looks to men is the only world, . . . that the values men have evolved are the only ones, that the way sex looks to men is the only way it could look to anyone, that what men think women are like is the only way to think about women."

In this paper, I shall compare the educational treatment of women in ancient Greece with that of contemporary educational practices. I shall show that egalitarianism--at least as it exists in education today--is more a myth rather than a reality; and that although we have mandatory education for males and females, there are still some serious problems that need to be examined if we are to eventually provide equal educational opportunity for both sexes regardless of gender.

Status of Women in Ancient Greece.

In spite of its literary, artistic, and intellectual achievements, ancient Greece did little to advance the social, intellectual, or educational status of women.

In the city of Athens, women were unable to participate directly in the affairs of government including holding public office, voting, and serving as jurors and soldiers.[4] While the advanced education of a boy consisted of the art of rhetoric and physical education, the Athenian girl's primary training dealt with the preparation of household tasks and duties.[5] The qualities admired in females were "silence, submissiveness, and abstinence from men's pleasures." Pomeroy reports that while the young male was busy developing his mental and physical skills, the adolescent girl was already married and had several young children. This discrepancy in educational levels between men and women, in addition to the gross differences in age between the bride and groom, "resulted in feelings of condescension and paternalism on the part of the husband, and a marriage characterized by a lack of friendship in the modern sense between husband and wife."[6]

Athenian law reinforced the status of the wife as a veritable child having the legal status of a minor in comparison to her husband. If a man desired to be separated from his wife and keep the children, all he need do was repudiate her in front of witnesses provided that he returned the dowry or repaid interest on it. Infidelity among men was notorious during this period. Demosthenes is reported to have stated in one of his speeches: "We have courtesans for our pleasure, concubines for our comfort, and wives to give us legitimate children."[7]

In contrast, Spartan women were much freer and enjoyed more influence in public and private life than did the women of Athens. Because Sparta's primary purpose was protection of the state through maintenance of a strong military force, women were trained "to be fitting wives and mothers for these heroes." The education of Spartan women included rigorous athletic training in which the spirit of competition was encouraged. Every effort was made to eliminate effeminancy by prohibiting the use of jewelry, cosmetics, perfumes, and colored clothing. Among Greek women, only Spartans did no wool work which was the traditional female occupation at the time.[8]

In *The Savings of Spartan Women*, Plutarch has the foreigner ask Gorgo, the wife of Leonidas, the following question: "Why is it that you Spartan women are the only women that lord it over your men?" Her reply was: "Because we are the only women that are mothers of men," implying that women took pride in producing strong citizens for the state.[9]

The Spartan woman, however, was not entirely free from masculine domination. When faced with the task of making a decision, a Spartan woman was strongly influenced by her husband.

"When I was a child I learned to obey my father, and made that my practice. Then when I became a married woman, my husband took that place. So if the man's proposal is honourable, let him lay the matter before my husband first."[10]

The few women in ancient Greece who were considered to be somewhat comparable to the intellectual level of men were *hetairai*, who were high class prostitutes better known as "companions to men."[11] One of the most successful *hetairai* was Aspasia, who was reputed to have taught Socrates and other men the art of rhetoric.[12] *Hetairai* were usually slaves or free non-citizen women who enjoyed the intellectual and social companionship of men. This was unlike the virtually solitary life experienced by the Athenian citizen wives.

The claim can be made that education, as it exists in the United States, is a far cry from the sexual discrimination experienced by our ancient female predecessors. One obvious change is that education today is mandatory for males and females. However, let us examine whether contemporary education is indeed free from the antiquated belief that "the male is by nature superior, and the female inferior" as argued by Aristotle[13] or from Plato's assertion that the superior race is called man; and if after being born, man is unable to conquer the sensations of pain and pleasure, in his second birth, he will be born a woman.[14]

Teacher as Perpetuator of Stereotypes.

In The Longest War, Tavris and Offir introduce some observational studies done in schools which support the view that teachers treat boys and girls differently in subtle ways. Teachers have a tendency to unknowingly reinforce aggressive behavior in boys by responding to the behavioral problem in negative ways.[15] Teachers reward girls for being dependent by reinforcing them when they are in close proximity and rarely encourage them to work in independent activities. In comparison, the same teachers pay equal amounts of attention to boys whether they are seated near or far and often encourage the boys to engage in independent work.

Jerome Bruner summarizes the possible effects that a teacher's behavior might have on the learning situation.

"Observant anthropologists have suggested that the basic values of the early grades are a stylized version of the feminine role in society, cautious rather than daring, governed by a lady-like politeness . . . . Girls in the early grades who learn to control their fidgeting earlier are rewarded for excelling in their feminine values. The reward can be almost too successful in that in later years it is difficult to move girls beyond the orderly virtues they learned in their first school encounters. The boys, more fidgety in the first grades get no such reward, and as a consequence may be freer in their approach to learning in the later grades."[16]

B.J. Kemer, in "A Study of the Relationship Between the Sex of the Student and the Assignment of Marks by Secondary School Teachers"[17] asked junior high school teachers to select adjectives that they felt would best describe good male and good female students. The teacher's responses were surprisingly stereotypical in nature:

Adjectives Describing Good Female Students

appreciative
calm
conscientious
considerate
cooperative
mannerly
poised
sensitive
dependable
efficient
mature
obliging
thorough

Adjectives Describing Good Male Students

- active
- adventurous
- aggressive
- assertive
- curious
- energetic
- enterprising
- frank
- independent
- inventive

Students Perceptions of Themselves.

Educational Testing Service research sociologist Marlaine Lockheed and her colleagues recently completed a longitudinal study involving 1500 fourth and fifth graders in East Windsor, a suburban New Jersey community. Questions such as: "Is there any man you can think of who has a woman for a boss? When do you think a woman will become the first spaceship captain? Do you think that women are usually smarter than men, that men are usually smarter than women, or that being smart doesn't have anything to do with it? were asked of elementary school children. The children's replies seemed to indicate that opinions concerning stereotyped views of women and men may be well formed by the fifth grade.[18]

The stereotyping of sex-roles is believed to handicap women by limiting their opportunities to rise to high leadership positions. Furthermore, acceptance of a dependent passive role may have a tendency to inhibit a girl's future opportunity for intellectual or creative success.

It appears that from early childhood, some girls and boys are unable to perceive girls as leaders or as influential members in mixed-sex groups. Traditional stereotypes reinforce the notion that girls are more "passive and attentive" while boys are "more active, independent, and assertive." Lockheed notes:

> "These attitudes are not only reinforced by children's literature, but also by classroom practices, particularly sex-segregated work and play groups. The children themselves . . . are largely responsible for this segregation."[19]

Lockheed suggests that teachers should take great care to positively influence mixed-sex activities so that stereotyped behavior does not occur. Results of Lockheed's questionnaire and of observations in small groups indicate a strong negative reaction to women assuming leadership roles; "girls were seen as having fewer good ideas and as being less able to direct and guide the group, regardless of whether they behaved as leaders." In spite of the fact that 70 percent of those children surveyed said that it didn't matter what sex one happened to be, and 75 percent said that intelligence was not related to gender, there was a general perception that power was somehow outside the female domain and that women were not "legitimate" leaders. Specifically, 60 percent of the girls and 30 percent of the boys felt that men and women were equally powerful; while in terms of self-perception, 60 percent of the fifth-grade boys saw themselves as a possible class president while only 38 percent of the girls held that similar view.[20]

Stereotyping in Textbooks.

Textbooks are notorious perpetuators of sexism in education. In a study on "Sex-Role Socialization in Picture Books for Preschool Chilren," Weitzman, Eifler, Hokada, and Ross[21] examined how sex roles were treated in those children's books which were identified as being the "very best." Winners of the Caldecott Medal, the Newbery Award, the Little Golden Books, and the "prescribed behavior" or etiquette books were scrutinized. The authors suggest that, for the most part, girls and women who are depicted in these books are a "dull and stereotyped lot." Girls are reinforced and praised for their attractiveness while boys are extolled for their achievements and cleverness. If women have any status at all, it is by virtue of their relationships to specific men; "they are the wives of the kings, judges, adventurers, and explorers."

Through picture books girls are inadvertently taught to have low aspirations primarily because of the roles they are relegated to portrya. For example, in What Boys Can Be and What Girls Can Be[22] both books portray a boy and a girl playing a particular occupational role. The reader is told that boys can be:

> a fireman who squirts water on the flames, and
> a baseball player who wins lots of games
> a bus driver who helps people travel far, or
> a policeman with a siren in his car.
> a cowboy who goes on cattle drives, and
> a doctor who helps to save people's lives.
> a sailor on a ship that takes you everywhere, and
> a pilot who goes flying through the air.
> a clown with silly tricks to do, and
> a pet tiger owner who runs the zoo.
> a farmer who drives a big red tractor, and
> on TV shows, if I become an actor.
> an astronaut who lives in a space station, and
> someday grow up to be President of the nation.

Whereas, in the second book we are told that girls can be:

> a nurse, with white uniforms to wear, or
> a stewardess, who flies everywhere
> a ballerina, who dances and twirls around, or
> a candy shop owner, the best in town.
> a model, who wears lots of pretty clothes,
> a big star in the movies and on special TV shows.
> a secretary who'll type without mistakes, or
> an artist, painting trees and clouds and lakes.
> a teacher in nursery school some day, or
> a singer and make records people play.
> a designer of dresses in the very latest style, or
> a bride, who comes walking down the aisle.
> a housewife, someday when I am grown, and
> a mother, with some children of my own.

In a 1972 study conducted by Women on Words and Images,[23] 134 children's readers from fourteen different publishers covering a total of 2,750 stories were surveyed for sexual stereotypes. The following rations were discovered:

Boy-centered to girl-centered stories	5:2
Adult male to adult female main characters	3:1
Male biographies to female biographies	6:1
Male animal stories to female animal stories	2:1
Male folk or fantasy stories to female folk or fantasy stories	4:1

In a more recent study of books published after 1972, the same group of researchers found that ratios for biographies had improved (2:1) but the ration of boy-centered to girl-centered stories had worsened (7:2). There were some changes made in individual books but the overall picture was not seriously altered.

Women on Words and Images also tallied occupations for both sexes and discovered 147 occupations listed for boys (such as astronaut and cowboy) and only 26 occupations listed for girls (including circus fat lady and witch). In 134 books investigated, only three working mothers appeared and in one instance, a young bully's bad behavior was attributed to the fact that his mother wasn't home during the day to take care of him.

Education Re-examined.

Numerous studies conducted with regard to expectations, self-concept, and intelligence need not be repeated here.[24] If females are not reinforced for having leadership qualities nor for possessing many of the characteristics that are admired in males, how can we expect these very same women to eventually assume high leadership positions in society?

Certainly, cultural conditioning imposed by parents, the media, biased curriculum texts, and society in general, cannot help but influence the perception that one has of oneself. Educators must ask themselves what they are consciously or unconsciously doing to perpetuate sexist practices.

For better or for worse, schooling is not value free. Teachers have a tendency to inculate their values into the school curriculum whether they consciously realize it or not. If a history course is taught which, by sheer omission, makes no mention of key women who have influenced or shaped history, then one is perpetuating a sexist view of the past.

Likewise, if one is teaching a course in the natural sciences and fails to mention the contributions that eminent female scientists have made to the profession then one is guilty of perpetuating a sexist view of the subject.

If an instructor happens to lecture on Plato's revolutionary idea of providing equal educational treatment for both men and women--and this idea was revolutionary at the time--but neglects to mention the fact that Plato's supervisor of education, over males and females, is required by law to be a man not less than fifty years of age and the father of a legitimate family preferably of both sexes,[25] then an imbalanced view has been presented about Plato, the presumable feminist.[26]

If, in an education course, one discusses the laudable virtues of Rousseau's Emile but fails to mention his Discourse on Political Economy where it is argued that women are inferior beings who should be nurtured for the primary purpose of serving men and providing them with pleasure, then one has again failued to provide students with a balanced viewpoint of an influential person.

Ignorance is no excuse for the perpetuation of sexism. Presumably, if education is a process by which one continually learns and is open to all information--though this information may conflict with one's value system--then teachers have a responsibility to share all ideas about a particular subject with their students.

Sexism is a very subtle phenomenon. One may virtually espouse equal rights and opportunities for all persons regardless of race, color, creed or religious affiliation. However, words are vacuous unless they are purposefully supported by actions which treat men and women equally.

Superintendents, principals, college chairpersons, and university deans--assuming they are predominantly male, and current research indicates that they are--,[27] have a particular responsibility in this area. Statements such as "women like part time work because it gives them time for their families" or "women are not interested in advancing professionally because they are not serious about their careers" are particularly insulting because they tend to categorize and limit women however erroneous those perceptions may be.

Even when trying to decide on an equitable salary for a female faculty member, one may unconsciously be plagued with the idea that a woman is not the "breadwinner" of the family and therefore need not have a comparable salary as her male co-worker in spite of the fact that the experience and qualifications of both persons are equal in all respects.

Women are partially to blame for the folly they have created for themselves. By mere acceptance and subservient silence women have in some ways, lived up to the self-fulfilled prophecy that men have created for her. The need to be more assertive, to assume positions of leadership, and to use the intellectual gifts that one possesses is important not merely because one happens to be a woman but because one happens to be a human being as well.

Roby[28] was correct in stating that "equal education does not assure equal opportunity." Plato ultimately realized this for he was enmeshed in a society which proclaimed the natural superiority of men over women. Unfortunately, our ties with the past are still with us. We have come a long way in providing what seems to be an equal education for both men and women. However, in closely examining our educational system, we have found that it is still fraught with sexist practices. Let us hope that it does not take another 2,000 years before we totally eliminate sexual discrimination within our schools and ultimately within our society.*

Documentations.

1. Plato *Republic* VII, 521c-535a; *Laws* I, 643b-644c; II, 653-654e, 659-e; VII, 789-792b, 793e-796b, 793e-796d, 804c-806c, 813c-815c; VIII, 833c-834d.

2. Plato *Laws* VI, 781b.

3. Pamela Roby, "Women and Higher Education," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 404 (November 1972):134.

4. Sarah B. Pomeroy, *Goddesses, Whores, Wives, and Slaves* (New York: Schocken Books, 1975), p. 74.

5. Arthur J. Grant, *Greece in the Age of Pericles* (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1973), pp. 226-233.

6. Pomeroy, p. 74.

7. Andre Bonnard, *Greek Civilization*, trans. A. Lytton Sells (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1957), p. 128.

8. Mary R. Lefkowitz and Maureen B. Fant, *Women in Greece and Rome* (Toronto: Samuel-Stevens, 1977), p. 52.

9. Plutarch, "Sayings of Spartan Women," *Moralia*, trans. F. J. Cole, III (London: Heinemann), p. 457.

10. Ibid., p. 476.

11. Pomeroy, p. 89.

12. See Plato's *Menexenus* 235e-236c.

13. Aristotle, "The Differences Between Men and Women," Rosemary Agonito (ed.), *History of Ideas on Women* (New York: B. P. Putnam's Sons, 1977), p. 51.

14. Plato *Timaeus* 42a-c, 90e-91a.

15. Carol Tavris and Carole Offir, *The Longest War* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977), p. 174.

*I wish to thank Arlene Metha and Carl Hoagland for referring me to some helpful references in the preparation of this paper.

CHAPTER 17.

THE IMPORTANCE OF CATEGORY SYSTEMS IN EVALUATION THEORY: A THEORETICAL VIEWPOINT*

MARVIN C. ALKIN & FREDERICK S. ELLETT, JR.

Introduction.

Even those interested in educational evaluation may be surprised to realize fully the scope and depth of issues and problems which fall under the rubric of educational evaluation theory. Once one comes to appreciate this fact one is likely to raise a question about what would be a good step in the developing of educational evaluation theory.

In response to such a question, we want to note that there are several kinds of theoretical formulation which are legitimate and which deserve attention. Without implying that other kinds of theory building activities are less important, our main intention here is to argue for the importance of classification or category systems and for the further development and criticism of such systems. We maintain the classification systems play an indirect but significant role in the justification of theory and are useful for both theoreticians and practitioners.

Preliminary Remarks.

Before we begin, some comments are in order about the use of various terms. We shall use the term theoretical formulations as a general term which can refer to definitions, to analogies or metaphors, to classification or category systems, as well as to theories in the narrower sense. In this more restricted sense, a theory is a systemically related set of statements, perhaps including some lawlike generalizations, that is empirically or ethically testable. Notice that we have enlarged the realm of justifiable statements to include ethical statements. Educational evaluation is in the end a normative activity which makes certain value or ethical statements,

---

*Paper presented at the Twenty-Eighth Annual Meeting of the Far Western Philosophy of Education Society, University of Southern California, November 30, 1979.

statements which stand in need of validation or justification (see Glass & Ellet, 1980).

Drawing the distinctions among the various kinds of theoretical formulations is important because the criteria and standards for establishing the worth of a theoretical formulation differ for the different types of formulations. For example, it is obvious that a definition can not be defended (or have its worth assessed) in the way that a theory-statement can. Theory-statements are either true or false, but a definition can at best be a logical or analytical truth. The defense of a definition often relies on matters such as clarity and comprehensiveness. We shall argue in the rest of this paper for the value of classification or category systems. Yet since category systems don't make theory-statements, they cannot be directly tested in the way that theory-statements can. We shall argue, however, that category systems do contribute indirectly to evaluation theorizing in important ways, and it is these indirect contributions which form the basis for judging their worth. Classification systems may be judged based on the extent to which they help in organizing the field of inquiry and by the extent to which they lead to a justified body of theory-statements.

The Importance of Classification Systems

"Confrontation with theory classifications either in terms of consolidation into a single theory or categorization into types is a major basis for modification and development of evaluation theories" (Alkin and Ellet, 1979a). The above quotation was one of the conclusions from previous work on the human activity of evaluation theorizing (see also, Alkin & Ellet, 1979b). Not only are classification systems valuable to researchers in theory development but they are also valuable to practitioners in their daily evaluation activities. In the following paragraphs we will present the reasons which support our conclusion about the importance of classification systems.

One should keep in mind, however, that not all researchers and evaluators hold the position that category systems can be judged by determining their utility in the development of theory-statements. A few remarks from a noted evaluation theorist will suffice to represent the kind of view we have in mind. W. James Popham, in the concluding section on current conceptions of educational evaluation, implicitly suggests that a classification system can be properly appraised by determining whether it is exhaustive and whether it marks out some of the actual differences between the particular models or theoretical formulations (1975, p. 41). Popham characterizes the engaging in model comparisons as at best a mild form of masochism (p. 42). Such a view makes no mention of evaluating classification systems by means of the developed theory-statements. We shall return to this point later on.

Let us begin by noting that classification and category systems are used quite often in the social sciences. Psychology, sociology, and economics illustrate well the wide spread use of classification schemes. And it should not be surprising to find that almost all of the noted evaluation theorists employ category systems which mark out the primary or major goals, the various methodologies, and the kind of value or ethical commitments (e.g., Popham, 1975; Worthen & Sanders, 1973). A striking example is provided by the work of Talcott Parsons, an influential writer in sociology, who characterizes his "theory of action" as involving concept schemes or sets of categories for classifying the components of action (Parsons, 1961).

Classification or category systems, then, serve to organize or structure the domain of inquiry. They provide a way to handle the complexity of the phenomena under investigation. In some cases, as in the sociology example noted above, the classification system may come to be incorporated as a constituent of the theory. It is important to remember that while category systems are not themselves theory-statements which are susceptible to test, nonetheless they contribute indirectly to the formulation of a body of testable theory-statements in ways which are quite important.

In areas of inquiry where there appear to be differences in substantive theoretical positions and differences in methodological commitments and strategies, as in psychology or sociology, or in educational evaluation, it is likely that the category or classification systems will be developed to make explicit the important ways in which the various theoreticians themselves for gaining a critical understanding of the field. For example, in educational evaluation a concerned practitioner will come to better understand his own beliefs and intentions in evaluation by using the classification system to organize various positions for comparison and contrast. It may well be that the practitioner will change his beliefs about evaluation by seeing how his prior view left out of the picture or left unemphasized certain aspects of evaluation. The practitioner may also come to a deeper understanding of the complexity of the phenomena and to appreciate the tentativeness of many of the theoretical views. Such insights can only put him in position to be more critical of his own activities either as an evaluator or as a person who oversees evaluations.

The theoretician, too, can profit from studying the classification system. First, he can profit from the critical feedback to his own theoretical position, feedback which allows him to see the differences and similarities among the various views. Such understanding may suggest new theoretical hypotheses about how to resolve (or strengthen) the differences. A good classification system might enable the theoretician to form a reasonable judgment about whether and where synthesis might take place.

In some cases it may turn out that the classification system helps one to conclude that the differences of evaluation viewpoints are irresolvable but yet to conclude that the disunity is quite legitimate. For example, it may turn out that theories of evaluation applicable to the local level differ in important ways from theories of evaluation applicable to that state, federal, or national level. It seems plausible that this is the case because of the great differences in the nature of the problem and its solution possibilities between the local and federal levels. One might label this the macro/micro distinction and point out that sociology and economics have macro and micro theories, too. Furthermore, as in economics, that there is presently no global theory which subsumes the macro and micro theories into a more general view. If this is so, it does not invalidate the practical or theoretical value of the two differing theories. Each kind of theory may deal with a specific setting in an adequate way. Given such circumstances, it is quite legitimate for each of the two types of theorists to pursue inquiry into his own kind of evaluation theory. Such an understanding of the field would enable the theorist to have confidence in his research direction in the specific setting or context. Indeed, it seems reasonable to argue that some writers are developing evaluation theory applicable at the local level (a micro theory)--e.g., Alkin et al., 1979; Patton, 1978--while others are interested in large scale or policy level evaluations (macro theory)--e.g., Cohen, 1970. As in economics or sociology, there may be no reason to expect or to demand that the micro and the macro theory merge, for the range of phenomena may be different. There may be, then, a good reason for recognizing the legitimacy of different kinds of evaluation theory thrusts.

Let's make a closely related point. Much of the work in evaluation theory has implicityly assumed that it would be helpful to have a single, overall characterization (or definition) of evaluation which would coordinate all of the various theoretical views. We believe that this assumption is unfounded. Some have argued that the apparent disarray in the kinds of theories is not really problematic, for in a new field of inquiry, such as evaluation, demanding or expecting a single, unified characterization (or definition) of evaluation will only stifle creativity, innovation, and progress in theory development. Perhaps this line of reasoning has some general force, but we believe there are reasons which are more compelling in showing the assumption to be unfounded in this case. There are strong reasons for believing that unity will never be achieved.

First, the definitions which have been given by some writers are logically incompatible with the definitions which others have given (Ellett, Fenstermacher, & Shumener, 1978). Given their definitions, what some writers regard as central or perfectly clear cases of evaluating, other writers regard as peripheral instances of evaluation at best, or at the worst, they refuse to recognize as being any kind of evaluation at all. Given that some writers hold that an evaluation must take into account moral or ethical considerations while others hold that only the values of the decision maker need be considered, and given that some hold that certain methodologies must be used for establishing empirical claims while others hold that such methodologies are inappropriate when dealing with human learning, it is quite plausible to hold that there is no general definition of evaluation which could coordinate or subordinate the views in any but a superficial manner. Thus, it is best to drop the assumption that there must be a single, unified kind of evaluation and to encourage the appropriate theorists to develop to the fullest possible extent their own positions. If the writers are talking about phenomena, or ranges of phenomena which are essentially different, then there is no theoretical utility in constraining or confusing the inquiries by expecting or demanding theoretical unity. Indeed, one has only to reflect on the deep, unresolved conceptual and logical problems in epistemology, philosophy of science and ethics to realize how fanciful it is to hope for a unified view which all rational agents would endorse.

Notice that by illuminating important aspects and dimensions of the evaluation theories, a classification system may provide both the practitioner and the theorist a frame of reference for clarifying, understanding, and perhaps reformulating his own point of view. When the area of inquiry is so complex and when there is such diversity of viewpoint about the phenomena, a classification system may be the key to being able to make sense of the geography at all. Having acquired such an understanding, one is in a better position to carry out the activities which are of interest to him and to determine where the work ought to be done.

Of course, not every classification system is adequate or useful, nor is every classification system useful in the same way. In general, classification systems are developed to serve certain purposes or interests. Although there are an infinite number of logically possible ways of constructing a category system, one is likely to produce a system with a finite number of aspects, dimensions, or categories which serve one's own interests and purposes.

For example, it is quite reasonable to expect that a classification system developed (by and) for the practitioner will differ in important ways from a system developed for the theoretician. After all, these people are concerned about doing different things. What is helpful for one may be cumbersome or irrelevant to the other. Even in matters where the activities overlap there may well be differences in emphasis. Given these considerations, it seems reasonable that the field enlist the help of the practitioner and the theoretician in developing those category systems which would be most appropriate for each in the pursuit of his interests. To have only one system for both may leave each in a comparatively worse-off position.

Even within the theoretical realm, efforts should be encouraged to develop classification systems which reflect the differing interests and concerns of the different theorists. Again, each theorist developing a classification system will abstract from the situation using a finite number of aspects or categories to serve his interests and concerns. An economist is likely to focus on certain features, while a political scientist interested in evaluation will rightly focus on others. There are also different levels. Certain political scientists may focus on the equity relations in evaluation while others may focus on systemic linkages between evaluations and school policy formation. Another group of theorists which is particularly interested in the testing (or the verification) of theory-statements may well develop a category system which exhibits the different kinds of theory-statements and the tests (or grounds) appropriate for each kind (see Glass & Ellett, 1980). such a classification system, of course, is not likely to exhibit in sharp relief the practical strategies and procedures which are derived from the more basic theoretical statements. From these considerations, then, we conclude that it will prove useful to encourage various kinds of theoreticians interested in evaluation to develop classification systems which they would consider most adequate.

Also, since evaluation activities typically occur in those contexts for which economists, psychologists, sociologists, and philosophers have been trying to develop theories, then there is every reason to expect that as the others have found, the evaluation theorist will come to find their classification systems useful to his inquiries. Indeed, it may prove useful to explore systematically the category systems which have been developed in these other areas of inquiry in order to come up with a set of valuable classifications for evaluation theory.

After some of the classification systems have been developed or collected in the ways suggested above, efforts should then be made to coordinate or consolidate the various classification systems, taking care not to force them into a false or superficial structure. Following such suggestions in a thoughtful manner can only serve to develop deeper insights into the nature of evaluation activities, illuminating the complexities, the dimensions, and the facets, as well as the unresolved problems and difficulties.

Such thoughtful use and deployment of classification systems will contribute significantly if not essentially to the development of verified theory-statements. Ultimately, of course, the task is to develop a wide and comprehensive set of theory-statements. This point needs to be understood fully, for the most straightforward way of judging the value of a classification system is by showing how it contributes to a broad range of verified theory-statements (see Rudner, chapter 2, 1966). Insofar as the field fails or neglects to increase its body of justified theory-statements, it can not establish the utility of classification systems (see Glass & Ellett, 1980). But in the carrying out of this global task, the classification systems play a significant but indirect role.

Conclusion

In this essay we have argued that classification systems are but one of the different kinds of theoretical formulations and that they play an indirect but very significant role in improving evaluation theory, for they can help in refining and developing theory-statements. Moreover, we have maintained that there are good reasons for holding that theory classification systems are likely to lead to expanded and improved evaluation practice. We have argued that additional development and criticism of classification systems is still needed, given that adequate progress toward the production of theory-statements is being made. Though not every theorist need be engaged in such an activity, the activity is a legitimate one which deserves the serious attention of some of the field's best researchers and practitioners.

8:MCA

CHAPTER 18.

OUR CURRICULUM DILEMMA

JOHN B. CONNELY

Often we blame many different people if the desired degree of learning does not take place in our schools. The teacher, the student, the parents and the administrator can all be mentioned as possible causes for the continuing, mayhaps even growing, gap between our perceptions of what is being achieved and the goals and aspirations we have for our educational institutions. The teacher, it is said, may be dull and uninspiring. He may not be capable of properly controlling his students. The student, on the other hand, may be untalented and uninterested in school and studies. He may be disrespectful and a source of turmoil. The parents may not be supportive of the teacher or the school. They may not have been able to or wanted to prepare their child so that he was cognitively or affectively ready to fruitfully participate in a classroom setting. Administrators may be primarily interested in a neat and orderly flow of paper work, in keeping a low profile and in avoiding altercations with their superiors and the public. All of these allegations may be more or less true, given specific individuals in given situations at particular times.

If it were possible to ameliorate all of these conditions, however, it would still not necessarily insure that the goals of the schools would be attained. For one of the major considerations of any successful educational endeavor must be adequate curriculum planning with some assurance that the curriculum can and will be implemented. Good will, effort, obedience, expensive equipment and an effective organization will often achieve less than is expected or deserved if the goals to be reached and the steps leading to them are not clearly enunciated and tenaciously pursued.

The term "curriculum" can be used in several senses. Sometimes a catalog of courses is considered to be representative of a school's curriculum. A display of particular courses leading to a specific degree may be considered the curriculum for a given major. People speak of a vocational, or a basics or liberal arts curriculum. Whether students must select a major and minor and the extent to which they are allowed electives are often included in curriculum considerations.

The term "curriculum" can also, however, be used to indicate the specific set of experiences which a student must have and absorb in order to develop from one level of skill and knowledge to another. It is important to emphasize that this is not at all the same as a set of courses, but is rather a set of articulated steps through which or by which a student can develop toward the desired goal. The distinction is similar to the difference between a tourist agency's list of worthwhile sights and a detailed description and map of how to get from one sight to another. What is desired is a precise delineation of what is to occur within a course and how the various experiences articulate with each other and relate to the larger goal of which they are supposedly a part.

An example of a curriculum in this sense can be most easily illustrated when dealing with some practical skill such as blacksmithing. There would not seem to be any theoretical difficulties presented in analyzing what a typical blacksmith does. A list of necessary skills and knowledge could be drawn up. Those items listed could then be analyzed into their composite parts. In the course of the analysis various items might turn out to be prerequisites to others and initially unforeseen skills might come to appear as necessary. In any case, eventually a plan could be drawn up whereby a student could begin at the beginning and by proceeding as instructed develop into an adequate blacksmith. A kind of road map would have been created for a particular type of journey--a journey whose destination is a particular ability or competence.

Such a paradigm does not seem particularly arcane or difficult to follow. The impression of simplicity is often quite misleading however. It is crucial to our understanding of what is happening to our schools to perceive some of the difficulties and problems which interfere with us developing and utilizing better curriculums than we have at present. Some of these difficulties are of a technical nature, others arise out of administrative or teacher ineptitude, and yet others out of social values we cherish or at least accept of seem unable to change. Often, of course, many of these factors interact to block any significant improvement.

A major technical problem is that we have lost a consensus of what is the necessary core of skills and knowledge. Many people would now argue that the formerly extracurricular studies or newly developed areas of knowledge are of equal or even greater benefit than the earlier "basics." Even within the traditional core of subjects there is little if any agreement as to what is a proper balance, either among subjects, or within such subjects as history or science. The argument of which foreign language to study has become largely moot because the tendency is to not study a foreign language at all. The upshot of this loss of consensus has been both to blur our vision of specific goals and to encourage various groups to expect such a plethora of benefits from public schooling that almost everyone is bound to be disappointed.

Sometimes we have not been able to agree to any clear definition of what our goal is in any very specific sense. United States history and most of the social sciences are examples of this technical problem. What is a student to know or do at the end of the course? It is not that an individual teacher cannot dogmatically generate his own criteria (although often they don't), but there is little agreement among teachers. The result is so chaotic that it is very difficult to ascertain what a student was supposed to have learned from studying United States history unless you can analyze a particular course.

Sometimes the possible goals are reasonably clear, yet there is some disagreement as to what should be included. A basic course in algebra offers an opportunity for very clear-cut goals, but choices may have to be made as to what is to be included.

Another technical type of problem is where the goal is reasonably clear, but we may not yet adequately understand how to reach it. The goal of studying a foreign language, I take it, is to develop certain language capacities in that foreign tongue. The evidence seems to be that few do this to any significant extent. True, not enough time may be allowed and some students may not work hard enough, but too many reasonably good students have diligently studied foreign languages in our schools with very meagre results for us not to suspect that the curriculum is at least partially at fault. In a similar sense it is no longer clear, if it ever was, that studying lists of spelling words improves spelling in compositions, that coloring countries on a printed map teacher geographic locations or, after Suzuki, that playing an instrument is best learned in the traditional manner.

Curriculum problems also arise out of teacher and administrator ineptitude. Sometimes it seems that a major problem is simply the lack of an understanding that a curriculum is not simply a list. One modern mathematics book changed topics on every other page and jumped from this idea to that with little apparent effort to establish a coherent framework within which a student could develop an understanding of mathematics. Many history books do not tell a story or develop a theme. They are constructed of categories filled with isolated facts. In one world history text the sole reference to Socrates was that he was a philosopher. Such books can be used for little else than rote memorization. Yet they are frequently selected by teachers and administrators.

Teacher ineptitude is given wide rein because many, if not most, teachers are forced into a position of taking the materials and students given them and each year, sometimes for each class, putting together a plan of experiences. Indeed, sometimes each class would ideally require a number of different plans to meet the needs of its diverse students. The difficulty is that many teachers are really not in a position to spend the time or develop the expertise to fulfill such a responsibility. Instead of a thoughtfully developed curriculum you have an everchanging cut and paste collage. What occurs is that many teachers emphasize what interests them, or what they learned years before, or what they already have a lesson plan for, or what the students can do or understand without undue effort or strain. The entire concept of a carefully articulated, developmental curriculum becomes a travesty and what students experience is more like beads on a string, rather than a coherent, meaningful set of experiences leading to any agreed upon goals.

The technical problems and the ineptitude, however, can perhaps be alleviated, if not right away, then in time. More stubborn difficulties arise out of the values we espouse and the social conditions which form the parameters of our situation.

Our students are generally promoted, at least through the 12th grade, on the basis of age. Whatever the defense of this procedure, its effect on the efficacious implementation of any curriculum, however thoughtfully developed or valid, is horrendous. The values which lead us to prefer social promotion may be more important than its negative consequences, but those consequences should be recognized. Many teachers simply have no idea of the developmental level of their students until they can test them at the beginning of the new semester. It is not at all unusual to find students in the 7th grade doing 2nd or even 1st grade work in the basic subjects. Moreover, a teacher may have in that same class as the student who is 6 years behind some students who are 4 or 5 years ahead. In fact, it is perfectly possible that students who are actually on that grade level in their skills form a minority in the class. In such cases, and they are as often as not what does occur, each teacher must perforce create an ad hoc curriculum. Moreover, no single curriculum is anywhere near appropriate for such a diverse selection of individuals as can be found in any one class.

The proliferation of elective courses has been argued for on the basis of freedom of choice for students, the right of democratic decision-making, the value of competition among courses, the need to cater to individual student differences in ability and motivation, the maturing aspects of self-regulation and the necessity of giving students as broad a curriculum choice as possible so that they can find where their true interests lie. None of these arguments are without merit, yet the reality is often that students choose classes that seem easy or entertaining, that are available at a desired time, are the only ones available, or that enable them to associate with their friends. The actual result is that often students study subjects for such a short time that little learning is accomplished and what learning does occur is very fragmented. For most students learning takes a long, steady effort, covering several years, to achieve adequate genuine results.

This can be accepted without indulging in a discussion of the perennial question of the possible differing generative powers of different subjects or questions of whether specifics or generalizations transfer best. For whether one supports more electives or more mandated courses, surely whatever is studied has to be learned to be justified at all. But the very nature of elective courses renders them largely inefficacious as the main means of arriving at long-term, complex learning goals.

Many of our students are not motivated to study, to learn or sometimes even to behave. Our values lead us to act in such ways as to keep such children in a comprehensive school through the 12th grade if at all possible. The effect on the curriculum is to exacerbate the problem brought about by social promotion. Not only must teachers develop ad hoc plans but these plans must often cater to almost the lowest common denominator on a daily basis. Students are generally not removed from class or school because they are doing or acting poorly; on the contrary, the expectations and content of the classes are continually modified downward, sometimes out of all recognition. A secondary subject matter teacher may find that most of his time is spent teaching basic skills and controlling his class. The nadir has been reached. The curriculum has become a question of what can be done during period two to keep the students quietly occupied and to enable the teacher to survive until lunch.

The degree of transiency in our school population would make it difficult to develop adequate curriculums even if we did not have social promotion and comprehensive education. The high degree of physical movement of our populace means that many schools have a tremendous turnover rate of students. It is not unusual for one-third to one-half of the students to move yearly. Some students may attend as many as eight or nine schools in a given year. In one case a teacher lost one-third of his class over a long weekend. His attendance area included several trailer parks. The difficulties of following a highly structured curriculum in such circumstances are enormous.

The curriculum problems caused by our degree of mobility are intensified by the American development of separate, relatively independent school districts. What is taught in one 5th grade may not be the same at any other school a student transfers to. In addition, the relative independence of teachers to control what they teach completes the breakdown. There has often been little, if any, check, historically, on what is taught or how well it was taught, or (not necessarily the same thing) how well it was learned. Under such conditions who would or could implement the type of developmental curriculum which we should ideally have?

Finally, our system of unit credit based on individual teacher grades severely hampers the implementation of adequate curriculums. Teachers receive classes for which they must develop ad hoc plans. Social promotion is school and societal policy. There are generally no objective standards for awarding grades. Teachers do so by forming judgments based on how this student is doing in comparison with other children in the same class in relation to the ad hoc plans that have been developed to allow this class to learn on their level of ability. Such grades are not totally meaningless. They do reflect a student's relative position in a given class, but there is usually no way of later determining whether it was a good or bad class, academically speaking. Thus it is very difficult to tell what the grade means in relation to subject matter learned. In such a system each teacher in each classroom becomes the final arbiter of the curriculum, of learning and of the meaning of grades. The situation is similar to one where each city or even each official would print its or his own currency and follow its or his own fiscal laws.

Summary.

Without adequate curriculums and the power to enforce them, our efforts will not accomplish the goasl we have set for our schools. A number of significant factors currently interfere with the development and implementation of the type of curriculum planning we need to achieve these goals. Some impediments can be at least partially removed through upgrading school personnel, others may be removed by a better understanding of the goals we set or the means to reach them. The major problem, however, lies in the area of the values held by American society and the institutions and behaviors they generate.

These values reflect American economic, social and political attitudes. The degree of mobility in our society, the belief in relative decentralization of educational control and one of its consequences, the authority of the individual teacher to relatively unchecked individually modify what is presented in the classroom all negatively affect our ability to implement a coherent curriculum. Because of our belief in and demand for Jacksonian democracy, the schools continue to be seen as a social mechanism by which to create an idealized equality. As long as relative decentralization, social promotion and a single track comprehensive school system remain the main and overriding operating principles of the American education enterprise, many of our efforts to upgrade the schools--in a cognitive sense--will have little effect. Our current operative values simply run counter to the values which would help us develop and enforce effective, developmental curriculums.

Improvement, however, is conceivable and possible. Our problems are not caused by factors totally beyond our control, but improvement will require structural changes. A new textbook, a new schedule of class hours or computerized registration will really not do the trick. Our curriculum dilemma exists because a number of the values we hold dear are to some extent incompatible. The dilemma probably cannot be resolved, but it is always possible to modify our priorities. By sharpening our awareness of the consequences of our choices, we may eventually come to the decision to alter the existing structure so as to seek other consequences than those brought about by our current practices.

CHAPTER 19.

JOY

NEL NODDINGS

Most of the topics with which we philosophers and educators concern ourselves are topics *to study*, *to teach*, *to talk about*. They are intellectually, but not vitally, significant. They do not touch our personal lives. Here I want to discuss something which *does* touch our lives, one mode of being of consciousness, *joy*, and explore how it arises and how it affects our lives.

I.

Philosophers have tried in a variety of ways to describe emotion and, since we are familiar with the objections raised to many of these positions, I shall run over them only briefly in order to introduce the view I shall take here. It was popular at one time to describe emotion as a physiological state but, while no one denies that certain physiological changes accompany various emotions, emotion itself is clearly *more* than a physiological state. Indeed, what we call "fear" or "anger" seems to *induce* the characteristic racing of the heart, flush or pallor, sweating palms or bulging veins, and there may be no discernible, discriminating state accompanying the gentler, subtler emotions. So this view will not do. It then became the fashion to think of emotion as *behavior*. Anger, from this point of view, is just the set of behaviors we often see in "angry" persons. But this will not do either. Such a view encounters a myriad of objections, among them how to account for silent anger and how to describe the cause of anger or fear or how it comes about. Emotion is, again, more than behavior. Closely akin to the view that describes emotion as behavior is one which simply denies emotion. From this perspective, the words we use to describe emotions are just words associated with various behaviors. We *say* someone is "angry" because he is red in the face and shouting. When we think about what we feel, particularly what we feel before we act or react, this view seems the height of foolishness. Next we have the "state of consciousness" position. In this account, we find two sets of conditions: a physiological set and a mental or psychological set. To experience an emotion, from this point of view, is to be in a mental state of awareness concerning our physiological state. While there are still those who espouse the state of consciousness view, I think phenomenologists have a strong argument when they point out that we need not *be aware* of any internal state when we experience a particular emotion. Indeed, when we are angry, or afraid, or filled with joy, the object of our anger, fear or joy fills our consciousness. Later we may describe ourselves as having been afraid, angry, or happy but, at the time, we may not have reflected on our state at all. I have, therefore, chosen to refer to emotion as a mode of being of consciousness, a way in which consciousness confronts the world and the self.

This choice does not eliminate all problems, but it does permit us to ask questions that are suitably subtle and sophisticated. It is a difficult position for psychology, or course, because it demands exposition of a systematic description that precedes empirical investigation. Although most psychologists *have* abandoned the earlier simplistic views, they do not yet have anything like a coherent, systematic description of emotion. Izard, for example, says that a "complete definition" of emotion must account for

> (a) the experience or conscious feeling of emotion (b) the processes that occur in the brain and nervous system, and (c) the observable expressive patterns of emotion, particularly those on the face.[1]

But just how these three components are related, whether we *choose* the expressive patterns that are observed, and how the emotion in its totality arises are all matters remaining unclear.

Of special interest, to me at least, are these systematic questions. Several of them have been raised by Jean-Paul Sarte. He suggests that one who would study emotion should

> interrogate emotion *about consciousness* or *about man*. He will ask it not only what it is but what it has to teach us about a being, one of whose characteristics is exactly that he is capable of being moved. And inversely, he will interrogate consciousness, human reality, about emotion: what must a consciousness be for emotion to be possible, perhaps even necessary?[2]

Now, perhaps I have provided some context for my initial brief statement: I want to talk about *joy* as a mode of consciousness and to explore how it arises and how it affects our lives.

II.

Psychologists, listening to accounts of personal experience, describe joy as something different from comfort, amusement, or mere pleasure. It is characterized, we are told, by self-acceptance, power, vitality, confidence or, sometimes, by contentment and serenity. But these are all correlative feelings. No combination of them *is* joy. They are ways in which joy manifests itself to those experiencing it. Indeed, it is clear that we do not need to ask what joy *is* (unless we are asking about the meaning of the word). As a basic emotion, it is something we all have experienced directly.

But how does it arise? That is the question that interests us. The answers given to us by psychology are interesting but not altogether satisfactory. Joy is connected to the situations that induce it, but there are no situations or conditions that induce it reliably. Events that bring joy to one person leave another neutral, and a situation that brings me joy at one time may leave me unmoved at another time. While external events seem certainly to have something to do with my experience of joy, they do not bring it about directly, and I cannot pursue joy straight-on through some well-chosen activity. It seems always to come upon me unexpectedly, sliding in by the side door. How do I enter this mode that we call "joy"?

Let's consider first how, in general, consciousness may assume a mode that is emotional. In one mode, the rational-objective mode, we think the objects of consciousness. We are rational, and we strain for objectivity. Suppose, for example, that I try to open a window that is stuck. Very reasonably, I check the lock and the sash cords or whatever other mechanical parts the window contains. I try this and that. I hypothesize. I may even study a neighboring window to find out how windows work when they are functioning properly. But the thing is stuck; it will not open. My face flushes; I beat and curse the window. I am no longer rational, but the window is still the object of my consciousness. My mode of consciousness has changed. It confronts its objects with feeling.

This sort of example is familiar to all of us. When the burdens of the rational mode become too great, we cast ourselves into an affective, directly feeling mode. Sartre calls this a "degradation of consciousness."[3] Our goal does not necessarily change, although it may, but our means seem to be chosen for us. We have given over control. Now it is interesting to note here that I do not regain control by focusing still more intently on the window. It already fills my consciousness. I regain control, if I wish to, by turning consciousness inward. I look at myself and how I am related to the object of consciousness: I am related to a window by half-crazed anger. This is astonishing. It is ridiculous. I have been so related, but I need not continue to be. Now that I see, I may choose what I see or something else.

Now, at first glance it is difficult to see how the "better" emotions could possibly arise in this way. But I think they can and do. Suppose that I am working on a particularly difficult problem of some sort. I am totally engaged, struggling. I am rational, cool, objective, and the problem begins to yield. As the analysis unfolds, I feel a growing pleasure, a real excitement. The rational mode is no longer adequate for the situation at hand. The energy available is too great for the remaining objective tasks. I may not shout, "Eureka!" but, then again, I may. I do not make statements. I sing, or dance with the dog (who responds, properly, nonrationally), or I close my eyes and grin. I have entered a world which Sartre describes as "magical," but I have projected the magic onto the world. It is the way I meet the world at this moment.

A second way for consciousness to assume an affective mode of being is very different, and it does not seem at all proper too label it a "degradation" of consciousness. It is not the result of any inadequacy of rationality, but rather, it is an natural as the objective mode. I cannot say, with any reasonable expectation of success, "I shall go sit on the front steps and be happy," but I can quit thinking and manipulating. I can be quiet, emptying consciousness of its thought objects and, then, a receptive mode may take over. Now the real magical qualities of the world may make themselves present to me, and just as the resulting emotions in the first form could be either "good" or "bad," so too in this way I may experience joy or fear or revulsion.

As Sartre puts it:

> Thus, there are two forms of emotion, according to whether it is we who constitute the magic of the world to replace a deterministic activity which cannot be realized, or whether it is the world itself which abruptly reveals itself as being magical.[4]

But we need not interpret the joy that comes to us in receptivity as "magical," nor need the revealed world itself be considered "magical." At least, I would prefer not to say "magical" if we understand by its use something illusory--a world produced by trickery. Sartre does not intend this meaning--the magical world is every bit as "real" as the rational world--but he does call the magical "an irrational synthesis of spontaneity and passivity."[5] He refers to it as "an inert activity, a consciousness rendered passive"[6] and, while he acknowledges the "essential necessity" of the passivity, he does not give it an exalted position. It is still a "degradation" of consciousness.

This view of passivity (or I would prefer to say "receptivity") as somehow degraded may be a natural consequence of the isolation of consciousness that permeates Sartre's ontology. From another ontological view, relatedness is the fundamental structure of human reality, and it is our receptivity that makes us immediately aware of that relatedness. When we are receptive--when we have ceased imposing structure on the world--the relatedness which is our reality is revealed. If it is a true picture of this relatedness that we seek, then we must continually turn away from rational analysis toward what is revealed in receptivity. Indeed, if looking and listening characterize the appropriate mode for certain forms of contact, then analytic thought substituted for the appropriate direct contact, may represent a "degradation" of consciousness. It seems to me, for example, that when we treat the feelings of others as data--as material to be thought--we are often in an inappropriate mode of consciousness.

Joy comes to us, unbidden, as a tremendous release from a high level of neural stimulation. We enter a joyous mode when the rational mode can anticipate but not achieve the fullness within our grasp. But joy also comes to us, invited, as a quality attached to our relatedness, and sometimes it comes uninvited when we are off guard. When I enter the living room after a working day, I may be flooded with joy at the sight of my daughter lying on the sofa. Here is my child, a young woman, exhausted from basketball (I cannot even *sympathize* rationally); her hair is wet from exertion and a recent shower. She is hopelessly, beautifully useless for the moment. I cannot put into words what I feel or why--or why I should feel it this day and not another. I do not know *why* the sight of her induces this joy in me, but I affirm in delight and wonder that it does.

Joy cannot be commanded in receptivity, and we risk encountering other qualities--horror, grief, revulsion--when we open ourselves to the possibilities of human reality. To experience joy as a real quality of the world, we must have the courage to accept these other unwelcome qualities when they are revealed. They are there: grief, sorrow, guilt, terror. One who would receive joy must affirm these also. So, it may happen, that even in the deepest grief, filled with guilt and sorrow and regret and despair, I still can see the *possibility* of joy. When joy itself cannot break through the pain, I feel it out there--separated from me--but there in the world as a possibility that will some day, at some magic moment, become a reality once more. To feel it, to prepare for it, I must accept the present pain. All other things being equal, some day, I will turn in the direction of joy. Even the present affirmation of suffering contributes to the possibility of eventual joy.

III.

How does joy affect us? Psychologists tell us, for example, that joy increases altruism.[7] It also increases appreciation and facilitates social responsiveness.[8] But what does it teach us about consciousness?

First, I think the occurrence of emotion points to *relatedness* as the ontological base of human reality. Joy comes as the essence of our relation to someone or something, and it enhances and deepens the relation. It comes, when it does, with a sense of transcendence and permanence as though it would remain forever. It reveals itself as both the essence of the moment and the essence of the more lasting relationship. It also reveals itself as both *in here* and *out there* and, thus suggests a consciousness which creates itself but is also in touch with something not itself, and it is from this not-itself, this relatedness, that it derives the power to create itself. Because it comes in on us even at times of sorrow, it reveals a consciousness capable of sustaining irresolvable paradox. While psychologists insist that we cannot *express* two basic emotions simultaneously,[9] it is clear that we can feel joy and sorrow coming upon us alternately and so closely one upon the other that they sit side by side in a consciousness grasping them both. In-here there may be grief and pain; out-there, bursting in upon me unbidden through a beautiful world, there may be joy, creating a rainbow out of light and tears. Joy, more than any other emotion, reveals our connectedness. Its occurrence suggests that we are, as individuals, best described not as the sum of our acts but as the set of our qualitative relations. All those things and persons and events with which we make immediate, direct contact form the ground upon which we are defined as individuals.

Second, the appearance of "passive" or "receptive" joy suggests a consciousness in need of quiet and tranquility.[10] We accept, in some wonder, that joy and other emotions come to us unbidden as real qualities of the world. But this recognition may remind us that understanding and insight also may come unbidden and so, of course, may inspiration. Joy signifies a consciousness capable of receiving, a consciousness that is admittedly active, intentional, manipulative, but also quiet, open, connected, and listening.

Joy, more than any other of the emotions, points to the receptive function of consciousness. But it does more than this. As an unreflected state, it is "mere" happiness, but as recognized by a reflective consciousness it expands both our emotional lives and out intellectual lives. It is not only joy we seek, when we have experienced it, but the wonder, power, and delight which accompany it. A contemplation of joy draws us toward receptivity. What else might the receptive mode disclose?

It is the receptive mode that we apprehend. Here is the beginning of creativity, the mode in which understanding begins and is completed. Explanation is controlled, contrived, constructed. But understanding, like joy, comes unpredictably. At one moment we are baffled, stymied. Then, suddenly, the light dawns. It is not something we do that produces the light, although things we have done undoubtedly contribute to the event, but it is something that happens, something that is revealed to us.

Mozart spoke of hearing melodies in his head and was so convinced that music was being created through him that he asked:

> Now, how does it happen that, while I am at work, my compositions assume the form of style which characterize Mozart and are not like anybody else's?[11]

Similarly, the mathematician Gauss is described as having been "seized" by mathematics:

> Conversing with friends he would suddenly go silent, overwhelmed by thoughts beyond his control, and stand staring rigidly oblivious of his surroundings. Later he controlled his thoughts--or they lost their control over him--and he consciously directed all his energies to the solution of a difficulty till he succeeded.[12]

And, in a recent television interview, Joan Miro attempted to explain his artistic creativity by saying, "The paper has magnitism," and "My hand is guided by a magnetic force," and, "It is like I am drunk."[13]

Yet, despite a flood of personal testimony to the contrary, the mode endorsed as creative and productive in our culture is the objective-analytic mode. We are everywhere urged to think, and we are seldom encouraged or authorized to see, to hear, to feel. It is this effect of joy to which I would draw your attention: that it signifies a consciousness capable of receptivity, one that apprehends essential relatedness.

IV.

I have not said anything about education, and I am almost afraid to do so. I do think we can teach in such a way and live as teachers in such a way that the possibility of joy may be awakened in our students. But I dread the construction of a course in "Preparing for Joy," complete with behavioral objectives. And I do not know how to evaluate such teaching or living. Indeed, I guess I reject the possibility of objective evaluation. To discuss the most significant matters of living with my children or with my students and then to assess what they got out of it in some formal way seems the height of the ridiculous. If we look inward and see the kinds of things we are putting side by side, we see just how ridiculous it is.

But there are some specific things we can do. We can talk about affect and receptivity and share experiences of our own and of others. In every subject, we can make use of the personal testimony found in biography so that our students will come to recognize that what they feel is not to be rejected but reflected upon and built upon--that their affective lives are intimately and indissociably linked to their cognitive and productive aspects. I would like students to realize, for example, that small miracles of understanding sometimes take place when we stop thinking directively and start listening, looking, and feeling. I would like them to hear Mozart describe himself as "on fire with inspiration" or Gauss as being "seized by mathematics." Most of all I would like them to know that many of the most significant things we learn in life are not learned directly but, as Robert Frost says, "cavalierly and as it happens." For me, many teaching episodes are like the creation of poems as Frost describes that creation:

> It begins in delight, it inclines to the impulse, it assumes direction with the first line laid down, it runs a course of lucky events, and ends in a clarification of life--not necessarily a great clarification, such as sects and cults are founded on, but in a momentary stay against confusion. It has denouement. It has an outcome that thought unforeseen was predestined from the first image of the original mood-- . . .[14]

And, I repeat, I do not know how to evaluate, except subjectively, such teaching. I confess I would not try, beyond the sort of effort made here, to justify it. Anyone who cannot see it will not be persuaded by argument. That leaves faith and joy to motivate the effort.

Documentations.

1. Carroll E. Izard, Human Emotions (New York: Plenum Press, 1977), p. 4.

164.

2. Jean-Paul Sartre, "The Emotions: Outline of a Theory," in *Essays in Existentialism*, ed. by Wade Baskin (Secaucus, N.J.: The Citadel Press, 1965), pp. 198-99.

3. Ibid., p. 241.

4. Ibid., p. 246.

5. Ibid., p. 245.

6. Ibid., p. 245.

7. B.S. Moore, B. Underwood, and D. Rosenhan, "Affect and Altruism," *Developmental Psychology*, (8), 1973, 99-104.

8. Izard, op. cit., pp. 239-276.

9. Manfred Clynes, *Sentics* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1977).

10. For a psychological distinction between active and passive joy, see C.M. Meadows, "The Phenomenology of Joy: An Empirical Investigation," *Psychological Reports*, (37), 1975, 39-54.

11. Quoted in Jacques Hadamard, *The Psychology of Invention in the Mathematical Field* (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1954), pp. 16-17.

12. E.T. Bell, *Men of Mathematics* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965), p. 254.

13. N.B.C.'s Prime Time Sunday, July 8, 1979.

14. Robert Frost, *Complete Poems* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1959), p. vi.

CHAPTER 20.

IN SEARCH OF JOY

ALETA YOU MASTNY

Nel Noddings is to be commended for writing a paper that has universal meaning for all of us. Although the subject is difficult to elucidate because of its subjective nature, she nonetheless provides us with some important considerations that we, as educators, need to address ourselves to.

In my response, I shall: 1) Focus on what I consider to be the key points of Professor Noddings's paper, 2) I shall raise some questions concerning the need to clarify some of those points, and 3) I shall suggest an alternative in which joy might be implemented within the classroom.

Noddings talks about joy "as a mode of consciousness" and characterizes it with self-acceptance, power, vitality, confidence, contentment, and serenity. As a "mode of consciousness," how might joy be distinguished from happiness, gaiety, or any other emotion associated with joy? Webster's New World Thesaurus[1] lists inner contentment, ecstasy, rapture, cheer and happiness alongside joy. Is there a continuum of joyful emotions that one might experience? Is contentment, for example, more joyful than happiness? What determines whether one emotion is more joyful than another? Because of its ambiguous nature, perhaps joy can be more precisely defined for the reader.

Noddings is correct in pointing out that part of the problem in examining joy lies in its subjective nature. Seeing a child walk for the first time or watching Helen Keller internalize the meaning of the word "water" are examples of what some people might view as being joyful. On the other hand, I might have the opinion that giving birth to a child by the Lamaze method is a joyful experience. Another woman, having less enthusiasm about childbirth than I, might find the idea to be totally repugnant. Because of the diversity of human nature and the variety of human experiences, what is joyful to one might be totally abhorrent to another.

How does joy arise and what might be some benefits derived from Joy? Noddings suggests "turning consciousness inward," "quit thinking and manipulating," and "turn away from rational analysis toward what is revealed in receptivity."

The suggestion of turning within is very similar to what St. Augustine recommends when he says, "do not wish to go out; go back into yourself. Truth dwells in the inner man."[2] Turning within is also reminiscent of what wise men have done throughout the ages.

> They [the wise men] have told us again and again, in legends and myths, aphorisms, poems, and allegories that there exists within us a source of direct information about reality that can teach us all we need to know. Maimonides called this source 'the still, small voice.' A Chinese sage, Hsuan-chiao, said of it: 'You remain silent and it speaks. You speak and it is silent.' And all of them stress that the only requirement for getting in touch with this source is the suspension of ordinary mental activity.[3]

Those who believe that life should be governed solely by rational thought might take issue with the recommendation of turning away from rational knowledge. In actuality, what Noddings may be referring to is not turning away from rational thought as she originally stated, but the necessity of going beyond the rational mode of thinking. Implicit in the latter distinction is the idea that rational, outer-directed thought can take one only so far in understanding and experiencing the world that one lives in. In order to experience the "possibility of joy," the mental mind needs to be silenced so that other parts of the self might be allowed to emerge.

In her paper, Noddings points out that some of the effects of joy are an increase in altruism, social responsiveness, and a deepening relationship to someone or something. The fruits of joy are unquestionable. And yet, Noddings wants to experience something more than joy; she wants to experience "the wonder, power, and delight" which accompanies this emotion.

Professor Noddings seems to allude to what many people might term a mystical experience. Could the experience of the Canadian psychiatrist, R.M. Bucke be similar to the "wonder, power, and delight" that she is referring to when he says that

> All at once, without warning of any kind, I found myself wrapped in a flame-colored cloud. For an instant I thought of fire, an immense conflagration somewhere close by in that great city; the next, I knew that the fire was within myself. Directly afterward there came upon me a sense of exultation, of immense joyousness accompanied. . . by an intellectual illumination impossible to describe . . . I saw that all men are immortal; that the foundation principle of the world, is what we call love, and that the happiness of each and all is in the long run absolutely certain . . .[4]

If Bucke's experience is similar to what Noddings is suggesting, then how might joy be similar to and yet different from a mystical experience? What determines whether one person receives this joyous inner contact and another does not? What role does Divine Grace play in one's ability to receive this type of experience? How might one be more susceptible to experiencing an inward illumination that is sometimes called joy?

Noddings suggests that we need "to see, to hear, and to feel more." We need to rely more on our subjective experiences rather than exist solely on the basis of our rational minds.

As for teaching students about "the possibility of joy," Noddings leaves the reader hanging in mid-air. Noddings concedes that it is virtually impossible to set down behavioral objectives and evaluate such a course. Some of the spontaneity which accompanies joy would surely be robbed in the process. She is correct in saying that scrutinizing the course and subjecting it to accountability tests would certainly sterilize what should and could be a spontaneous situation. It is as if a surgeon were performing an autopsy on the human heart in search of love; or a spiritual seeker climbing the heights of the Himalayas in search of God; the illusive and the intangible are not always subject to human dissection and strict accountability.

However, Noddings does recommend talking about receptivity, sharing experiences, and reading testimonies of individuals who have constructively lived and acted from the subjective world of "listening, looking, and feeling."

Another alternative that Professor Noddings might consider is in the way of meditation. Meditation has actually been used in several public classrooms in California with some degree of success.[5] Deborah Rozman, psychologist and educational consultant, suggests that because meditation might invoke negative connotations from those who misunderstand the word, that alternative terms such as awareness training, concentration, centering, awareness games, wholistic learning, or creative imagery might be used instead. According to Rozman, when a number of different meditation techniques were used in the classroom, the following results invariably occurred:

- a calm vibration throughout the group
- more receptivity on the part of children
- a sense of fellowship or community experience
- an awakening sensitivity and empathy with other people
- acceptance of feelings
- increased creative expression
- an improved self-concept
- an awakening of the imagination and parts of themselves the children had not explored[6]

In terms of implementing joy within the classroom, meditation might be just one avenue out of many, that educators might seriously consider as a viable alternative.

Nel Noddings is to be praised for shedding some light on a topic that, by its very nature, is difficult to grapple with and pin down. At a time when many educational philosophers are primarily concerned with the linguistic analysis of words, Professor Noddings has courageously turned our attention toward a topic that will have a greater impact, in the long run, toward the quality of life that humankind may ultimately choose to explore.

Documentations.

[1] Webster's New World Thesaurus, s.v. "joy."

[2] Quoted in Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, trans. D. Cairns (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1960), p. 157.

[3] Andrew, Weil, The Natural Mind (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972), p. 152.

[4] Quoted in William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience (New York: Random House, 1902), p. 390.

[5] Evidence of this can be found in quotations taken from the foreword in Deborah Rozman's, Meditating With Children (Boulder Creek, California: University of the Trees Press, 1975). Some of the school districts mentioned were Santa Cruz Independent and Scotts Valley Public Schools.

[6] Ibid., p. 147.

CHAPTER 21.

IS ARISTOTLE'S ACCOUNT OF HAPPINESS INCOHERENT?

DAVID P. ERICSON

It has long been commonplace to observe that Aristotle in the *Nicomachean Ethics*[1] maintains two views of *eudaimonia*, or happiness.[2] One view, the main subject of the treatise, identifies the happy life for man with a morally or practically virtuous life. The second view, hardly touched upon until Book X, identifies the happy life with the intellectually virtuous life of contemplation. Now it appears that these two views are mutually incompatible since Aristotle sharply distinguishes between the moral virtues and the intellectual virtues (e.g., 1103^a 6) and between practical and theoretical wisdom (1141^b 1-14; see also 1139^a-1141^a). And because Aristotle identifies the happy life with two mutually incompatible lives, we might suspect that his account of happiness is internally incoherent. Yet only recently has that charge on those grounds been made in the literature.[3]

There is reason for this silence; and I believe it is to be found in Book X where Aristotle discusses the contemplative life and its relationship to human happiness. Briefly, there are certain passages that lead one to believe that the contemplative life is a divine form of life corresponding to a divine form of happiness (e.g., 1177^b 26-30). Scholars have, accordingly, assumed that for Aristotle only the morally virtuous life is the *human* life of happiness. Hence, Aristotle's account of happiness is *not* incoherent once we distinguish between human happiness and the happiness of the gods.

However, I believe there are good reasons to reject this view. So, in what follows, I shall in section I briefly explicate Aristotle's two views of the happy life and show why they conflict. In II, I show why the human contemplative life on Aristotelian grounds is a *human* life of happiness. In III, I shall suggest some ways in which Aristotle's account of happiness might be free of incoherency. And finally, in section IV, I shall indicate how an Aristotelian-type view of happiness could provide the basis for thinking that there is a strong connection between *education* and *happiness*--a claim that rings peculiar to our modern ear.

I

After defining happiness as "an activity of soul which follows or implies a rational principle in accordance with virtue"[4] (1098^a 7-19), Aristotle raises the question of which activities are connected with man's activity of soul (1098^b). Answering his own question, Aristotle claims that the happy life consists of engaging in activities that involve exercising the virtues of the soul (1098^b-1101^a 1-8).

Now, of the virtues of the soul, Aristotle cites two kinds: moral and intellectual. Among the moral virtues are justice, liberality, and temperance, while philosophic wisdom, understanding, and art are intellectual virtues. And as Aristotle claims, these two sets of virtues are conceptually distinct:

> For in speaking about man's character we do not say he is wise or has understanding but that he is good-tempered or temperate; yet we praise the wise man also with respect to his state of mind; and of states of mind we call those which merit praise virtues. (1103^a 6-10)

Even though Aristotle does distinguish between the moral and intellectual virtues (see also 1103^b, 1104^b, 1106^a, 1106^b, and the whole Book VI), he could easily avoid any semblance of internal inconsistency by simply claiming that though the lives of moral virtue and intellectual virtue are each sufficient for human happiness, neither form of life is necessary. But Aristotle refuses the easy way out by making identity claims between happiness and each form of life.

This is least clear, I grant, with respect to the morally virtuous life; yet Aristotle does cite the inscription at Delos that includes the moral virtue of justice and later proceeds to identify justice (or moral virtue-entire, 1129^b 25-1130^a 14) with happiness.[5] And it can hardly be denied that the EN, in the main, is devoted to the connection between human happiness and moral virtue.

However that may be, it is exceedingly clear that Aristotle does identify the contemplative life with happiness. Aristotle argues that if happiness is an activity of soul that follows a rational principle, it is reasonable that man's life should be spent in exercising the highest rational virtue; he explains that this activity is contemplation (theoria), since contemplation involves the highest and best virtue of which man is capable (1179^a 11). Furthermore, he claims:

> Happiness extends, then, just so far as contemplation does, and those to whom contemplation more fully belongs are more truly happy, not as a mere concomitant but in virtue of the contemplation; for this in itself is precious. Happiness, therefore, must be some form of contemplation. (1178^b 28)

Because for Aristotle, happiness both entails and is entailed by contemplation, it follows that should the activity of contemplation be absent from a man's life, so too is happiness. But since the morally virtuous life doesn not appear to be identical with the contemplative life, the two accounts of human happiness may be at odds with one another. Aristotle's view of happiness may well be ultimately and fundamentlly incoherent. Yet perhaps this brief account of Aristotle's view is defective and not Aristotle's view itself.

II

In this section I shall consider two objections to the account in I and seriously entertain the notion that Aristotle's view of happiness is, indeed, incoherent. The first objection, concerned with the virtue of practical wisdom, is less serious.

It is true that Aristotle cites practical wisdom as an intellectual virtue connected with the morally virtuous life (1140^a 5-1140^b 30). And though the moral virtues are not reducible to practical wisdom, it is true that Aristotle thinks that the moral virtues involve or imply practical wisdom (see 1144^b 18-29 where Aristotle attacks the Socratic view that wisdom and moral virtue are identical). Thus, the morally virtuous life is a rational and an intellectually virtuous form of life since the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom belongs to the rational principle of the soul. Finally, because an intellectually virtuous life is a contemplative life, it follows that the morally virtuous life is a contemplative life.

Unfortunately, this argument contains an obvious flaw in the last premise: the identification of all forms of intellectually virtuous lives with the contemplative life. Though practical wisdom does belong to the rational principle of the soul and so is concerned with truth, its connection with truth is different from that of philosophic wisdom--a virtue which is exercised in the activity of contemplation. As Aristotle mentions, practical wisdom is a "true or reasoned capacity to act with regard to the things that are good or bad for man" (1140^b 5-6) and so is concerned with the deliberation of particulars rather than, in the case of philosophic wisdom, solely the contemplation of invariable universals (1141^a 9-1141^b 25). The contemplative life--which Aristotle identifies with the philosophical life (1177^a 12-1177^b 25; 1178^b 1-8; 1179^a 23-33)--does not require the virtue of practical wisdom, nor does the morally virtuous life require the virtue of philosophic wisdom.

By far the most important argument that supports Aristotle's innocence concerns the nature of the contemplative life. It proceeds as follows. Even though the contemplative or philosophical life is the supremely happy life and the paradigm of the rational life, it is not, nor could be, a life proper to man (qua man) on Aristotelian grounds. The contemplative life is a divine form of life; it is literally for the gods, while only the morally virtuous life is identical with the happy life for man. If this argument is correct, then Aristotle's view of happiness is coherent.

In the first place, Aristotle--agreeing that the gods are happy, active, lacking in body (hyle), which is liable to degeneration, but not form (eidos)--raises the question of what sorts of activities the gods engage in. He answers in this way:

> Therefore the activity of God, which surpasses all others in blessedness, must be contemplative; and of human activities, therefore, that which is most akin to this must be most of the nature of happiness. (1178^{b} 10-25).

Contemplation, then, being proper to God, is the divine activity. Thus, it would appear to follow that insofar as a man engages in contemplation, he is engaging in an activity which, strictly speaking, is not a human activity. And on this point Aristotle seems in agreement when he speaks of the contemplative life in relation to man:

> But such a life would be too high for man; for it is not so far as he is man that he will live so, but in so far as something divine is present in him; and by so much as this is superior to our composite nature (hyle and eidos, not, like God, purely eidos) is its activity superior to that which is the exercise of the other kind of virtue (moral virtue). (1177^{b} 26-30)

It would appear, then, that Aristotle does, after all, provide the resolution to our dilemma. Man, the rational-animal, has as his proper activity the morally virtuous life. It is in this that the happy life for man consists. And it is for this reason that Aristotle can claim that Pericles, the 5th century Athenian legislator, statesman, and general, is the paradigm man (1140^{b} 8). The contemplative life cannot be the human life, for it would be to gloss over the fact that man, though rational, is yet an animal. And as an animal, as a soul informed with matter, man is subject to the informities and corruptions of body which prevent him from realizing continuous, unimpeded activity.

Though this account of the matter appears to have won the day, I nevertheless cannot help but think it deceptive. For surely it is strange to believe that the scholarly life is essentially a non-human, divine life. What I have in mind is the fact that scholars, those who seek the truth, often fail to realize that which they seek. Now it may seem to be a rather low-level and obvious truth that our arguments, whether inductive or deductive, are sometimes (perhaps all too frequently) invalid, and it may seem to be trivial that our mental errors often separate us from the truth; but this observation, in the context we are considering, does, I submit, assume an importance worth noting. It reminds us that to err is human.

Though we can readily admit that human fallibility often enters into our theoretical inquiries, one thing we cannot admit, nor could Aristotle admit, is that the Aristotelian God could make mistakes while engaging in his proper function of contemplation. Error, often made possible by physical and mental weariness, is an impediment to an inquiry; but as an impediment it cannot be applicable to Aristotle's God, who, by nature, exhibits unimpeded activity. The very fact that God exhibits unimpeded activity is a reminder that he is not an animal--he has no body--and thus is not subject to the frailties and foibles, generation and corruption, to which animals, even rational-animals, are subject. So, there is one difference at least between the conditions (or lack thereof) to which human and divine contemplation are subject. This fact, however, is not the most of it.

If to err is human, so too is man's form of contemplation. Man reasons most often from premises to conclusions, while God does not. If it is absurd to imagine the gods as making contracts and returning deposits as Aristotle thinks, it is just as absurd to imagine them as wondering whether a _reductio ad absurdum_ is sound or whether the evidence supports a particular belief or body of beliefs. Is it not absurd to imagine the gods as behaving in this manner precisely because, like paying debts, there are customary _human_ theoretical activities?

Aristotle, if he does not provide direct support, does imply that this contention is correct. Of all the intellectual virtues to be found in the human soul, only one, intuitive reason, the instantaneous grasping of the truth of first principles (1140^b 30-1141^a 8), could possibly be akin to God's contemplative activity.[6] But as Aristotle relates elsewhere (_Posterior Analytics_, Book II, Ch. 19), intuitive reason, superior as it is to demonstration, requires sense-perception. Of course, however, because God does not have a body, which is necessary to have sense-perception, he cannot even engage in intuitive reason.

Nonetheless, it must be granted that as God engages in the activity of contemplation, that activity must be something like intuitive reason, a grasping of first principles without need of sense-perception.[7] Furthermore, we may grant that insofar as man engages in intuitive reason, though such reasoning requires sense-perception, man is engaging in a divine-like (if not divine) activity. From this we may conclude, as Aristotle does, that man engages in such an activity not as a man but insofar as there is something divine in him. Yet even should we agree to all of this, we must admit that to engage in other intellectual activities--involving the exercise of the other intellectual virtues--is to engage in human, rational activities.

Hence, Aristotle's distinctions between the various _human_ intellectual virtues preclude the identification of any of them with human happiness. The standard view that only the morally virtuous life is the life of human happiness fails on grounds other than the alleged connection between intuitive reason and divine happiness. It simply ignores that art, scientific knowledge, philosophic wisdom, etc. are also virtues of the soul and are different from practical wisdom; and the rational forms of life that exemplify these other virtues are, therefore, different in kind from the morally virtuous life. They are, all of them, the stuff out of which human happiness is made. But insofar as Aristotle identifies one of these forms of life as the life of human happiness, his account of happiness is internally inconsistent.

III

Though any attempt to single out and identify one particular virtue-exemplifying form of life with the life of human happiness necessarily fails, there may be other ways to salvage Aristotle's account. Let me suggest two possible avenues of investigation. First, assuming that Aristotle was not blind to the fact that his delineation of the intellectual virtues of the human soul committed him to the view that though each virtue-exemplifying form of life was, or could be, sufficient for happiness, none was necessary, we can point to his comments on individual men. For example, he speaks of Anaxagoras and Thales possessing the virtue of philosophic wisdom in a high degree, but lacking practical wisdom (1141^{b} 1-14; see also 1139^{a}-1141^{b}). And if these philosophers lacked the virtue of practical wisdom, we might presume their attempts at a more practical life to be less than happy (to wit: Thales' unfortunate meeting with a well).

The suggestion is that Aristotle believed that some men are fitted by nature for theoretical pursuits, some for artistic pursuits, some for practically virtuous ones, etc. Thales may have been suited for only a philosophical life. For such a person, the philosophical life is sufficient and necessary for happiness. Though the happy life for man cannot be identified with any particular human intellectual virtue, the happy life for particular men and women can be identified with a particular virtue according to their various natural endowments.[8]

A second avenue of exploration can be found in relation to Aristotle's comments on self-sufficiency. Concluding a lengthy argument of self-sufficiency early in the EN, Aristotle states, "Happiness then is something final and self-sufficient" (1097^{b} 8-23). But the possible import of that conclusion is lost from sight until we reach Book X where Aristotle extols the self-sufficiency of the philosopher above all men. There he argues that though the philosopher, like any other man possessing any of the other virtues, is not biologically self-sufficeint in the sense that he also requires the necessities of life, he is self-sufficient in a way not possible for the practically virtuous man. The practically virtuous man needs people toward whom and with whom he can act justly, liberally, temperately, etc. and needs money and things insofar as the performance of these virtuous actions requires. But the philosopher needs neither friends, instruments, nor money in order to engage in contemplation. For this reason (and other connected reasons such as the leisureliness, final nature, and pleasure attributable to the activity), "the activity of reason, which is contemplative . . . will be the complete happiness of man."[9]

By examining happiness in relation to the criterion of self-sufficiency, we may have the vantage point from which we can understand why Aristotle's identification of happiness with both contemplation and moral virtue posed so seemingly difficult a problem. Perhaps instead of focusing upon the various forms of reason and attempting to decide whether they are or are not human forms of reason for Aristotle, we should be paying more attention to his remarks on self-sufficiency. For from the standpoint of self-sufficiency, the practically virtuous life is deficient in ways in which the philosophical life can never be.[10]

But in dwelling upon self-sufficiency as a criterion of happiness, we must keep in mind that the impetus for and the problem of Aristotle's two-fold account of happiness lie in his distinction between sophia (philosophic wisdom) and phronesis (practical wisdom). Not sophia, but phronesis, the virtue always connected with action and good political counsel, was proclaimed as the virtue of the philosopher by Plato! But in order to make that claim plausible, Plato was required to force the philosopher back into the cave to guide the human affairs of state. Aristotle, however, having broken with Plato's view in the EN by claiming that sophia is the virtue of the philosopher and phronesis that of the practical man of action,[11] opens the issue of which virtue-exemplifying form of life is the human life of happiness.

In fact, the EN can almost be read as a dialectical drama on whether Aristotle will bestow the wreath of complete human happiness on the brow of Pericles or Thales. In a book written largely for the educational benefit of the would-be Pericles, it is easy to understand why so many see the wreath on Pericles' head. Yet if we examine the great weight Aristotle attached to self-sufficiency, we cannot fail to see that it is actually Thales who wears the crown.

IV

A few final words must be said about the possiblity of any relationship between happiness and education. And here I can do no more than to point out that the type of theory that Aristotle offers concerning happiness is crucial to an assessment of that possible relationship. Though we may not find Aristotle's rather intellectualist considerations wholly plausible, it still remains possible that the formal features of his theory may provide the framework from which a more cridible story on the connection between happiness and education can emerge.

At first glance, happiness in life and education seem to have little to do with one another. After all, we may observe, there seem to be many individuals who are happy but uneducated, and then again those who are educated but unhappy.

I want to suggest, however, that such an observation conceals an implicit assumption that happiness is necessarily a subjective matter. That is not to mean that being happy is equivalent with feeling happy or the having of pleasant sensations, for when we say that someone leads a happy life we do not imply that he is right now feeling pleasant sensations. Rather, happiness is thought to be subjective because we can judge a person happy or unhappy only in reference to the standards that that person sets for himself. And if those individual standards make no reference to education, then it follows that a person can be happy but uneducated.

But it is precisely that assumption that Aristotle challenges. His entire account of happiness involves the attempt to establish independent, objective grounds for judging individuals happy or unhappy. He is more than willing to claim that a person who fancies him or herself happy (in reference to their own set standards) may in truth be unhappy. And it is obvious that given the pride of place that Aristotle gives to practical and theoretical reason, education is intimately connected with happiness.

Of course all of this depends upon whether happiness is a subjective or objective matter. And though I cannot plunge into this issue now, I would like to mention a few examples that are crucial in resolving the issue; for I do not think we can so quickly conclude that, of course, happiness is subjective. Richard Kraut in a recent article provides two examples that should give cause for hesitancy.[12] (1) Assume that subjectivism is true. Yet notice that even when we operate on that assumption, we still say that a person could be far happier had he done X or had Y not happened to him. Beyond the individual's self-set standards, we seem to imply that there are external, objective, standards used to judge the happiness of a person's life. This is in conflict with the subjectivist thesis. And (2) a person may review the course of his or her life and observe that all goals were achieved. On the subjectivist thesis, this person has necessarily led a happy life. Now, however, the person recognizes that the goals were worthless and his or her life to have been unhappy. But such a judgment cannot rely on a subjective notion of happiness. To think otherwise is to claim that though my life is and has been happy (I achieved all my goals and had a positive attitude toward my life), my life is not and has not been happy. To avoid this contradiction, we must presuppose an objective conception of happiness. For only an objective conception would allow us to claim that though I fancied myself happy by meeting the standards I set for myself, those standards were ill-founded and ill-chosen; I now find myself, as a result, a very unhappy person.

Both examples suggest that the matter is not quite so easy as we might think. Whatever the case, the objectivist-type thesis that Aristotle presents suggests that it is not so wildly implausible to wonder if the expression "happy, but uneducated" is a fully coherent notion when applied to human beings. Aristotle is committed to saying that the expression is utterly fantastic. But then again, Aristotle is committed to the utterly fantastic view that in both happiness and education, there we can find the light of reason.

Documentations.

1. Hereafter referred to as EN. Section and line references to EN appear in the body of this paper.

2. Literally in the Greek "eudaimonia" means "prospered by a demon." Happily or not, it has been widely transalted as "happiness" in English. And I shall follow this custom even though it is claimed (falsely, I think) that "happiness" is too hedonistically oriented in English to serve as an adequate translation. "Happiness" is ambiguous. We speak of "feeling happy," which clearly is connnected with a momentary, pleasurable sate of mind; however, we also speak of "being happy in life," which is not mementary but is (implicitly at least) connected with engaging in activities. In this way, "happiness" in the second sense may serve quite well as a transaltion of "eudaimonia," for certainly it is one's life which is prospered (though perhaps not by demons) by engaging in certain kinds of activities.

3. A. W. K. Adkins in "Theoria versus Praxis in the Nicomachean Ethics and the Republic," Classical Philogy (1978) is the only author of whom I am aware that takes this consideration to be a real problem for Aristotle. (But see also W. F. R. Hardie, "Aristotle on the Best Life for Man," Philosophy, 54(207) (2979).) My argument in this paper, however, rejects Adkin's conclusion that the moral virtues are logically necessary for the contemplative life. Mutatis Mutandis, I reject J. M. Cooper's similar conclusion in Reason and Human Good in Aristotle (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975).

4. Many commentators have taken the word "virtue" in Aristotle's definition of happiness to mean either moral virtue, or some one moral virtue, e.g., justice or courage. This is a bad mistake. It stems from the fact that "arete," Greek for "virtue" or "excellence," covers either the way in which any performance is accomplished or the worthiness or excellence of the activity itself. These are two different things. A man can perform a worthless action with great virtuousity (wiggling one's ears) or engage in an excellent activity poorly (playing the violin). Here Aristotle means that the happy man will perform actions or engage in activities which follow or imply a rational principle in an excellent way. He will do them well. It is true that Aristotle thinks that these actions and activities connected with reason are excellent in and of themselves--they are aretai (virtues)--but all that he is saying here is that happiness is the excellent performance of these rational activities. He has not yet said which actions and activities are connected with a rational principle.

5. Aristotle's remarks and the inscription at Delos read as follows: "Happiness then is the best, noblest, and most pleasant thing in the world, and these attributes are not severed as in the inscription at Delos:

> Most noblest is that which is justest,
> and best is health;
> but pleasantest is it to win what we love.

for all these properties belong to the best activities; and these, or one--the best--of these, we identify with happiness" (1099a 24-30).

Notice, too, in this identity claim that no mention is made of intellectual virtue.

6. The other intellectual virtues--scientific knowledge (demonstration which is either deductive or inductive in form), art (concerned with the fashioning of materials), practical wisdom (at once concerned with universals and particulars in connection with moral virtue), philosophical wisdom (a combination of intuitive reason and scientific knowledge), and some less fundamental virtues--require either demonstration, generalization from particualrs, or body for their proper performance (see EN, Book VI).

7. Aristotle argues that God's thinking is a thinking on thinking (Metaphysics, Book XII, Ch. 9). In other words, God is thought thinking thought: he thinks himself. In fact, Aristotle uses the word "mus" for both human and divine intuitive reason. The considerations above and below, however, rule out the possiblity of taking the concept to be univocal.

8. For further possible support of this suggestion, see Aristotle's comments on natural moral virtue (1144b), natural endowment (1143b 5-10), on being a slave by nature (Politics, 1254b 15-22); but see 1144b 301145a 12 on the unqualified good man, which may count against this view..

9. My emphasis. The entire argument concerning self-sufficiency, the practical virtuous (or political) life, and the philosophical life, of which the quoted portion is the conclusion, runs from 1177a 23-1177b 23.

10. For a fuller treatment of the notion of self-sufficiency (autarkia) see my The Concept of Happiness: An Essay in Political and Social Theory (Ch. 3), unpublished dissertation, Syracuse University, 1976.

11. In Aristotle's earlier works, On Philosophy and Protepticus, he uses phronesis in describing the virtue of the philosopher. Cautiously read, Werner Jaeger's still undated book, Aristotle (London: 1934), gives a useful account of Aristotle's development on this subject.

12. "Two Conceptions of Happiness," The Philosophical Review, LXXXVIII, No. 2 (April 1979). Kraut attempts to show that such examples do not really undercut the subjectivist thesis. I think he very well may be wrong; but that is the subject for another paper.

CHAPTER 22.

THE PLACE OF EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATIONS IN STATE TEACHER PREPARATION POLICY: GRIST FOR THE PHILOSOPHIC MIND

DR. PETER L. LoPRESTI

It is a distinct pleasure to be invited to speak with you today. I am honored that a group of educational philosophers would be interested in hearing from an officer of the state educational bureaucracy, and I am mindful, as Francis Villemain informed me in extending an invitation to me, that it is a departure from the pattern of your previous meetings to be hearing from someone outside of the discipline of educational philosophy.

Given the dichotomies familiar to most of us--the state versus the academy, the teacher versus the administrator, the political versus the logical--it might seem particularly strange to have a civil servant speaking to an assembly of philosophers. There could be no common ground for such a discussion. While this might often be the case, probably too often, I am here today to argue that it is not always so, and indeed that it need not be so.

I am well aware that there are some hurdles which must be jumped in developing this argument for you. The first is the announced title of this address, which appears in your program as "Alternatives to Program Evaluation: Grist for the Philosophic Mind." This was not a title of my choice, and by the time I responded with a choice the program was apparently in press.

Even though unannounced, it is my desire to pursue a broader title for this talk. I would choose to label it "The Place of Educational Foundations in State Teacher Preparation Policy: Grist for the Philosophic Mind." I believe with this wider scope I will have the room to make some arguments of relevance to you, and perhaps in passing we will also discuss not alternatives to, but opportunities within program evaluation.

The Context of the Educational Foundations.

While I am by training and experience a student of educational administration and elementary education, my years of service with public schools, colleges and universities, and state educational agencies have provided me with considerable familiarity with and respect for the traditional role of educational foundations. The notion that prospective teachers should study and develop an appreciation for the historical, philosophical, and social context of the schools and the profession has always made sense to me. Indeed, it is a strange sequence of institutional, social, and economic pressures which have served to challenge such traditions in the past decade and a half. The irony, of course, is whether today's students of education will be allowed time to study those very currents while preparing to enter the profession.

While I must approach this field as an observer from the outside, it happens that one member of my staff at the Commission for Teacher Preparation and Licensing is a former faculty member in educational foundations who has over the past decade conducted several surveys of the field. Thus, to provide further context for this discussion, I would like to share with you some of the information collected by Dr. Alan H. Jones.

His research in this area was initiated in 1972, at which time he was a member of the faculty at Eastern Michigan University and coordinator of a masters degree program in the social foundations of education. The faculty in educational foundations at that institution was beginning to sense the strong pressures inherent in the so-called "educational accountability" movement, and the potential threat to professional educational offerings which were not readily viewed as practical and of immediate use to a new teacher in the classroom.

Following discussions with colleagues in the educational foundations at nearby institutions, Dr. Jones developed a national "Survey of the Social Foundations of Education in the United States, 1972." The survey instrument was printed in the Winter 1972 issue of Notes and Abstracts in American and International Education, a quarterly publication of the Program in Social Foundations of Education at the University of Michigan with a distribution of over 3000 to faculty members, institutions, and libraries in the United States and abroad.

During the year 1972 Dr. Jones received 246 useable responses to the survey. 197 of these were from colleagues in the educational foundations, 48 from teacher educators in related fields, and one from an editor active in the field of education. Responses were received from all geographic regions of the United States, generally reflective of the distribution of population and incidence of institutions of higher education. More responses came from the mid-Atlantic and midwest regions, followed closely by the far west, New England, and the south. The greatest number of responses from single states came from New York and California, and responses were received from all states but seven of the least populous.

The respondents indicated employment in institutions of all sizes and types, the most from small regional public institutions, but also many from large public institutions and from private colleges and universities. In most cases the respondents indicated that educational foundations as a field on their campuses existed as a department within the school or college of education. Responses from smaller campuses, however, tended to reflect simply the existence of foundations courses within some other education or liberal arts department.

Nearly all of the respondents indicated that courses in educational foundations were offered at their institution at the undergraduate and graduate level, and at over 100 of the institutions represented in the survey it was reported that graduate degree programs in educational foundations were offered. I have given you this amount of detail primarily as an indication that Dr. Jones' 1972 survey did draw responses from across the nation, and thus has utility in serving as a gauge of opinion in the field at that time.

Self-Image in the Foundations of Education.

In addition to seeking such statistics on the frequency of course and program offerings in the educational foundations, Dr. Jones also solicited opinions from the respondents on the health of the educational foundations. While it was found that nearly all institutions required courses in educational foundations of undergraduate teacher candidates, less than half of the respondents stated that their college or university required foundations courses of candidates in graduate programs in education. This, of course, represented, in 1972, a departure from tradition of previous decades, when nearly all degree candidates in schools and colleges of education would take courses in the foundations.

The survey also asked the respondents' opinion of the way in which the educational foundations were viewed on each campus. While the results were quite spread, in the main it was indicated that educational foundations as a field was viewed well by the faculty and students in that field, not quite as well by faculty in other educational disciplines, only fair by the rest of the campus, and with indifference by state government agencies and the general public.

In seeking to determine the contemporary interests of faculty in the educational foundations, the survey requested an indication of the primary foci of instructional, research, and service programs on each campus. Nearly 200 of the respondents suggested that current social issues, such as economic inequity, racism, and sexism, were receiving the most increased attention. Increases of interest were also noted in the areas of educational finance, educational governance, and international education. Quite obviously, the more traditional fields of educational history and philosophy were not seen as thriving by the respondents.

The survey also requested an indication of specific problems that were faced by the field of educational foundations. Over half of the respondents stated that the major problem was getting a fair share of institutional financial priorities. Other problems frequently noted were failure of the field to execute needed research, a lack of relevance to kindergarten-through-12th-grade education, and a lack of respect and cooperation from others in professional education.

An initial report on these findings was published by Dr. Jones in 1975, and he also made several presentations that year and the next at professional meetings.

A Second Future-Oriented Survey.

Based upon interest in these initial findings, Dr. Jones proceeded in 1975 to circulate to all respondents to the first survey a request for assistance in developing some predictive statements about the educational foundations which might be used in a second survey to examine by opinion the potential future directions of the field.

Such predictive statements were based, primarily, upon the results of the first survey. Examples are:

> The social foundations of education will seek greater involvement in contemporary social issues.
>
> Social foundations of education courses will move to incorporate material of increasing relevance to K-12 schools.
>
> Social foundations will receive increasingly lower priority in higher education institutional budgets.

Dr. Jones proceeded, with the assistance of colleagues across the country, to assemble some one hundred such predictive statements for use in a second survey which was disseminated in the spring of 1976. A total of 86 colleagues, again widely distributed across the country, responded to this future-oriented survey.

On each of the 100 questions the respondents were asked to rank the likelihood that the predictive statement would occur or come true. A five-point scale ranging from great likelihood to no likelihood was provided. A full report on the results of this second survey was presented by Dr. Jones at the American Educational Studies Association meeting in November of 1976, and I will comment at this time on only a few of the interpretations he drew from those results.

Based on the responses he received, it appears that faculty in the educational foundations are more inclined towards retaining disciplinary ties, such as history, philosophy, etc., than towards encouraging increased interdisciplinary and generalist study activity. Within a continued emphasis on disciplines, however, the respondents predicted growth in such fields as educational politics, educational sociology, and educational economics. Few predicted increased activity in educational history, educational philosophy, or international education.

In several questions on the second survey, the respondents indicated expectations that major research activities in the educational foundations would focus on seeking answers to contemporary social problems of importance to the public schools. Further, the respondents indicated strong agreement with the notion that scholars in the educational foundations were uniquely well suited to address such issues.

With respect to the role of educational foundations within teacher preparation, respondents to the survey suggested that foundations courses will give increased attention to needs of the public schools and to activities which take foundations scholars into the schools. At the same time the respondents expressed strong opposition within the foundations field to competency-based teacher education.

Finally, the results of the second survey indicated that foundations of education faculty anticipate that there will be increased enrollment difficulties in their classes, lower priorities in institutional budgets, and an increased need to effectively justify the role of the foundations in schools and colleges of education.

These findings, now almost four years old, probably do not come as a surprise to any of us. Indeed, during the eight years that Dr. Jones has worked with these survey instruments, he has corresponded and met with other foundations scholars who have solicited similar data from colleagues, and the same generalizations have surfaced in each case.

Development of Suggested National Standards.

If the results of such efforts has been primarily to verify what most faculty in the foundations could have guessed, it is fair to ask what value the surveys have had. Dr. Jones suggests that in the first instance these efforts were generated to establish some contact and support among foundations colleagues, with the collection of data almost as a side effect. Findings which suggest that faculty in the educational foundations share common circumstances and hold similar opinions from campus to campus have been, in and of themselves, useful as a reinforcing tool on many campuses.

Building upon the results from these surveys, Dr. Jones has worked with Dr. Marie E. Wirsing of the University of Colorado at Denver to gather more specific data on faculty and programs in educational foundations at all colleges and universities in the United States, on behalf of the American Educational Studies Association.

He has also served with Dr. Wirsing and seven other foundations colleagues on a Task Force on Academic Standards for that Association, which has written and circulated a document entitled "Standards for Academic and Professional Instruction." The document, which is devoted to teaching and research in the foundations of education, has been distributed by the National Council on Accreditation of Teacher Education as a guide for judging programs in the educational foundations, and since original adoption by the American Educational Studies Association in 1977, the Standards have been endorsed by the Society of Professors of Education and the Philosophy of Education Society.

It is at this point that you will hopefully note some convergence with the original title that Francis Villemain suggested for this address. While the work of our colleague Dr. Jones and the American Educational Studies Association Standards do not provide an alternative to evaluation, they do provide a strong professional alternative within evaluation.

I personally applaud these efforts because they seek to recognize the ligitimacy of the field of educational foundations within the broad scope of professional education, and the Standards which have been developed provide some guide posts by which the work of persons in that field can be judged and accredited. I am also pleased that NCATE, the primary national accrediting agency in teacher education, has welcomed this form of self-support from a given segment of the educational community. Indeed, I hope that this effort within the educational foundations will serve to remind all portions of the professional community that attention to accreditation standards will ultimately be of service to all of us in teacher preparation.

While it is clear that the direction taken by the American Educational Studies Association in developing such standards is in part an act of self-protection, since the Standards have been forged to assure that appropriately trained people will serve as instructors in foundations courses, this is a form of self-protection which all of us in the educational community can endorse, since it is also a protection of traditional academic standards and integrity.

Some Specifics on California.

Some natural questions occur within this context of Dr. Jones' surveys and the evolution of the Standards document. Do we know what is happening in the educational foundations at colleges and universities in California? Are these new Standards being observed at our own institutions?

In 1976 Dr. Jones conducted a review of the program documents on file at the Commission offices from the seventy institutions which are approved to offer basic teacher credential programs in the state. His review at that time was for the purpose of determining if such programs contained courses in the educational foundations. It must be noted in passing that the Commission's guidelines for such programs do not require study in the educational foundations, nor do the guidelines prohibit such study.

That review indicated that at 28 institutions, 42% of the total of 70, the programs require at least one course in foundations of education for all teacher candidates, while at three more institutions such a course is required for only single subject candidates. At 24 other institutions, 36% of the 70, a general introductory education course is required, which contains many educational foundations ingredients. At two other institutions such a general course is required only of single subject candidates. Of the total of 70 institutions, only nine were found where no foundations or general course was part of the required program.

Thus, even though the Commission's guidelines do not specify instruction in the educational foundations, nearly half of the programs contain such a course, and most others provide some such foundational background in a general teacher preparation course or sequence.

Perhaps the more important question--is such instruction in educational foundations conducted in keeping with the Standards developed by the American Educational Studies Association?--is yet to be investigated.

Commission Has A Similar History.

Since our attention has now been turned on the state of California, I would like to ask you to entertain a possible analogy between the national context of teacher education in which Dr. Jones has examined the foundations of education and the brief history of the Commission for Teacher Preparation and Licensing. Dr. Jones' research has been born of the concern of foundations faculty that the "accountability" movement of the past decade has called into question the value of the foundations disciplines. Indeed, there are many who have responded to his surveys with expressions of sentiment so strong as to suggest that recent and contemporary demands for "practicality" in education leave no room at all for philosophical or historical study.

My analogy is perhaps obvious to you. The birth of the Commission for Teacher Preparation and Licensing in California, through the Ryan Act of 1970, came in part as a result of that growing pressure for accountability. The actual development of the Ryan Act is complex, and can not be explained by any single force. The politics that coalesced to bring about that legislation included those who were dissatisfied with institutions of higher education, those who disliked the teacher education community, those who felt the State Department of Education was doing an inadequate job in this area, and many others who appeared to simply want a change.

The result, however, because of the timing of the act, took on an accountability cloak. The initial staff of the Commission were, in several instances, veterans of other educational programs in which accountability guidelines and program approval and evaluation formats had been used, and the new law called for such a system in the teacher education arena.

Those of you who have worked closely with the Commission for the past decade are well aware of our brief history. Most of the decade has been taken up with the exhausting effort to implement the Ryan Act--to establish a program approval and evaluation mechanism, to develop and utilize a system of subject matter examinations in combination with waiver programs, to retool the licensing and professional standards systems to fit the new legislation and credential categories, and to grow accustomed to the administration of a separate agency. I came to this scene in January of 1974, at which time the agency was but three years old, and still deeply engaged in the initial implementation of the law.

It has only been in the last few years that the members of the Commission, who are the policy makers, and our staff have had any time to begin to stand back from this frantic process of implementation and contemplate some of the broader issues and educational problems which impinge upon our small enterprise.

A More Philosophical Orientation.

If you will excuse an everyday use of the term, I feel that it is appropriate to say that the Commission has in the past year or so taken a far more "philosophical" approach to its work. This has come for many reasons. The membership of the Commission has changed over the years with new appointments by the Governor. Just this past month we saw new appointees replace the last two members of the original Commission appointed in 1971.

Perhaps most importantly, the work of initial implementation of the Ryan Act is now complete, and our Commission has chosen to take some time for a broader examination of the context of their work. In 1978 the Commission held three special seminars for the purpose of hearing experts from the field on such questions as "the state of the art in teacher preparation" and "the future of teacher preparation and licensing."

One result of such exploration of ideas has been the establishment this year of an "informal discussion session" at each of the monthly meetings of the Commission. These sessions have been scheduled to allow the members of the Commission, outside of the regular format of their meetings, to discuss topics of special interest. During these sessions this year they have examined and suggested revisions in our program evaluation system, they have discussed and formalized a set of guiding principles for the work of the agency, they have explored such complex issues as bilingual education and the role of staff development in teacher preparation, and they have initiated some tentative investigations of the future of our agency in these difficult times for all public enterprises.

An Inviting Role for Philosophers.

My analogy does not lead to any alternatives to program evaluation. I am not even sure that Francis Villemain, or for that matter any of you, expected that it would. The Commission for Teacher Preparation and Licensing is by statute a regulatory agency, and we are mandated to approve and evaluate programs of professional preparation in California.

What I have said, however, does, I believe, lead to some very inviting possibilities for involvement of educational philosophers in our public enterprise. In the sense that I have suggested similarities between the battle for survival of the educational foundations which has been waged this decade and the battle of our agency to get past the demands of implementation of the Ryan Act, there is obviously light at the end of both tunnels. Groups like the American Educational Studies Association, the Philosophy of Education Society, and your own regional group have made considerable headway in establishing some national Standards and calling upon the profession to live up to those expectations. Our agency has, in just the last few years, also turned its attention to larger issues which require study and cooperation.

Let me offer some specifics which might be of interest to you. In the area of program evaluation we have just this fall adopted a revised procedure which will, in part, rely upon the conduct of some special studies each year. We are seeking input on the nature of such studies, both in terms of issues to be addressed and methodology to be used. We are also embarking upon a review and possible alteration of the program guidelines in each of the credential areas, and this effort will most certainly open the door for dialogue with respect to the Standards that have emerged in the educational foundations.

Just as the surveys I have discussed indicate an increased interest among foundations scholars in contemporary social issues, our Commission will in the early months of 1980 be addressing several such issues in its "informal discussion sessions." Among the issues on the discussion agenda for early next year are an exploration of confrontation in the public schools and the impact this might have on the preparation of teachers, an analysis of the voucher proposal, examination of the fifth-year-of-study as a bridge between inservice and preservice teacher education, and changing population patterns of California's public schools.

I mention these for two reasons. I hope that the new attention of the Commission to such issues will interest you in more direct involvement with our agency, and secondly, I invite you to suggest yet other issues which you feel our Commission should address.

A Friendly Challenge.

Having provided this groundwork, let me now propose a friendly challenge to you as philosophers of education. The Commission, by virtue of its role as a state agency, is a political entity. We are called into existence by law, and we are mandated to implement that law. Further, we are mandated within that law to evaluate our actions and to recommend alterations and additions in law to the Legislature.

This is the arena in which educational policy comes into being, usually far removed from the institutions of higher education and the public schools. Yet, we all know that there are philosophical bases and philosophical implications in any legislation that affects education. How can we bring these worlds together?

Within the range of my observation of five years of educational policy making in California, I find little evidence that state government calls upon educational philosophers. Unfortunately, I also find little evidence that philosophers of education have asked to be called upon, or have made any strong effort to examine and become involved in government action which impinges upon the field of education. If I am wrong in that observation, I ask that you correct me. If I am right, I think it only appropriate to offer a challenge that you do become involved.

The nature of such involvement can take many forms. The most immediate which comes to my mind is assistance in the examination of the myriad of social and philosophical issues which each agency such as ours must deal. I have already indicated that our Commission will, in the next several months, examine such critical topics as the problem of confrontation and violence in the schools and the demands that places on educational personnel, the potential impact of the educational voucher proposal on our state's schools, the changing population of our public schools, and the potential for conduct of some productive studies within our program evaluation system.

In each of these areas we would welcome thoughtful, logical, indeed "philosophical" assistance. Let me expand the challenge even further. There are questions which we are only beginning to raise at this time, and which need definition, study, and discussion. For instance, many teacher educators in California have raised strong issue with the current limitation in the Ryan Act which allows only nine credits in professional education prior to student teaching in our basic programs. While it now appears that most of us--teacher educators, Commission staff, members of the Commission, and other interested parties--feel that this nine-unit limit is unwise, we do not have either research data or philosophical rationale to support an effort to change the law.

What should be the dimensions of professional education? How much on-campus study should be involved, how much on-site time in a clinical or training setting? Ultimately, what are the real and necessary and appropriate pedagogical foundations of teacher education? It has frequently been argued that the Legislature legislates without benefit of such information. That is undoubtedly true.

However, if we can proceed to collect and document answers to such questions, we will have a far better chance to influence future legislation, and to suggest improvements in our current laws.

It is a wide open challenge that I bring to you. I do not suggest for a moment that we even know the questions, let alone the answers. I have mentioned many topics which are already of interest to our Commission, but I also invite you to suggest yet other questions. It is my feeling that if educational philosophers will turn greater attention to the political arena in Sacramento, and in the other seats of gevernment across this nation, it will be far more likely that the issues of the day can be addressed with some logic and some rationality before they are blown out of proportion and addressed only with political answers.

Thus, my challenge to you is that you become involved with us in studying both the issues which we have already chosen for attention and those yet-to-emerge issues which you can help us identify before they become major educational problem areas. As students of educational philosophy and colleagues of scholars in the other disciplines of the educational foundations, I believe that you are particularly well qualified to assist us in such ventures. As indicated by the findings in the surveys quoted earlier, scholars in the educational foundations should have the most to offer policy makers in addressing current and future educational issues.

A Final Note.

I do not make this appeal to you lightly. I am very serious in seeking your ideas and your involvement. Our agency has an admirable record of public involvement. Our meetings are always well attended by an audience representative of the teacher organizations, the teacher education community, school districts, and a variety of segments of the California public. We encourage discussion with and from the audience at both our committee sessions and the full Commission meetings, and we hold formal public hearings on all major policy issues before the body. We know that these procedures result in better communication on all subjects, and we hope that the result is also better public policy.

I must confess, however, that we have few if any educational philosophers in regular attendance. One member of our Commission, Dr. Irving G. Hendrick, who serves as the ex-officio representative from the University of California, is an educational historian of strong reputation, and while he speaks eloquently on all issues before the body, I don't want to try and pass off an historian to you as a substitute for a philosopher. Let me therefore reiterate our need for philsophical input--I have no doubt that we would profit from such voices.

I am personally very pleased with the Commission's movement in the last few years towards a broader examination of issues and policies, not only specific to teacher preparation and licensing, but also of interest and importance to the total educational community. Given this direction, I feel very comfortable in urging you on behalf of the Commission to share with us your concerns, your ideas, and your philosophical expertise. Our Commission will, without question, be interested in what you have to say.

I began this talk with the intention of arguing that there is a common ground for discussion between a group of philosophers and a representative of the state educational bureaucracy. I hope that I have been convincing. If you agree, let me conclude by asking that you help me to bring such a dialogue to life as a permanent contact between your organization and our agency.

As an initial step in that direction, I would now be most happy to respond to any questions that you may have, and to share with any of you who are interested copies of some of the materials I have mentioned during my remarks. I would, in particular, welcome your ideas with respect to issues and concerns which you feel our agency could cooperate with you in exploring in the future. Thank you.

CHAPTER 23.

AN EDUCATIONAL INTERPRETATION OF MARCUSIAN THOUGHT

VAL D. RUST

Herbert Marcuse passed away during the summer of 1979. His death symbolizes the passing of a brief era of social criticism which provided the mature world with a heightened consciousness of an excessive level of repression and alienation in society. This era was also marked, however, with an intense optimism that these ills are not as predetermined as people such as Freud and his followers imagined them to be. Marcuse was outspoken in his faith that society has reached a stage where a qualitative transformation is now possible, even though conserving forces internalized by man must be overcome before such a change is possible. He maintained until his death that the old Freudian reality principle, which is oriented toward performance and technique, will be replaced by a new reality principle which is oriented toward gratification and protection of human life.

Curiously, in spite of its own movements in the era of the 1960's and early 1970's in the form of humanistic education, alternatives, and free schools, educational thought has rarely included the ideas of Marcuse. This is understandable because Marcuse rarely concerns himself with the educational enterprise except within the context of university student life and the role students and scholars may play in social changes.

It is my opinion that Marcuse must at least be understood, if not accepted, among educators since his ideas have strong implications for a reorientation of education in mature industrial societies. It will only be possible to discuss a small portion of Marcuse's thoughts in this essay. Marcuse is most vivid when criticizing the mature modern world, and I have chosen to outline certain basic concepts which he develops in this criticism. I am unable to discuss the nature of the post modern world which he anticipates, and it will not even be possible for me to describe the conserving forces which prevent us from entering this new era. My remarks will focus only on an analysis of man in mature industrial society and the implications of this analysis on education.

Marcuse relies heavily on Freudian instinct theory in an attempt to unmask the repressive forces which he claims to find in countries such as the United States. We recall Freud's assertion that the infant is instinctually oriented toward the pleasure principle. That is, the very young manifest mental activities or "primary processes" which "strive towards gaining pleasure" and which draw back "from any operation which might arouse unpleasantness."[1]

Since the primary processes are completely psychic in nature, animal man is unable to discriminate between material objects and mental images of them; therefore, psychic images of such things as warmth, food, tenderness, are as satisfying as the real things. Since the primary processes do not aim at self-preservation but only satisfaction of instinctual needs, animal man would not be able to sustain life unless he were able to transcend these processes.[2] Animal man's instincts must, therefore, be "repressed" or brought under control.

Freud's "secondary processes" are mental functions which emerge to orient man away from the pleasure principle. Secondary processes are directed toward the outer world, are conscious of psychic differences, and possess a memory of and ability to discern "whether a particular idea was true or false, that is, in agreement with reality or not."[3] Whereas primary processes function on the pleasure principle, secondary processes function on what Freud calls the reality principle; it obeys rational social laws of logic and grammar, retains physical forms in terms of time and space, and enables the organism to sustain itself in the external world.

Freud argues that the constraints placed on natural inclinations form the substance of civilization. Mental functions, which emerge to insure survival of the organism, insist that happiness be postponed and freedom be controlled. Since the primary processes are repressed and do not find release through instinctual channels, the energy build-up which occurs is channeled to outlets known as sublimation, identification, and projection. These are useful outlets since they result in cultural progress with its interest in security, control, and order.

Marcuse accepts the basic framework we have just outlined; however, in interpreting the reality principle he puts it in a new perspective:

> Behind the reality principle lies the fundamental fact of Ananke or scarcity (Lebensnot), which means that the struggle for existence takes place in a world too poor for the satisfaction of human needs without constant restraint, renunciation, delay. In other words, whatever satisfaction is possible necessitates work, more or less painful arrangements and undertakings for the procurement of the means for satisfying needs.[4]

Thus, according to Marcuse, the reality principle turns man away from happiness and freedom and focuses on pre-established necessities usually involving work. Civilization has imposed on man the necessity of engaging in labor, almost all of which is painful, miserable, alienated labor having nothing to do with Eros and libidinal satisfaction.[5]

The struggles of civilization have in one way or another historically reflected relationships arising out of scarcity. In fact, Marcuse feels that the dynamics of domination throughout the history of the world are founded in the attempts of some to create a condition in which there is unequal distribution of goods and services. The despots, the elites, the nobility throught history have exploited poverty, scarcity, and weakness in order that enjoyment be reserved for themselves while the masses engage in involuntary alienated servitude.[6] In this context revolution is largely an attempt on the part of one segment of society to liberate itself by attacking that segment which heretofore had the power to exploit others for goods needed for personal satisfaction.

With the advent of capitalistic industrialism, Marcuse sees the emergence of two contradictory phenomena. First, labor becomes even more alienating because an "acquisitive and antagonistic society" emerges which requires its members to participate in a mechanical, technological labor apparatus with no inherent qualities of gratification. Second, "technological rationality" creates a mode of operation which exploits and harnesses nature and society so that it becomes possible for the material wants of man to be satisfied. Thus, technological society does tend to eliminate scarcity but the necessary labor becomes even more alienating.

With these two points Marcuse transforms thoroughly unhistorical concepts of Freud into socio-historical realities, and in the process develops a radical interpretation of the role of technology in modern society. In doing so, Marcuse must introduce two important concepts of his own: surplus-repression and the performance principle. Both of these concepts are intended to highlight the historical dimension of Freud's ideas.

Surplus-repression: Marcuse agrees with Freud that instincts must be repressed or brought under control if civilization is to continue. However, he argues that a certain portion of repression (surplus-repression) may be instituted by particular forms of civilization; these extend beyond that historical forms of civilization; these extend beyond that repression "necessary for the perpetuation of the human race in civilization." He maintains that modern societies are especially characterized by a social organization which imposes a form of repression almost exclusively related to arbitrary domination rather than necessary labor.[7] In theory then, modern societies should be able to do away with surplus-repression brought about by arbitrary domination and fall back to a minimum repression level, while retaining the high level of civilization that past sublimated efforts have produced.

Performance Principle: Whereas Freud assumed that the reality principle was universal in time and place, Marcuse sees its peculiar historical dimension. The reality principle is universal in one respect--man is unable to survive unless the primary processes are brought under control--but the manifestation of this principle can assume different forms. "In order to emphasize that under its rule society is stratified according to the competitive economic performance of its members," the historical form of the reality principle in industrial society Marcuse calls the performance principle.[8]

It is clear that Marcuse is a relentless critic of technological society. On the other hand, he recognizes its potential for freedom. The end of technological rationality is automation, complete alienation of labor, representing the ultimate rationalization and mechanization of industrialism.[9] At the same time Marcuse sees automation or advanced industrialization as the key to total liberation since "technical progress has reached a stage in which reality no longer need be defined by the debilitating competition for social survival and advancement."[10] In other words, repression of pleasure principle instincts can now be minimized since scarcity has been almost completely eliminated. The performance principle is also no longer necessary and can be replaced by a new rationality which is not based on hierarchical organization and "survival-of-the fittest" oriented competition. Although labor continues to be alienating, modern man accepts the necessity of engaging in alienating labor, because the technological apparatus provides for the first time in history an opportunity to satisfy man's basic needs.

Time plays a fundamental role in moving men to accept their condition in technological society because alienating labor is now "part-time" labor. A growing share of man's time is available for activities of his own free choice. Through the progressive reduction of the working day a partial freedom is possible since the time off from work can be devoted to pleasure. Nevertheless, labor time remains alienating. To enable man to move beyond partial freedom, Marcuse postulates a further evolution of modern society:

> The development of the productive forces beyond their capitalist organization suggests the possibility of freedom within necessity. The quantitative reduction of necessary labor could turn into quality (freedom), not in proportion to the reduction but rather to the transformation of the working day, a transformation in which the stupefying, enervating, pseudo-automatic jobs of capitalist progress would be abolished.[11]

Capitalism here refers mainly to the escalation of commodity production and productive exploitation, a condition which actually characterizes almost all modern countries. According to Marcuse, a point might be reached at which free time rather than labor time determines the content of life. So far we have made little mention of education. I wish in the rest of this essay to extrapolate the concepts developed above into the sphere of schooling.

Within Marcuse's conceptual framework, it is clear that educational environments without a certain level of repression are not possible. He is supported in this orientation by Freud, who pointed out that "education can without further hesitation be described as an incitement to the conquest of the pleasure principle and its replacement by the reality principle."[12] The modern school, based on the performance principle, prepares youth for alienating labor by engaging them in a simulation of production activities--an alienating activity in itself.

The modern age developed its characteristic and, in many respects, unique structure, by breaking away from the traditional education system which integrated learning into on-going social activities. Modern education became formalized in distinct, separate institutions called schools, which engaged the youth in a simulation of the more vital aspects of industrial technological organization. The modern factory, with its calibrated clock, its shifts, its division of labor, its whistle or bell to signal when to begin and when to cease work, became the organizational model for schooling. Alvin Toffler gives us a most graphic picture of that process:

> . . . The whole idea of assembling masses of students (raw material) to be processed by teachers (workers) in a centrally located school (factory) was a stroke of industrial genius. The whole administrative hierarchy of education, as it grew up, followed the model of industrial bureaucracy. The very organization of knowledge into permanent disciplines was grounded in industrial assumptions. Children marched from place to place and sat in assigned stations, bells rang to announce changes of the time.[13]

Toffler maintains that those features of the school which were most instrumental in preparing young people for industrial society were "regimentation, lack of individualization, the rigid systems of seating, grouping, grading, and marking." In their book, Industrialism and Industrial Man, Kerr, Dunlop, Harbison and Myers best characterize the full role of advanced education in modern society.[14] They see education not as an end in itself, not liberalizing, but as the handmaiden of industrialism. Industrialization requires an education system structurally and functionally related to the skills and professions necessary to its technology. The overt concern of the technocracy is not with values and meaning, since these are taken for granted, but with skills. The technology sets into motion its own imperatives and the educational process is designed to satisfy these demands. In terms of values, technological education must be change-oriented. Those being educated must be indoctrinated in such a way as to be capable of continually adapting to new techniques, new skills and even new disciplines.

Such a point of view is expressed in modern capitalist as well as socialist nations. The Soviet Union, for example sees the relationship between education and production as expounded so forcefully by Krushchev and his ministers in their "Theses on Strengthening the Ties of the School with Life" as intending to help the young combine theoretical knowledge with practical skills. Education is to help instill in people the scientific and technical knowledge regarding the productive processes and a curiosity not dulled by monotonous manual labor or purely theoretical "school" problems. The responsibility of schools under the Krushchev reforms was enormous:

> To strengthen their ties with life the schools must not only introduce new subjects which teach the pupils the fundamentals of technology and production, but must also systematically accustom the pupils to working in factories, collective and state farms, experimental plots and school workshops.[15]

These reforms were consistent with the Marxist belief that "an early combination of productive labor with education is one of the most potent means for the transformation of present day society.[16] Andrew thinks Marcuse never discusses Marx's ideas about combining work and education because Marcuse does not think labor can be "substantially improved, made less oppressive and more fulfilling" through education or any other means.[17] The interpretation is consistent with Marcuse's attitudes but it is not a sufficient explanation. Marcuse undoubtedly relies more heavily on Freud than Marx in his concept of the role of schooling in modern technological society.

Since the end of technological rationality is automation, we are able to observe that schooling moves toward ever greater technological sophistication. If we restrict our concern to teachers in schools, we are able to translate directly Marcuse's notions of alienated labor. That is, modern teachers are found to be as uninterested and alienated by the schooling system as are workers by the factory. Much of this alienation could be eliminated by partially replacing people-staffed schools with machine-based instruction. By reducing the time teachers devote to classroom production processed, we might be able to reach a point at which alienated labor time is transformed by activities of the teacher's own choosing. We have little empirical evidence of the degree of free choosing on the part of the teacher. However, I suspect it is not far different from that found in a recent study of working life in general, which indicated that people felt free less than 20 percent of their working time.[18]

Even if the technical advances eliminate the time teachers devote to alienting labor, the learners as participants in the system would find themselves in sterile nonhuman environments which perpetuate the performance principle. Video equipment, holography, and mobile units would move schooling beyond the lock-step structure of the modern era into a future which is freed from the drudgery of doing the same tasks unadjusted and untailored to individual requirements, yet, these processes would require completely alienated activity on the part of the child since they are mechanical and externally determined. If educational labor time for the child can be efficiently shortened, then the remaining time could gain dominance and eventually a new quality of educational life could emerge; that is we might be able to reduce the amount of time pupils devote to school labor and thus allow the child to devote much of its time to pleasure. Modern history is not too encouraging, however, for whereas industrial labor time has decreased for the individual worker in the past century, school time has increased many fold.

Recent events suggest that a new attitude toward school time is emerging. Empirical studies have shown that more school time is not necessarily better even in terms of performance principle objectives.[19] Compulsory education laws are even under attack for the first time in this century; nevertheless, drastic reductions in schooling time seem remote because schooling is multi-functional in nature. Schools provide child-care, for example, while the adults fulfill their tasks in society, and this custodial role is not likely to change in the near future.

Since time seems to be an inappropriate variable to manipulate with regard to youth in our schooling equation, we must find another variable, consistent with Marcuse, which allows for the emergence of a new reality principle. We have shown that modern schooling duplicates industrial processes and therefore provides its own surplus-repression and performance principle. However, schooling is not necessarily as inherently alienating as we find contemporary reality based schooling to be. Recall that the contemporary reality principle exists because of scarcity. School is also organized on the basis of scarcity in that knowledge, skills, tastes, and certificates are differentially distributed according to prescribed criteria such as grade point averages, sex, or I.Q. All of these criteria are based on the assumption that talent is a scarce commodity in society and educational goods and benefits would be distributed justly if and only if they were distributed to those possessing relevant educational talent.

One of the main functions of modern schooling has been to identify those with talent through a competitive hierarchical ranking system and at the same time sift the young into appropriate social levels. In spite of the fact that its sorting function has persisted, the nature of the school has changed radically from the beginning of the modern school movement until the present. Since the time of the common school movement, Americans have been exemplary in practice by extending schooling opportunities to more and more people for increasingly longer periods of time. The Soviet Union has also been as diligent as any country in the world in breaking down, in theory at least, the elitist nature of schools.

School enrollments have been maximized in all modern primary and secondary schools. We see signs that even at the higher levels, schooling is changing from an elite to a mass institution. We might postulate that the quantitative expansion of the recognized talent pool could turn into a qualitative transformation of the nature of schooling itself. The very concept of scarcity of talent has been at the root of domination in terms of surplus-repression within the school setting. With its reduction to a minimal level also comes the possibility of establishing a new reality principle because the competition oriented performance principle would become inoperative.

1. Freud, Sigmund, *Collected Papers* (London: Hogarth Press, 1925) vol. IV. p. 14.

2. *Ibid*., p. 4.

3. *Ibid*., p. 14.

4. Marcuse, Herbert, *Eros and Civilization*, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), p. 35.

5. *Ibid*., p. 35.

6. *Ibid*., pp. 37-39.

7. *Ibid*., p. 155.

8. *Ibid*., p. 44.

9. Andrew, Edward, "Work and Freedom in Marcuse and Marx," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. III (June, 1970).

10. Marcuse, *op*. *cit*., p. 5.

11. Marcuse, Herbert, *An Essay on Liberation* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), p. 21.

12. Freud *op*. *cit*., p. 19.

13. Toffler, Alvin, Future Shock (New York: Bantan Books, 1970), p. 400.

14. Kerr, Clark, et. al. Industrialism and Industrial Man (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964).

15. Central Committee of the CPSU and the USSR Council of Ministers, *Bringing Soviet Schools Still Closer to Life* Soviet Booklet No. 44. (London, 1958).

16. Marx, Karl, *Critique of the Gotha Programm* (London, 1943).

17. Marcuse, *op*. *cit*., An Essay on Liberation, p. 247

18. Csikszentmihalyi, Mihaly and Ronald Graef, "Feeling Free," *Psychology Today* Vol. 13 (December, 1979).

19. Husen, Thorsten, "Does More Time in School Make a Difference?" *Saturday Review* (April 29, 1972).

CHAPTER 24.

MORAL REASONING, NEEDS ASSESSMENTS AND UNIVERSALIZABILITY

F.S. ELLETT, JR.
R.E. NEWMAN
B.M. SCHUMENER

Introduction

Educational evaluators at both the state and local levels have often been asked to develop programs which would help students meet pre-specified objectives. They also have been asked to determine whether existing programs have succeeded in meeting their objectives. But evaluators rarely have been called upon to assist in the formation of educational objectives. As a result, some evaluators have come to see their task as one of determining the program's success (or failure), and do not see it as their task to formulate and defend the program's objectives.

Evaluation must investigate the worth of educational objectives if it is to benefit education. As long as we are unsure of the worth of a program's objectives, knowledge of that program's success or failure will be of little value. Many educators realize this and have begun to develop procedures which not only address program success, but also examine the worth of a program's objectives.

The most commonly used procedures for assessing the worth of educational objectives is the method called needs assessment. In Part A of this essay, we argue that:

1. the method of needs assessment really amounts to a survey of the wants of various groups;
2. the method does not establish that such wants ought to be fulfilled (see Ellett and Shumener, 1978); and
3. the method of needs assessment lacks a principled basis for carrying out its strategy.

In Part B, we suggest ways of modifying the needs assessment method so that morally relevant considerations may be taken into account. We recommend that certain rules of universalizability become part of this method. Although judging in accordance with these rules does not guarantee that the resulting moral judgments will be correct, following them will deepen the awareness and understanding of all those involved in needs assessments.

Part A

Needs assessments have been popular for more than a decade now. Their popularity derives, in part, from the widely-shared belief that needs assessments perform an essential function in educational evaluation--that they disclose the goals or programs that educational institutions ought to adopt. It is this belief about needs assessments that we question.

We have no quarrel with those who claim the job of educational evaluation is, among other things, to disclose the goals and procedures schools ought to adopt. They stake this claim on solid grounds. But the belief that needs assessment does a good job of educational evaluation is not well-grounded.

Proponents of needs assessments rely on four basic assumptions. The first is that institutions ought to fulfill the needs of people. The second, that institutions ought to fulfill greater needs before fulfilling lesser ones. The third assumption is that people need of institutions what they want from them and are not getting. And the fourth is that people are in greatest need of what they want most and are not getting.

Evaluators offer definitions of educational needs which are based upon these assumptions. According to W. James Popham, for example, an educational need is the discrepancy between what people want from education and what is actually taking place. He writes the following:

Desired Status Learners	minus	Current Status Learners	equals	An Educational Need

(1975, p. 65)

(See also Morris and Bank, 1977; Popham, 1975; Gagne and Briggs, 1974.)

Given these assumptions, it is clear what the evaluational strategy for disclosing goals is to be. To determine what institutions ought to do, i.e., to find out what people need of those institutions and how great the need is, one must discover what they want those institutions to do, how much they want the institutions to do those things, and the extent to which the institutions are doing those things.

Evaluators go to schools and communities and ask people what they want the schools to do. Then they ask the people to rank what they want the schools to do--from what they want least to what they want most. After collecting this preference data, the evaluators determine the extent to which the schools are doing what people say they most want them to do.

In an earlier paper (Ellett and Shumener, 1978), we argued that some of the assumptions made by advocates of needs assessments are unjustified. The assumptions that needs ought to be fulfilled and that greater needs ought to be fufilled before lesser needs have a great deal of plausibility. However, the assumption that needs are unfulfilled wants is mistaken and, therefore, so is the assumption that the greater the unfulfilled want the greater the need. In this paper, we will show that needs assessments are open to additional objections. To show that this is so, let us briefly consider the consequences of using needs assessments in two sorts of situations.

Suppose that the high school in a community lacks the large football stadium the community wants it to have. The high school also lacks classroom facilities and textbooks for the speech and debate classes, and the community wants it to have these things too. Given the needs assessment assumption that educational needs exist to the extent that people want of educational institutions what they are not getting, we must conclude that there is an educational need for the football stadium as well as an educational need for the classroom facilities and textbooks.

Make one other supposition about the community--that it prefers having a high school with a large football stadium to having the classroom facilities and textbooks required for the speech and debate classes. The needs assessment assumption that there is a greater educational need for what people want more of educational institutions and are not getting, forces us to draw the conclusion that the "educational" need for a large football stadium is greater than the educational need for the classroom facilities and textbooks. We are required to conclude that the high school ought to enlarge the stadium before constructing the classrooms and purchasing the textbooks.**

Nothing in the needs assessment procedure ensures that these constituents are well-informed of either the alternatives of their implications. To know whether the constituents were well-informed, one would have to know the reasons they had for ranking the alternatives as they did. The needs assessment procedure makes no room for the consideration of the reasons people have for preferring one thing to another.

As long as evaluators are ignorant of the reasons people have for their preferences, they cannot eliminate ill-reasoned or arbitrary suggestions. People may employ all sorts of reasons for the conclusions they draw, some of which may be based on false beliefs. As long as the evaluator is ignorant of these reasons, s/he cannot discount or correct preferences and conclusions stemming from false beliefs.

For example, some people may favor a large football stadium because they believe that college admissions officers would be more impressed by students

---

**One troubling feature of cases such as this is that the constituents seem, in large part, to be dealing with matters which are peripheral to education. Matters which strike us as central to education--learning, knowledge, understanding--are not given priority. Nothing in needs assessment procedures ensure that matters of central importance to education will be considered. The lack of such safeguards is a sign that something has gone wrong in needs assessment procedures--needs assessments provide no guarantee that people's wants will be considered on a principled basis.

who excel in football than by students who excel in speech and debate, and that a college education would ultimately give their students a better chance in the job market outside the community. Others may push for the football stadium because they beiieve that community life is stagnating, and that football would make the students feel more committed to their community than would speech and debate. In other words, the second group feels that the students already have too many reasons for leaving the community, and that an emphasis on football would instill in them a desire to live and work within the community.

These groups have incompatible goals. One group prefers the football stadium because it believes football is a better means of helping students succeed outside the community; the other group prefers the stadium because it believes football is a better means of keeping the students within the community. If one group is right, the other group is unknowingly defeating its purpose by giving the football stadium a higher priority. Suppose that college admissions officers actually give greater priority in admissions to students who excel in speech and debate than to students who excel in athletics. If so, the first group's preference for the football stadium stems from a false belief. Had they known this, they may have preferred constructing classrooms and purchasing textbooks for the speech and debate classes.

This is one way in which the current needs assessment method breaks down. If the needs assessor has no access to the reasons on which people base their preferences and conclusions, he cannot be assured that the conclusions of needs assessments will not be based on false beliefs. Perhaps needs assessments could be revised so that preferences based on false beliefs are identified and the members of the community informed. Such a procedure would, among other things, involve examining the reasons people have for their preferences. However, even if it were possible to revise needs assessments in this way, needs assessments would still be open to other, more serious objections.

Suppose an evaluator finds that the schools in a community are fully integrated. Upon asking the community members what they want the schools to be like, however, the evaluatior discovers that the community members want the schools to be racially segregated. Given the needs assessment assumption that an educational need exists to the extent that people need of an educational institution what they want from it and are not getting, it follows that there is an educational need for those schools to be racially segregated. An evaluator who uses needs assessment strategies in this situation is forced to conclude that fully integrated schools ought to be racially segregated, but people may be morally and legally obligated to keep the schools integrated.

The possibility that needs assessments could yield such a conclusion shows that something is wrong. Needs assessments identify wants, but they employ no principles for determining which, if any, of those wants ought to be fulfilled. Needs assessments lack a principled basis for carrying out their strategies. Without this basis, they cannot determine defensible educational objectives. One purpose of needs assessments is to determine what ought to be done in education. Yet this purpose cannot be achieved if wants are the only things taken into consideration. People can, and often do, want immoral things. The community wants the schools to be racially segregated; but what it wants may well be unjust and unlawful.

Considering preferences will not help, for preferences merely prioritize or rank wants. A procedure which considers preferences not only fails to provide principles for determing which of the wants, if any, ought to be fulfilled, but it also fails to provide principles for determining which of the preferences ought to be fulfilled, if any. These failures defeat the very purpose of needs assessments. If needs assessments still leave unanswered the question, "Which needs ought to be fulfilled?," then they fail to achieve the very purpose for which they were designed.

Part B

In this part of the essay, we argue that the current method of needs assessment should incorporate two formal and two heuristic rules of universalizability. The general insight underlying these rules is this: To judge that in a particular situation it would be morally right (or wrong) for an agent to perform a particular action, is to imply that one would judge that in any other relevantly similar situation, it is morally right (or wrong) for such an agent to perform a similar action. In other words, moral judgments are universalizable. Some noted theorists have argued that the four rules of universalizability are logical or semantic features of moral reasoning and discourse. As we shall see, however, only two of the rules are related to moral reasoning in this way.

When we set out to consider ways of modifying the method of needs assessment, we did so in order to help it reach conclusions which were ethically justifiable. It seemed clear that the four rules of universalizability would guarantee that the educator drew an evaluative conclusion on the basis of moral reasoning. Given that the rules were presented as formal or logical in nature and not as substantive moral rules, it seemed that all people engaged in moral reasoning, whatever their moral outlooks, could accept them as guides. For the rules do not exclude, *a priori*, any set of interests or ideals.

If following the rules of universalizability would guarantee valid moral reasoning, it would be theoretically important and practically feasible to incorporate them into needs assessments. Indeed, given the prominence of universalizability in the work of modern moral philosophers, such as R.M. Hare (1965) and J. Rawls (1971), our efforts seemed likely to succeed. But we shall argue that although the rules ought to be incorporated into the method in certain ways, their incorporation cannot guarantee that the reasoning is moral.

Although it is often claimed that the rules are formal, we shall argue that two of them are substantive. The substantive rules should not be viewed as tests for the acceptability of criteria for making moral judgments; instead, they should be viewed as devices for increasing one's awareness and understanding of the other people involved in the evaluation.

The following is a description of the first kind of universalizability:

> In a particular situation, one's judging that "Agent A ought to do Act X" is universalizable means that in making the singular judgment (Agent A ought to do Act X) in the situation one is, either implicitly or explicitly, following RULE OF UNIVERSALIZABILITY$_1$ (Rule U_1): WHENEVER THE FEATURES PRESENT IN A SITUATION SATISFY CRITERIA FOR JUDGING THAT AGENT A OUGHT TO DO ACT X, MAKE THE JUDGMENT.

Rule U_1 is part of an analysis of what it is for one's judging to be universalizable. The intuition underlying this analysis is that one's judging is universalizable if one is judging consistently. Whenever a person makes a judgment because he recognizes the presence of certain features in a situation, the person uses those features as criteria for making a judgment whenever he recognizes, either implicitly or explicitly, that those features are present in a situation. Failing to make the judgment about a situation in which one recognizes the criteria are satisfied, leaves one open to the charge of judging inconsistently. Rule U_1 is simply a rule to the effect that reasoning and judging be consistent (Locke, 1968; Monro, 1967).

Reasoning consistently is necessary for reasoning correctly, but insufficient. To judge consistently is merely to follow the same rules either implicitly or explicitly, in making judgments. But one can follow the same rules in judging, and so judge consistently, without necessarily following the correct rules, and so without judging correctly. If the criteria are incorrect, the judgment itself may be incorrect. Following Rule U_1 does not guarantee that one is aware of or using correct criteria.

Rule U_1 is morally neutral because it is a purely formal rule. In fact, it is common to many kinds of reasoning, and so will not serve to differentiate moral reasoning from non-moral reasoning. Even though Rule U_1 does not mark off moral from non-moral reasoning, we believe that it should be incorporated into the needs assessment method so as to remind evaluators and participants of their commitment to standards of rationality. Evaluating should not be an unreasoned activity relying solely on feelings or inclinations. Evaluators and participants should strive to clarify the criteria and rules used in evaluation. If they use the language of "ought," if they are making judgments about what ought to be done, they are indeed committed to following certain rules.

The second kind of universalizability may be described as follows:

> In a particular situation, one's judging that "Agent A ought to do Act X" is universalizable means that in making the singular judgment (Agent A ought to do Act X) in the situation one is, either implicitly or explicitly, following RULE OF UNIVERSALIZABILITY$_2$ (Rule U_2) WHENEVER THE FEATURES PRESENT IN A SITUATION SATISFY CRITERIA FOR JUDGING THAT AGENT A OUGHT TO DO ACT X, MAKE THE JUDGMENT, ONLY IF THE CRITERIA ARE RELEVANT.

Rule U_2 is part of an analysis of the second kind of universalizability. The intuition underlying this analysis is that one's judging is universalizable only if one is using criteria relevant to one's judgment.

Not everything counts as a reason for making a moral judgment. The presence of some features in a situation will be relevant to judging that Agent A ought to do Act X; the presence of other features will be irrelevant. In other words, some features of a situation will not be morally relevant.

Rule U_2, however, is a purely formal rule and, as such, is morally neutral. In reasoning about a subject matter, one's reasons must be relevant to the subject matter. They must have something to do with it. Since Rule U_2 does not specify what the relevant criteria are for making moral judgments, it will not differentiate moral reasoning from non-moral reasoning, nor will it distinguish moral from immoral judgments.

The following is a description of the third kind of universalizability:

> In a particular situation, one's judging that "Agent A ought to do Act X" is universalizable *means* that in making the singular judgment (Agent A ought to do Act X) in the situation one is, either implicitly or explicitly, following *RULE OF UNIVERSALIZABILITY*$_3$ (Rule U_3): WHENEVER THE FEATURES PRESENT IN A SITUATION SATISFY$_3$ CRITERIA$_3$ FOR JUDGING THAT AGENT A OUGHT TO DO ACT X, MAKE THE JUDGMENT, ONLY IF ONE ACCEPTS THE CRITERIA AS RELEVANT AND ONE WOULD ACCEPT THE CRITERIA AS RELEVANT IF ONE WERE IN THE POSITION OF THOSE WHO DIFFER FROM ONESELF IN *MENTAL ABILITIES, PHYSICAL QUALITIES AND SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS*.

As we have seen, reasoning governed by Rule U_1 only ensures a kind of consistency. Such reasoning is not constrained by any particular content. Reasoning governed by Rule U_2 only guarantees relevance, but Rule U_2 does not specify what the relevant criteria are. Rule U_3 limits the sorts of criteria one may use in making a moral judgment to those one not accepts as relevant, but would accept as relevant if one were in the position of those who differ from oneself in mental abilities, physical qualities and socioeconomic status. The intuition underlying this rule is that one's own mental abilities, physical qualities and socioeconomic status. It is a heuristic device for discovering whether your acceptance of the criteria is based on such considerations. As a heuristic device, Rule U_3 has the added advantage of increasing our understanding of people who differ from ourselves.

Some writers have maintained that the third kind of universalizability is a formal or logical feature of moral reasoning--that Rule U_3 could be used as a logical test for the admissibility of rules or maxims into moral discourse. Rule U_3, however, is not a purely formal rule. It is a substantive moral rule. It quite nicely expresses our intuitions that one's own mental abilities, physical qualities and socioeconomic status should not be favored in determing which criteria are morally relevant.

We recommend that Rule U_3 be incorporated into needs assessment *as a heuristic means* of gaining greater awareness and understanding of ourselves and of persons who differ from ourselves with respect to these characteristics.

Until it is shown that Rule U_3 is substantively correct, however, we do *not* recommend that it be used *as a test* for the admissibility of criteria for making moral judgments.

The fourth kind of universalizability may be stated the following way:

> In a particular situation, one's judging that "Agent A ought to do Act X" is universalizable *means* that in making the singular judgment (Agent A ought to do Act X) in the situation one is, either implicitly or explicitly, following *RULE OF UNIVERSALIZABILITY*$_4$ (Rule U_4): WHENEVER THE FEATURES PRESENT IN A SITUATION SATISFY CRITERIA FOR JUDGING THAT AGENT A OUGHT TO DO ACT X, MAKE THE JUDGMENT ONLY IF ONE ACCEPTS THE CRITERIA AS RELEVANT AND ONE WOULD ACCEPT THE CRITERIA AS RELEVANT IF ONE WERE IN THE POSITION OF THOSE WHO DIFFER FROM ONESELF IN MENTAL ABILITIES, PHYSICAL QUALITIES, SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS, *DESIRES*, *TASTES*, *PREFERENCES*, *VALUES AND IDEALS*.

As we have seen, Rule U_1 imposes requirements of consistency in reasoning, while Rule U_2 imposes requirements of both consistency and relevance. Rule U_3 imposes limitations of acceptability on what count as relevant criteria, and Rule U_4 imposes additional limitations.

A few writers have maintained that the fourth kind of universalizability is a formal or logical characteristic of moral reasoning. Given that Rule U_4 further limits the sorts of criteria one may use in making a moral judgment to those one would accept as relevant if one were in the position of those who also differ from oneself in desires, tastes, preferences, values and ideals, Rule U_4 clearly is not a formal or logical feature of moral reasoning. It is a substantive moral rule.

The intuition underlying Rule U_3 is that one's acceptance of criteria as morally relevant should not favor one's own mental abilities, physical qualities and socioeconomic status. Rule U_3 is a heuristic device to guard against this. An additional intuition underlies Rule U_4. Not only should one's acceptance of criteria as morally relevant not favor one's own desires, tastes, preferences, values and ideals, but also it should not be tied to desires, tastes, preferences, values and ideals which one has failed to reflect upon.

We recommend that Rule U_4 be incorporated into needs assessment *as a heuristic means* of gaining greater awareness and understanding of ourselves and of persons who differ from ourselves with respect to these additional characteristics. Until it is shown that Rule U_4 is substantively correct, however, we do *not* recommend that it be used *as a test* for the admissibility of criteria for making moral judgments.

We are recommending that needs assessments incorporate into their methodology devices for fostering an intuitive understanding and awareness of others. Our hope is that incorporating such devices in needs assessments will bring about these results. It is important to realize, however, that allowing these rules to be part of one's reasoning does not commit one to accepting or endorsing the criteria others use in making moral judgments. It merely requires that others be taken seriously. It provides for a kind of concern, a kind of respect for others, but does not require a positive endorsement of their values and ideals.

Conclusion

We have argued that the current needs assessment method cannot serve the purpose for which it was designed. At best, needs assessments yield a survey of wants or preferences, and a survey of wants cannot disclose what ought to be done in education. We have proposed that four rules of universalizability be incorporated in the needs assessment method so that well-reasoned judgments, rather than arbitrary ones, would result from needs assessments. We realize that following these four rules will not guarantee that needs assessment participants will draw the morally correct conclusions. However, evaluators will be taking a step in the right direction if their enterprise fosters a *rational* consideration of educational goals and programs.

Documentations.

1. Ellett, F.S., Jr., and Shumener, B.M. *Defensible Educational Goal and Needs Assessment Strategies*. Los Angeles: Center for the Study of Evaluation, University of California, Los Angeles, 1978.

2. Gagne, R.M., and Briggs, L.J. *Principles of Instructional Design*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1974.

3. Hare, R.M. *Freedom and Reason*. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1965.

4. Locke, D. "The Trivializability of Universalizability." *The Philosophical Review*, January 1968, 25-44.

5. Monro, D.H. *Empiricism and Ethics*. Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 1967.

6. Morris. L.L., and Bank, A. The values clarification technique; The problem snapshot technique. *CSE needs assessment kit* (Field test Edition). Los Angeles: Center for the Study of Evaluation, University of California, Los Angeles, 1977.

7. Popham, W.J. *Educational Evaluation*. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1975.

8. Rawls, J. *A Theory of Justice*. Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971.

CHAPTER 25.

PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION: SOURCE AND CRITIC OF "NEW" METHODS IN EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH

ANTHONY STIGLIANO

Wittgenstein asserted in his usual provacative fashion that psychology has experimental methods, but is conceptually confused (1953, p. xiv) and philosophers following in his tradition have argued equally disconcerting things about social science in general. A.R. Louch (1969) for example, has argued rather persuasively that behavioral psychology, anthropology and economics are conceptually confused because human action can only be described by way of moral categories. Louch's position, as is Wittgenstein's, is highly controversial, and people like Merle Turner have argued that there really is no methodological difficulty in eliminating practical reasoning and intentionality from scientific discourse concerning human action. Nevertheless, the arguments have not abated, indeed, they have intensified. The social sciences, and psychology, in particular, have always been the models for educational research, both basic and applied. Yet educational research has pretty much avoided (or evaded) the controversies surrounding the social science stemming from not only the neo-Wittgensteinians like Louch, but also from a variety of other sources. Moreover, educational research has avoided the criticisms and analyses being made of empirical science in general. It has gone its complacent way; philosophers of education, I shall argue, need to focus these criticisms on educational research, and, moreover, they need to introduce new methodologies not reliant upon the statistical-empirical model which has been under fire for some time now.

Of course, philosphical controversies usually have no effect on the procedures and activities of the sciences. Even most physicists proceed as though Kuhn and Popper did not exist. Physicists who do pay attention to philosophy are the ones who make the major breakthroughs in physics, however (Lakatos, 1972). Given the normative structure of education, I shall argue here that educational research needs and requires philosophical discourse as a starting point, as a context and as a reflection of research activities. This argument is implicit within the discussion presented in this paper of the following points: (1) that philosophical critiques of science are rattling the empirical sciences from their very core: their claim to objective truth; (2) that the humanistic basis of philosophy as inquiry and speculation can be used to create alternative approaches to educational theory and practice.

I

Problems in Empirical Social Research

Travers (1964) wrote that "The scientific goal of educational research is to discover laws or generalizations about behavior which can be used to make predictions and control events within educational situations." This position is compatible with a conception of scientific methodology which goes back to the logical positivists. The term "law" for example, is a technical term that comes from physics, the empirical model given for the social sciences. As Mill wrote (cited in Putnam, 1978, p. 66) "The backward state of the Moral Sciences can only be remedied by applying to them the methods of Physical Science, duly extended and generalized." These "methods", it is claimed, are universal to all scientific knowledge (von Wright, 1971). What that method produces and how that method operates is considered to be coextensive with what is accepted as objective knowledge. Curiously, there is a kind of Platonism at work here, it is not so much of an attempt to idealize reality, but to idealize a particular method for explaining/predicting reality. The definitions of educational research given by Travers (1964), Kerlinger (1973), Lehman and Mehrens (1979) all attest to this uncritical belief in a methodological monism for all the empirical sciences. Moreover, they hold as articles of faith that scientific explanation is "causal" and that mathematical physics is the model of development for all the sciences and, I daresay, the humanities as well.

In a recent examination of the relation of educational research and practice, Impact of Research on Education: Some Case Studies, edited by Patrick Suppes (1978), the word "research" is virtually a neutral term above reproach and analysis. While Suppes says in his preface that the intent of the study was to examine the effects of "research" on practice and not the validity of the findings, that study may be systematically misleading by not pointing out that "research" is a term of diverse and incompatible points of view. But the uncritical attitude towards research is not unusual, while there have been some alternative empirical procedures, i.e., single subject experiments, in the practice of educational research the scientific method is identified almost obsessively with "the statistical experimental Zeitgeist" (Shaver, 1979, p. 7).

Now, in the past few years many criticisms have been raised from within the ranks of educational research. Problems of the relation between research and practice, significance testing and experimental replication are examples of difficulties that most empirical researchers would agree are of significance. These problems are only ripples on the surface, however. The "waves" that are breaking up 'Neurath's ship' faster than it can be repaired, arise from "deeper" sources: the very nature of science as quantitative, analytical and nomothetic exclusively is being called into question.

> The scientific revolution (argues F.E. Sparshott, 1972, pp. 124-5) was essentially the discovery that by transposing

> our inquiries into terms of exact quantities we can make their answers testable and mutually interlocking in a way quite impossible to the qualitative and unexact ways of thinking that we usually apply to our everyday concerns. ...But the practical primacy of calculation as a way of human thought has lately been discredited... What distinguishes brains from computers, it seems, is their indefiniteness... Our calculations and quantifications are elaborate and painful constructions on the outskirts of our thought, while our improvisatory skills of organization, integration and just getting along stand unnoticed in the center....

The discreditation of quantificational research, and empirical research in general, comes from a remarkable variety of sources: from neo-aristotelians like Leo Strauss to neo-Marxists like Jurgen Habermas to historians like Thomas Kuhn. The crisis in the social sciences is a crisis emergent from any attempt to construct a formal system that allows for a monistic scientific method. Hilary Putnam (1978, pp. 72-73) argues that the "general laws of history, sociology and psychology" (assuming there are such "general laws") are not applied in formulating conclusions about historical or contemporary human beings. The researcher relies "on his human wisdom", that is, on informalizable insight based not upon correct logical canons, but upon the researcher's practical knowledge. What occurs in "research" is dependent on what can be produced and applied in the experiential continuum of the laboratory, or the classroom. That is to say, whether a formal theory or hypothesis is applied to a given case is a decision that emerges from a continuous context of circumstances, previous decisions, and is an "ultimately intuitive" process. The very apotheosis of empirical science, physics, "could not proceed using only the scientific method" (Putnam, 1978, pp. 74-5).

The various arguments concerning problems in the philosophy of science point in the following direction: that the meaning and practice of 'science' cannot be reduced to a logical syntax. Furthermore, the creative impulses in the arts are equally distributed among scientists as among humanists; and that the prescientific context of knowledge is value-and meaning-laden and that the continuum of value with scientific work makes the work reflexive and humble. Reflexive in the sense that the human meaning and significance of research is integrated with the search for an objectivity definable in terms of subjectivity. Humble in the sense that the value-context whence comes the researcher's methodology also produces the philosophical recognition that that same value-context produces methodologies not compatible with his/her own. What that value-context is and philosophy's role in that recognition process is suggested in the final portion of this paper. Suffice it to say that critics of the statistical-empirical ("scientific") matrix have indicated a tension, if not a contradiction, between the value-free claims of that matrix and the value-laden reality of the everyday lives of human beings (Carr, 1979; Habermas, 1973). This tension, or contradiction, is clearly manifested in the application of mathematical/statistical analyses to education.

The framework of much educational planning policy, design and development is a species of practical reasoning that involves values and metaphysics. The very items excluded by the scientific methodology assumed in educational research.

We can look at this tension from another perspective. The day-to-day activities of teachers, administrators, students and any one else involved in education or training make enormous numbers of decisions continuously in their interrelationships. These decisions are derived from sources not only impossible to merely reference, but impossible to describe even if we could somehow point them out. This indeterminacy is due to a variety of factors, some cultural, some psychological, some linguistic. It may be manifested as "intuition or insight", but for the most part the sources are inarticulate, yet indispensible to teaching and learning. This situation is, I believe, analogous to criticisms of economic planning by people like Friedrich von Hayek and Ludwig von Mises: centralized economic planning is fundamentally irrational (they argue) because the decisions, needs and values that go into the demand for an item or a service (thereby setting its market price) are too complex to be empirically described or reproduced in a computer. Generalizing, we can say that the starting poing for an argument concluding in an imperative for action is unknowable. Moreover, the conditions that would induce or evoke the required action in conformity with the imperative are equally unknowable. This is not to say that we cannot conjecture, or partially describe a situation to the extent that a kind of heuristic generalization could be constructed to help solve certain kinds of problems. But to assert with Travers (1964) that empirical research alone may provide insight (let alone "laws or generalizations") into the practical knowledge which is the repertoire for teachers and students is highly questionable.

This is the case not merely on the grounds that one cannot have enough information to make precise, predictive statements about educational situations (whatever they are), but that Travers' claim that he has defined a "scientific" research program is highly inaccurate. The work of Lakatos, Kuhn, Feyerabend, Achinstein, Putnan and (even) Popper, though these authors are hardly compatible with each other, point toward very different meanings of what a "scientific" research program may be, and even raise the question as to whether a unified meaning for all such programs is even possible. Every aspect of what has traditionally been referred to as "science", "law", "observation", "explanation", "model", "analogy", "induction", etc. has a plurality of interpretations and controversies attached to them. It is as if the logical syntax of scientific explanation that the logical empiricists were arduously constructing has exploded and continues to explode. And, part of that explosion was set by the positivists themselves (see, Carnap, 1960, pp. 205-221).

Unity of science, methodological monism, prediction and control are being located in an ever-expanding geography of diverse and sometimes incompatible ideas. It has become clear that the application of mathematical empiricist methods to education has not led to the discovery of laws of human behavior. But, what is one to do? Is the testing and measurement of educational outcomes a bootless task? What alternatives are there that would avoid the problems associated with attempting to set forth a rationalist methodology that abstracts from the content and the context of scientific discovery and debate?

II

Back to the Humanities: Outline of a Philosophical Research Program

There is a traditional analysis of the emergence of science in the modern world, associated largely with Ernst Cassirer, which states (very roughly) that those human endeavors involving myth, poetry, and religion were the basis for scientific inquiry. The present situation of methodological cul-de-sacs and epistemological anarchy exemplified by the social sciences, I shall argue, can be transcended by a return to the humanities. This is not too original an idea, one way that Plato used myth is as a pole-vault over the aporia to which truely empirical discourse sometimes leads. We can with confidence set as one of philosophy's tasks in education (though this is certainly not limited to education) to discover what alternatives there can be, what kind of validity they might have and how they might be associated with, or be made complementary to statistical-empirical research (which is, after all, valid within certain contexts).

One way of approaching this task is suggested by R. D. Bromwell (1978). It is, in effect, a pragmatic-relativistic approach, that of applying the appropriate methodology to the appropriate puzzle (p. 228). The difficulty here lies in the question of knowing when to apply what methodology. Bromwell rather simplistically reduces this problem to the kind of question one is asking: a "what" question is a logical-empirical one; a "why" question (he says) requires an interpretive deductive methodology (e.g., a Meade-type 'observer-participant' approach). As far as validity is concerned, he states that teachers find the latter research method to be "immediate and vivid" with findings that are "penetrating and seminal" (pp. 229-230). While there may be an interesting aesthetic or even moral theory underlying this heuristic approach, which needs to be further analyzed, as it is Bromwell makes the choice of methodology to appear to be arbitrary and without a logical or epistemological rationale of any sort.

Clearly, however, such a rationale very well may be impossible, if not exceedingly difficult to construct. What would be a compelling argument for a non-mathematical, non-causal, non-explanatory methodology, i.e., an interpretive methodology? Wilfred Carr (1979, p. 30) argues that practical sterility in educational theory is virtually guaranteed if models for theory and research are defined by abstract rational argument: he says, "...any educational theory which takes the nature and purpose of its activity seriously should be directed towards providing the kind of conceptual resources that will enable practitioners to take their activities more seriously" (p. 30). Enabling practitioners--teachers, administrators and students--to be reflective of their activities, Carr argues, derives from a philosophical (and, I add, research) style which attends to everyday educational reality: a reality of meanings, explicit and implicit; of intentions, conscious and unconscious; and values, moral and aesthetic. How could such attention be paid in a "rigorous" way? The testing of outcomes, behavioral objectives, etc. removes problems from the organic interchange of the classroom to the rational discourse of the computer. Attention still needs to be paid to the unique situation, the unique meaning, the unique intuitive (dare I say 'I-thou'?) relationship between person-teaching and person-learning.

Interpretive science, the science of verstehen and Einfulilang (sympathetic understanding and empathy) may be examples of such meaning and purpose-attending methodologies. The list of such methods is fairly long and somewhat mysterious sounding: hermeneutics, phenomenology, critical theory, neo-aristotelianism, ordinary language analysis, psychoanalysis, analytical psychology and combinations thereof. These positions and disciplines are mutually critical of their own epistemic limits and values and metaphysical roots. Moreover, it is unclear whether these positions are to be considered "rigorously scientific" (or philosophical) methods, or the bases of such methods. In any event, interpretive methods with their own standards and techniques can approach (confront, perhaps) the ambiguous, the imprecise, the unformulizable human world of meanings and values lived by individuals through their intentional actions.

The improvisational, creative, comic/tragic, spoken, gestured, continuous center of our lives in situ is the "data base" for these interpretive and critical methods. Verification, validity and testing of hypotheses have no place in these activities. These methods provide a state of constant inquiry, without closure or completeness, in what is called a hermeneutical circle in which interpretations are interpreted in ways which assume still other interpretations. Hence, they are humanistic methods of inquiry intensely and literally absorbed in their subjects of study in which the subjects are in fact the questions being asked. The tantalizing details of these methods cannot even be sketched out here. Hermeneutics and phenomenology have many diverse currents within and between them and also have long, complex traditions. Nevertheless, they are unified in their humanisitic basis and their dedication to understanding the human without reducing theory to ideology, nor practice to technique. I can propose here a kind of philosophical research outline in which these methods of inquiry are examined, critisized and brought to bear on educational issues and reflected upon as they are put into operation. After we have found the limits of science, we re-discover its roots in the humanities and realize that there are yet other resources to be exploited.

The outline I propose is overly simple, time and space preclude the working out of fine structures. Nonetheless, we can set forth the following propositions:

(1) Philosophers must enter into the humanistic bases of science, and the potentials for the humanities as inquiry into a human world livid in and understood by humans. What must inquiry mean now? What would it mean

for "education"?

(2) Associated with understanding the internal qualities of humanistic inquiry, what possible relationship could there be with allegedly non-humanistic, nomological, quantitative sciences? Is there a larger context in which both poetry and technology can be related? Or, is this a fundamental antinomy in human self-knowledge?

(3) Whatever relations may be found between the interpretive and the nomological, the research centering on educational practices should be coordinated. Moreover, the fine structure of the relationships between different methods must be constructed (even if those relations are critical ones). Research, theory, practice, evaluation, administration must be continuously re-interpreted in the light of a larger framework of inquiry.

(4) Finally, the philosopher must synthesize these efforts to "...redress the balance between (understanding and explanation) by asserting the claims of that vast fund of unformalized and unformalizable knowledge of man upon which we depend and with which we live and breathe and have our being every day of our lives" (Putnam, 1978, p. 76).

Documentations

1. Bromwell, R. D. "Education and the Two Traditions of Science," Educational Theory, 28(3), Summer, 1978, 223-231.

2. Carnap, Rudolf. "Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology," In Meaning and Necessity, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960.

3. Carr, Wilfred. "Philosophical Styles and Educational Theory," Educational Studies 5(1), March, 1979, 23-35.

4. Habermas, Jurgen. Theory and Practice, Boston: Beacon Press, 1973.

5. Kerlinger, Fred N. Foundations of Behavioral Research, 2nd edition, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973.

6. Lakatos, Imre. "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programs," In Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1972.

7. Lehman, Irvin J. and Mehrens, William A. Educational Research, 2nd edition, New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1979.

8. Louch, A. R. Explanation and Human Action, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969.

9. Popper, Karl R. and Eccles, John. The Self and Its Brain, New York: Springer International, 1975.

10. Putnam, Hilary. Meaning and the Moral Sciences, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978.

11. Shaver, James P. "The Productivity of Educational Research and the Applied Basic Research Distinction," Educational Researcher, 8(1), January, 1979, 3-10.

12. Sparshott, F. E. Looking for Philosophy, Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1972.

13. Suppes, Patrick (ed.). Impact of Research on Education: Some Case Studies, (summaries), Washington: National Academy of Education, 1978.

14. Travers, Robert M. An Introduction to Educational Research, 2nd edition, New York: Macmillan, 1964.

15. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations, New York: Macmillan, 1953.

16. Wright, Georg Henrik von. Explanation and Understanding, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971.

CHAPTER 26.

EXPOSITORY WRITING, GENERAL AND MORAL EDUCATION, AND EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY

HUGH C. BLACK

Teachers of English in our public schools can make a difference, I maintain, in affecting the success of their students. The "success" of which I speak can be that of college-preparatory students interested in college or university admission and in faring well in future studies. Or "success" may be that significant learning of skills, attitudes, and understandings which enhances the living of any human being--college-bound or not. The clue lies in the judgments of teachers whom I would encourage to determine better aims, purposes, and objectives for their daily teaching endeavors through consideration of educational philosophy and the application of theory to practices, especially with regard to liberal, general education and the teaching of morality.

Little "magic" and much hard work characterizes this plea and suggestion from an educational philosopher. For the surprising number of successful public school teachers of English who have made a difference actually do what I am suggesting even though the close tie between teaching expository writing, general and moral education, and educational philosophy has not been sufficiently expressed. Too many of their colleagues just beginning their teaching careers or "filling-in" under school district exigencies do not know what the expert teachers know and practice. My purpose here is to share that knowledge within the context of consideration of aims expressly intended to improve the kind of people we may become.

We need to improve the kind of persons we are and our progeny may become. This imperative becomes evident with each morning's reading of our newspapers and every night's listening to the news from our television sets.

So bad have we become that an April 19, 1979, announcement from Washington that a new study issued by the Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education discloses an ethical crisis afflicting the nation's colleges shocks us but not to the extent it might. For its "student cheating, vandalism and theft, faculty inflation of grades, and dishonest advertising by institutions seeking students" strike us as "old hat" occurrences. And even they seem mild compared to other news of what kind of people we seem to be--too many of us and our "leaders."

For example, spring 1979 hearings before U.S. Senators in Utah revealed citizens deeply concerned about abnormally high cancer deaths in an area near atomic testing sites where lives might have been affected by radiation fall-out. Again, our news media hit us with the news that in the early 1950s President Eisenhower had instructed the Atomic Energy Commission deliberately to confuse the people about the dangers from radiation! That, too, shocks us less than it otherwise might because we had experienced in the early 1970s the trauma of the Ervin Committee revelations that President Nixon lied about his lack of knowledge of the Watergate coverup and that he and his cohorts offered and took bribes, abused authority, and broke our laws--all morally wrong acts by our leaders. Then we saw demonstrated so vividly before our eyes the fact that many of our trained lawyers lacked not only virtuous character but also the capacity for moral reasoning, as they committed such logical fallacies as "reasoning from analogy."

How long, I wonder, shall we be content not to see? How long can we continue even our mere existence when so many lack the ability to make proper judgments and present school practices seem to have little to do with the development of judgments regarding truth, beauty, and goodness? Our needs shall go unmet when we fail to do justice to these products of liberal and moral education and educational philosophers neglect their responsibility of inciting teachers to recognize these purposes in their classroom practices.

We need to become, I assert, the kind of people who can see from our experiences that we have often been misled and betrayed even by persons in positions of trust. We must become alert to wrong thinking and acting whether by elitist intellectuals and scientists or by our more common human beings. For our every-day lives--indeed our very survival--hang in the balance; and we are affected--for better or worse, good or bad, right or wrong--by the judgments of human beings.

For example, the Three Mile Island affair in Pennsylvania in April 1979 brings this home to us vividly in the statements by Garry Wills in his Universal Press Syndicated column labeled "Outrider":

> The real trouble at Three Mile Island was not with science. It was with the people using and misusing what they took to be science--the business owners who encouraged shortcuts and evasions; the career-oriented workers who did not blow whistles; the people who faked an expertise they did not have; the regulators who did not regulate; the local populace that did not want to entertain doubt; the press that did not want to say the unwelcome. . . . Only men or women are moral agents--or immoral ones. What we do not want to face up to is the immorality of the human agents who owned, ran, regulated and reported on the Three Mile Island installation--the little cumulative greeds, career corner-cuttings, deferences, influences, slackness that could have led to major tragedy.
>
> Both sides are wrong in saying science failed or was vindicated by recognizing that fact. (Bee, April 30, 1979)

Frightening to me, our failure to see and consequently to think and act rightly indicates the thrust our teachers and schools must make in the light of the model set by our more successful and better teachers.

I maintain that our more successful and better teachers are those who have taught in terms of an ideal of the liberally educated person. Teaching in emulation of these well-known ideals must be enunciated and kept before us continuously if we courageously make use of our human potentiality for good rather than succumbing to the surfeit of failures we drastically need to correct. A better start--although not the complete solution and panacea--lies with what our teachers of English, particularly those who teach expository writing, can do when they connect knowledge of educational aims and objectives to their exciting tasks with secondary-school students. Here my suggestions are limited to that part of liberal or general education usually conceived as moral education and possibilities open to the teacher of expository writing. I also caution you to be aware of the reality that we face: that of manifold problems in a setting best described by the words University of Texas history professor Joe B. Frantz used in his AAUP Bulletin article (April, 1979) describing "Academe in Texas." He wrote: ". . . academics everywhere are generally as rigid as red-necks, as conservative as successful farmers, and as irrational as religious zealots" (p. 172). In our such human nature are we challenged to cope with our dilemmas; in what English teachers (and others) may do we find our hope.

My hope is that more English teachers shall do a better job than college and university teachers in contributing to our having more liberally educated human beings. Long aware of world-wide evils, especially those of Nazism and Bolshevism in the World War II era (of which there are amazing current outbreaks) notable colleges and universities have grappled with the challenging task of providing truly liberal or general education. Some of us remember at the end of World War II the famous Harvard "Redbook" proposals of Conant's Committee on General Education in a Free Society--The Harvard Report (1945). I am still impressed with their saying teachers must develop these "traits of mind": "to think effectively, to communicate thought, to make relevant judgments, to discriminate among values." Such contributions somehow have faced insurmountable difficulties, and over the years even the usual "model" general education programs such as those at Harvard, Chicago, and Columbia have lost out to the pressures for specialization. Their histories have been well-chronicled by Daniel Bell in his 1966 The Reforming of General Education as he suggested his own "one-man" proposals for Columbia, including this relevant observation (on p. 109): "The persons most likely to become creative and to act as leaders are not those who enter life with the largest amount of specialized information, but rather those who have enough theoretical knowledge, critical judgment, and the discipline of learning to adapt rapidly to the new situations and problems which constantly arise in the modern world." The full history and account of liberal or general education in our colleges and universities reveals a tragic failure of academics to agree enough to withstand the forces of the 1950s and 1960s toward specialism and a divisive "permissive," laissez-faire education. So late in the 1970s our colleges ponder the nature of quality education as in the "pulling back from permissiveness" such institutions of higher learning as Harvard again debate curriculum reform proposals(See *Time*, March 27, 1978, p. 76.).

In 1928 Margaret Mead, celebrated anthropologist who died in New York City on November 15, 1978, published the first edition of a study favored with new editions in 1939, 1949, 1955, 1961, and 1973 declaring her message for us. *Coming of Age in Samoa* is about the Samoa and the United States of 1926-1928. "I wrote this book," writes Mead in her Preface to the 1973 edition, "as a contribution to our knowledge of how much human character and human capacities and human well-being of young people depend on what they learn and on the social arrangements of the society within which they are born and reared. This is still something that we need to know if we are to change our present social institutions in time to prevent disaster" (p.xi). Her insights in 1928 included the injunctions to teach youth universal tolerance based on the recognition of "many possible ways of life" and for them the "possibility of choice." "Indeed," she wrote (p. 137), "we must turn all of our educational efforts to training our children for the choices which will confront them." We must seek to realize, she said "individual choice and universal toleration which a heterogeneous culture and a heterogeneous culture alone can attain. Samoa knows but one way of life and teaches it to her children. Will we, who have the knowledge of many ways, leave our children free to choose among them" (p. 138)? I suggest the same kind of query applies to our situation over general or liberal education today. Are there not, perhaps, many ways to liberal or general education? Immediately jump to mind these sources of knowledge about the many ways: (1) Matthew Arnold's injunction from *Culture and Anarchy*: the dependence of freedom on acquainting our youth both with the world and with "the best that has been known and thought in the world"; (2) Alexander Meiklejohn's 1930 Harper's account of *The Experimental College* at Wisconsin; (3) T.M. Greene and others' *Liberal Education Re-Examined--Its Role in a Democracy* (1943); (4) Greene's scheme for liberal education in Chapter IV of *The Fifty-Fourth Yearbook, Part I: Modern Philosophies and Education* of the National Society for the Study of Education (1955); (5) Joseph Tussman's *Experiment at Berkeley* (1969); and (6) the earlier Great Books approach and controversy and the St. John's Program. In these sources, those previously referred to, and others readily available lie possibilities of knowldge about liberal education which, I suggest, are very much relevant to the judgments of choice our colleges and universities must make about liberal or general education. It may be that our better course of action shall be to recognize a heterogeneity of possibilities, the freedom for institutions to choose the approach best for each, and a universal toleration for different plans of liberal education. But my main point is how central in importance is our ability to make good judgments, and this is an important matter for teaching and especially teachers of expository writing.

Whatever the outcome of curriculum reform debates over general or liberal education at the college level, I suggest to the secondary-school English teacher the study of these proposals and debates as revealing possible aims and objectives for the teaching of expository writing. For surely our teachers must want to prepare secondary students for success in college and in life. What a terrific opportunity they have in so teaching as to develop the traits of mind cited in The Harvard Report or the kind of creative leaders described by Bell as having theoretical knowledge, critical judgment, and the discipline of learning to adapt! How much more satisfying teaching must be if we were assured of what we should be doing! So, I am suggesting, for the secondary-school teacher, a look at what kind of persons college teachers want. In the arguments over liberal education, as illustrated above, our teachers will find clues. But I wish to share some other possibilities coming to my attention recently which augment these purposes.

Instructive, for example, are the October 1978 criteria for listing a course as college preparatory by the college counsellor at Maryknoll High School, Honolulu: "that the course involve a substantial amount of writing, and/or a substantial amount of logical and analytical thinking."

Another telling statement is that of an associate professor in anthropology in recommending a sophomore University student for a prestigious scholarship:

> I have very much enjoyed having her as a student. She likes ideas, thinks critically (but speaks gently), and develops her arguments thoroughly and logically. She communicates ideas clearly--both written and verbally--and is very industrious. On the three examinations (essay) she has done with me, I have been as much impressed by the process by which she arrives at her conclusions as with the conclusions themselves. She appears to be committed to careful scholarship and certainly is no idealogue. . . . In short, she appears to be an unusually gifted and active student, and a very pleasant and solid person.

Such statements point to those qualities which advocates of liberal and general education, or moral education in the public schools, and college and university teachers of English have sought to cultivate as worthy objectives of teaching. I suggest them to secondary-school teachers of expository writing who, I think, have in their teaching the best chance to "make the difference" we need in the kind of people we become.

Teaching for such ends should lead to more success for secondary-school graduates. Especially is this so for those applying for college admission whose writing skills shall be evaluated in terms of criteria held by college and university faculty in English. A Laurence University Ph. D. dissertation in 1979 by my colleague W. Augustus Davis ("A Descriptive Analysis of Teaching Expository Writing in the Secondary Schools In the Sacramento, California, Area") discloses this likelihood.

Davis' dissertation reveals that 52% of incoming freshmen at UCD flunk an entrance examination in writing and must take a remedial class--English A. English A teachers, he found, look for a well-developed, well-supported thesis, an analysis rather than a wandering description on some topic. College and university English teachers want the kind of students who make judgments which express their belief or opinion and then write arguments which support those conclusions of clear thinking in sequential paragraphs made up of sentences relating ideas meaningfully and organized to make a point. Ten weeks of English A instruction toward those ends, he found, results in a remarkable improvement and goes far toward correcting the failures of secondary-school instruction in writing. Davis' study disclosed that high school teachers of expository writing who devote time to these same instructional goals have successful students. Those whose students fail spend their time not on these activities but on "teaching spelling word-by-word, run-on sentences, and sentence fragments." They fail to teach "the use of a dictionary and a thesaurus" and knowledge of what is expected of the student: "to state a thesis, organize their ideas to support an argument, and provide details, examples, and specific facts as supporting evidence in developed paragraphs containing sentences that relate ideas meaningfully."

Teaching expository writing in our secondary schools in the light of Davis' disclosures, I maintain, is equally important for the high school graduate who does not go on to college. For he also needs to be the kind of person the better teaching of expository writing could produce. Out of the "successful" practices of his secondary-school teachers he also could develop into our needed citizen with "reasonableness." The cultivation of this essential trait of mind by secondary-school teachers would be an extension of the work of the elementary teachers in stimulating and keeping alive the child's sense of wonder. It might help younsters develop empathy for those who do not as yet live as they should because they lack the vision of the need for reasonableness. It could open the door to civility--civil, open discourse and proper regard for keeping open the ground rules for discourse (See Dean Marty's suggestions on p. 711 of Kappan for June 1975, the issue on "Moral Education.").

If teachers of expository writing place their students in situations requiring them to respond to moral issues, they could draw on fascinating resources in the racial experiences recorded in world literature. I shall not here specify examples, for our creative English teachers are fully capable of making use of these materials they know so well to fulfill their objectives. Here also lies an opportunity for those teachers who believe in stressing good thinking and oral expression by students who find "talking it out" helpful prior to writing. As more of our secondary school English teachers teach expository writing in ways disclosed by Davis' study, more hopeful are we about the products of our public schools becoming liberally-educated persons.

They are more likely to exhibit "reasonableness" in their lives. And this is good, for it puts the emphasis on what our better educational philosophers have seen to be of most worth. Israel Scheffler, in his 1972 article on "The Moral Content of American Public Education," for example, saw what I see our "successful" English teachers doing and what liberal education advocates have wanted in our colleges. He expressed it in terms of what cultivation of reasonableness means:

> . . . to liberate the mind from dogmatic adherence to prevalent ideological fashions, as well as from the dictates of authority. For the rational mind is encouraged to go behind such fashions and dictates and ask for their justifications, whether the issues be factual or practical.

And he expressed specifically what this cultivation entails, reminding us of what I think Davis' study disclosed the more "successful" teachers as doing:

> In training our students to reason we train them to be critical. We encourage them to ask questions, to look for evidence, to seek and scrutinize alternatives, to be critical of their own ideas as well as those of others.

Similarly David Purpel and Kevin Ryan in their 1976 Phi Delta Kappa publication distributed by McCutchan from Berkeley entitled *Moral Education . . . It Comes With The Territory* stress involving our students in "careful and sensitive inquiry into moral questions" in fulfillment of these hopes:

> One hopes that students will make independent judgments that are *informed* and that have been subjected to rigorous analysis based on well-established and accepted methodological principles. We hope to develop in our students and in ourselves the skills and capacities to deal critically with the onslaught of ideas, notions, hypotheses, assumptions, 'facts,' etc. that we are all asked to confront, so that we can resist manipulation and indoctrination and make intelligent, independent judgments. (p. 56.)

For the attainment of such purposes, aims, and objectives of school instruction my hopes lie in those secondary school English teachers who are liberally educated themselves, who are knowledgeable about the human "experience of literature" as Lionel Trilling entitled his anthology, who are models to their students of lives worth living, who (in their teaching of expository writing) are creative in causing their students to inquire so carefully and sensitively into moral questions as to become the kind of persons who can and will make intelligent, independent judgments. We shall benefit greatly from that kind of instruction which has as its aim what Pastor Ulzen told the young Johann Friedrich Herbart is the aim of all instruction: "clearness, definiteness, and continuity of thought." Such persons should see, feel, think, and act in good taste and for the greatest good of all. We need their kind badly!

CHAPTER 27.

DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION: A POLEMIC
PART I OF DEMOCRACY, MODELS, AND A PARADIGM FOR INTERNSHIP

T.F. SAUNDERS, R. BLAKE, J. ENGLE, C. DECKER

Democratic Participation: A Polemic.

A democratic society carries with it the privilege of having members of the community participate in social judgments. This privilege has encouraged many people to believe that participation, in and of itself, is justifiable in all decision-making situations. There are those who find it appropriate to participate in a decision:

.in the absence of knowledge,
.without awareness of any structure, and
.with only a limited concern for collateral issues.

What is often overlooked by these participants is that effective involvement in an issue is usually related to the scope of the implications of the decision and to the degree of their own expertise in direct relation to the types of decisions or plans to be made.

This paper will clarify the following issues:

1. two opposing types of democratic participation, such that distinctions can be made between "pooled ignorance" and "expert judgments," between uniformed guesses and structured observations, and

2. implications for the urgency of analyzing the level of participation in terms of the contexts and the operational implications of the decisions being made, and

3. the changes in the definition of "participation" as the criterion used increases the urgency of having informed participation.

Open Participation and Expert Judgment: Some Implications of Decision Making.

It may be trite to be reminded that everyone cannot participate in those decisions which are predicated upon a fund of specialized information. A patient with acute appendicitis, for example, would not want to take a vote of the cafeteria staff to decide whether or not to have the inflamed appendix removed. Yet, there are other crucial issues in which those who are uninformed participate in crucial decisions. Then there are those with technical training who are excluded from important decision-making processes on the basis of political influences by those controlling input information. There are those social situations where input is restricted due to personality conflicts between participants. In a business the informed judgment may not be forthcoming as a result of inter-unit competition or because the criteria for competence or an informed judgment may be unclear or simply ambiguous.

A criterion with which to assess whether or not people participate in particular decisions, even in those areas "beyond their competence," may be found in the scope of the implications of the decision, e.g., areas where an error in judgment may result in low output, death of a patient or, on a grand scale, the decision to declare war. Can the parameters which form the boundaries of "critical consequences," and of the parallel competence which must be found in direct proportion to the severity and the scope of implication of the decisions to be made be identified? Are there agendas which can be compounded in which the participation process can take on two sequential forms where, for instance, an initial input is made from a wide community of concerned participants, an input which subsequently must be translated and collated as an essential part of a more rigorously formed decision?

The following parallels can serve to introduce the issue of open participation in contrast, or in sequence, to the informed decision:

Figure I

Decision Implications: Some Contrasts.

Where the implications for action are directly proportional to the need for expertise, the participation issue becomes clear, i.e., where an awareness of each significant alternative for the problem confronted is required for a judgment to be an effective form.	Where no dangers in the lives of others can be identified, the bases for decisions are never at issue, i.e., an individual's choice carries limited implications for others or for emergency situations.

1. In business, where organizational design may be established by means of setting up production lines by product or by function.	1. In business, where the choice for a certain color of telephone has no influence or productivity.
2. In education, where testing also means a standard test or alternative assessment.	2. In education, where the seating assignments do not influence learning.
3. In an open community where voting means the declaration of war or unilateral disarmament.	3. In an open community, where implications for others are minimal, e.g., an individual's decision that the U.S. should stay in the United Nations.

In social, educational, and business decisions, the direct, and even the delayed, effects of the judgment rendered are not easily specified nor understood. The processes of:

.living in a community is sometimes confused with being trained to plan for the growth and development of the community,

.having an education often is confused with having the skills to develop an educational curriculum for others, and

.performing a task within a company is frequently confused with carrying the responsibility for establishing the company's mission, policies, and procedures.

There is no single or simple way to establish precisely when a context becomes important enough to warrant that only a specialist's participation in the judgment process should be solicited. There is, in addition, no easy way to identify when an expert carries sufficient expertise to warrant that that person is called upon in a certain sequence of the choosing process.

Nonetheless, a general rule can be employed through which guidelines can be established into which these informed factors can be sorted and classified.

Figure II

Participation: Critical Implications, A Sequence From Open Participation to The Need for Expert Knowledge


.Declare war
Critical implications of participation
.Produce cures for for social ills
.Perform an operation
Social implication of participation
.Serve on a committee
.Selection of an insurance company
Personal impact only
.Where to eat tonight
Limited knowledge of situation
Specialization content and method
Perspective and specialization
Degree of Expert Knowledge

This may be a simplistic way of expressing, in a two-dimensional frame, the inverse relationship which should pertain between "open participation," and the "critical implication" of the anticipated effects of the decision. However, the crucial factors are presented and the structure for subsequent parallels are suggested.

1. Participation: Pooled Ignorance or Expert Judgment, Permissive or Structure Frameworks.

In a general effort to locate some clarity in the way in which the word, participation, is used, certain distinctions have to be made. It is necessary to differentiate between:

1. a common sense notion of participation, which we will call restrictive in character, and
2. the meaning of participation in a more generic sense, i.e., participation in a procedural definition, constructive in character, and
3. the methodological meaning of participation.

Three levels of participation can be placed in sequence to reflect the kinds of participation which are most effective for the type of decision to be made:

1. Information collection, collation, and dissemination.
2. Categorizing, structuring, and coordinating of procedures.
3. Designing, formulating, and setting in perspective the purposes and outcomes of the decision.

The following figure presents contrasting statements - restrictive and constructive, which demonstrate competent participation at the information collection, collation, and dissemination level:

Figure III

Decision Making: Information Collection, Collation and Dissemination.

Constructive	Restrictive
.A structured competence selects appropriate data for inclusion.	.Everybody participates.
.Information can only be part of a specialization.	.Everyone says what he wants to say when he wants to say it.
.An awareness of significant alternatives; in, where and how the data is to generate and by what procedures, yield effective decisions with that data.	.Everyone should feel good about the decision process.
	.The agenda is to get involvement with little or no regard for the need for the formalization of the data used by an expert.

Participation by non-experts at this level may be desirable. However, assurance of constructive participation requires that an expert direct the information collection activities. Expertise is a necessary condition for the development of the instruments that are used to collect the information and will determine the significance of the information in relation to the issue at hand.

In business, for example, the failure to produce products at a rate necessary to accomplish shipment objectives may be obvious to most everyone associated with the production process. In addition to this awareness of the production problem, the expert has knowledge of the full range of alternative organizational designs available to produce the products.

Information, in order to be meaningful, must be collected and collated with respect to the categories and variables needed to compare alternative organizational designs. Collection and comparison instruments designed using the appropriate categories and variables can only be developed by an expert. In most situations, the actual information to be collected should be gathered from those individuals who are closest to the production operations.

Thus, participation, in this instance, takes place at two levels; the development of instruments to gather and collate information related to the problem and the literal informational input into the instruments by the individual affected by the decision to be made.

Figure IV presents some contrasting structured procedures where even an expert can be led astray by his confidence in his competence within a particular specialization. He may come to believe that expertise in one specialization gives him equal skills in other areas.

Figure IV

Decision Making: Categorizing, Structuring, and Coordinating Procedures

Constructive	Restrictive
.Whenever decisions affect a person, he should be able to get in behind the judgment sequence used by those making a judgment in order to share and agree, at least in principle, with this judgment.	.Nobel Prize physicists should make expert judgments about peace.
.The replication, restatement process is a demand for shared, structured participation; the reinstitutional character of the judgment marks it as democratic procedure.	.Roberts Rules of Order should be suspended when they get in the way of "democratic participation."
.Each decision process has, as a criterion of adequacy, the approval of the specialists who have explored the procedures appropriate to the subject matter under question.	.We have always done it this way. I don't know how or why it was decided, but it was good enough before and it's good enough now.

Expert competence requires demonstration of the knowledge of the rules of competence which requires understanding the minimum structure of what science has called the "publicity of knowledge," the shareability of categories, of the judgment system, and of the recipe. It is not sufficient for an expert participant to be congruent with his feelings or beliefs but he must be competent with the methods and subject matter of the areas in which expert participation is desired. Although the rules of a particular subject matter are shared by the "experts" of that field, the principle which requires only expert participation in matters that affect others lives is a generic rule for participation in the decision-making process.

Continuing the business example, the expertise required to collect meaningful information about a production organization can only be tested by the rules used to identify an "expert." These rules include categorizing, structuring, and coordinating procedures used to collect, collate, and disseminate information in relation to production organizational designs.

An interpretation of democratic participation in the sense that "anyone can play" at all levels of participation yields to a structured democratic process where each participant selects an "expert" representative to participate in those decisions which affect the participant. This belief, in a structural participation by proxy, guarantees the most effective decisions in those areas where the consequences carry widespread implications but where the participant has neither an appropriate understanding of the technical procedures nor sufficient responsibility for the consequences of the decision.

In summary, we select and remain committed to those people who carry the expertise to make judgments that we think will be congruent with our fundamental values. In business, the president directs policy development; in education, teachers design curriculum; and, in our society, elected officials translate our values into law.

The next level in the sequence can now be labeled anticipatory democratic participation. Anticipating democratic judgment stipulates decision making as the design formulation, and perspective level of judgment patterns. Figure V presents contrasting perspective types of judgment patterns.

Figure V

Constructive	Restrictive
"A shared communication-channel-pattern precludes private interest." "The emergence of ideas, over time, given the open marketplace of competition, through the structure of science, will help all people participate again and again through these procedures and will even help people come to learn to criticize effectively. This is the goal of anticipatory democracy." "The demands of the 'competence' problem in the definition of democracy imply that competence beyond competence becomes a democratic definition of creativity: How well one can state alternatives, especially as polemic inferences?"	"There is a 'pure' democracy. Man will necessarily arrive at this state automatically, inevitably, if given enough options...Democracy will out." "If each person had a 'truth button' he could push, in making decisions, telling what he wants, pushing it would imply a pure choice without alternatives." "This pure choice precludes the possibility of a community because of the lack of a shared channel or communication system; a shared procedure through which ideas are developed; lack of participation; no recognition of the competence demand which requires an understanding of major alternatives for future planning."

The recognition of powerful human goals or futures becomes a recognition of major alternatives in human possibilities."

"A shared procedure can be considered a value, through which ideas are developed.

The parallels (Figures I-IV) in the sequence from information issues to value judgments also represents different levels of participation. There is no single way to establish precisely when a context becomes important enough to warrant only specialist participation in the judgment process. There is, in addition, no easy way to identify when an expert is a sufficient expert to be called upon in the sequence of choice.

Nonetheless, a general rule can be employed which can establish guidelines into which these factors can be placed.

In summary, there are several principles for democratic participation which can be derived from the above presentation:

Principle #1: While the overarching value of the public in a democratic system presets the intent and even the value of the meaning of democratic participation, the operationalizing of the overarching value is the exclusive domain of specialists of one kind or another.

Principle #2: Where the structure and the procedure within which the question of participation is established, specialization and an open commitment to shared meanings is required--shared but unknown futures.

Principle #3: A shared belief in the justice of a decision based upon the values held by the cultural members, may anticipate the need for expert participation by those members.

Principle #4: Where the use of subject-matter categories is an essential phase of the definition of democratic participation, a selective system, a model, is necessary to an inclusion of appropriate categories.

Principle #5: Open participation may not be had at technical levels (See Principle #) but may be relatively effective by the belief of the participants in the results or in the commitment to the process of shared resolution.

Principle #6: Open participation is acceptable in inverse proportion to the critical nature of the consequences which may emerge.

Principle #7: A decision as to which content or information (topic) will be pursued is arbitrary and open to all participants--the public in a common sense definition.

SOME ASPECTS OF SELFHOOD: THE SELF AND THE OTHER

STEPHEN ALLEY

Henri Bergson agreed with the sceptics that the self was never something to be described and that one could only describe what it *does*, but he also thought that the self was something to be caught hold of in a moment of intuition. Most of us have such moments -- quiet moments, as James said, when we seem to ourselves to make ourselves and grow. One fact that we notice in such an experience is that to intuit one's self is not the same as conceiving one's self as a *thing*, as Object; not even from the earliest awareness of self do we do that.

Consider how different is the case when we think of the Other!

From our earliest days when frustration of desire bears in upon us the existence of Other, and the realization that everything else is Other, our tendency is to think of Other as object -- to be acted upon. The very young are solipsists, for whom the entire world is a panorama spread out for their amusement, and each is the only spectator; all else is pageant.

As we grow older, we learn more effective ways of manipulating Other than crying loudly. "Other" becomes differentiated into others and things. In our growing awareness, we find that often others are much more amenable to manipulation than things. Sometimes we shamelessly bend them to our own ends, obedient to that remnant of solipsistic concern that lingers in the best of us.

With maturity dawns the ethical consciousness, and the insight which expresses itself in actions which follow Kant's dictum, "So act that in your own person as well as in the person of every other you are treating mankind also as an end, never merely as a means." And when it takes the further step, willingness that its action "should be a universal moral law," the ethical consciousness approaches its zenith.

But ethical maturity comes slowly. Even more slowly comes the self-discipline which is needed to restrain ourselves from attempting to order the lives of others by making decisions which they themselves should make. The problem is not a simple one. One the contrary, its complexity is attested by the great number of psychologists, medical doctors, educationists, writers of advice columns, and others, all of whom are often concerned with it.

In its essentials, it is the age-old problem of freedom, manifesting itself under a myriad of guises. The parent, anxious about a child and worrying how much freedom should be allowed to the immature; the teacher, trying to find a mode of teaching which avoids both the repressive and the abandoned; the law-enforcement officer, endeavouring to uphold the authority of his position while protecting the civic rights of the citizen -- all these and others are plagued by the absence of hard-and-fast recipes detailing exact action in all the multifarious human situations they encounter. Where there is complete agreement in a society on the question there is apt to be censorship in morals, authoritarianism in home and school, and a police state in government. The problem of freedom is only encountered in democracy, and it is always encountered there. The ideal of democracy can be betrayed quite as readily by failing to recognize the other side of freedom, which is responsibility, as by the withholding of freedom. Both amount to the same thing in the end.

Ralph Barton Perry observed a quarter of a century ago that the essential difference between Western democracy and communist "democracy" lay in the fact that the former affords opportunity for the acceptance of responsibility to all concerned. As it is with nations, so it is with individuals. The exercise of the capacity to think for oneself is necessary for the responsible acceptance of freedom.

Who has not seen this: a mother riding in an automobile or bus or subway will be distressed by her child's standing in the seat beside her. She sharply tells him, "Sit down." The child asks the natural childish question, "Why?" And the mother's response? "Because I tell you to." If the child is educable at all, she has passed over an opportunity to help him think for himself, and incidentally help him to obey more readily and quickly another time. Contrast her response with another's, "Because the car will stop, and it may be very quickly. Then you will be thrown against the dashboard. Can you think what that will do to you?" Warned, the child sits to avoid hurt to himself, rather than "Because I tell you to."

There is, of course, a time for insisting on blind obedience, in situations where the immaturity of the child and consequent inability or unwillingness to recognize danger demand it. Yet as fast as the child can handle the responsibility for his and other's welfare, he should be given it. Again, we see how synonymous the phrases, "giving responsibility" and "giving freedom" really are.

Because of the nature of the vocations of parenthood and teaching, the problem of freedom is doubly pressing for parents and teachers. Their opportunities for repressing and for liberating are equally numerous, precisely because each opportunity carries simultaneously within it each alternative. The temptation to extend the legitimate authority of the responsible office of parent or teacher into the coercive and genuinely illegitimate tyranny of repression is always present, and it takes a person of rare maturity, judgment, and insight to resist the temptation all the time, or even very much of the time. So strong is our tendency to view the Other as object! So strong is it to forget the distinction that exists within the Other between person and things.

Part of the conceit that the Other exists for me shows itself in dishonesty, and particularly in lying. Jean-Paul Sartre has given us valuable insights as to how this can be so. He has called our attention to the overall opaqueness that exists between each Self and its Other, permitting the Self to hide its intention.

In the act of lying, the Self takes advantage of the duality that exists between Itself, and Itself in the eyes of the Other. "The Self becomes the cynical consciousness, affirming the truth with itself, negating the truth for the eyes of the Other, and further denying the negation." The cynicism and the lie are both raised to the second power (the enormity of the offense is geometrically increased) by the further denial, which is always present when the Self is aware that it is lying. And it always must be aware of it, or the lie is not present, for one does not lie about that of which one is ignorant or about which one is deceived.

The initial attitude must be a certain callousness toward the Other, a preoccupation with himself that allows the liar to attempt the restructuring of the world in terms of the lie. The remnant of the solipsistic concern that only I am really real, prompts him to do so. Thus the lie is not only false to reality itself, and unreal in that sense, but it has its genesis in a basically false attitude, unreal in the same sense. This is what Sartre means when he says that the liar imputes a universal value to the lie.

The liar often lies out of desperation, of course, in an attempt at reassurance of himself. The attempt is doomed, because in order to lie the liar must be aware of the truth which he is trying to hide, and thus be uneasily aware always that he is lying. The truth stands immutable, enduring and eternal. Omar Khayyam recognized the futile desire of the liar as well as the passionate remorse of the penitent when he wrote:

> The Moving Finger writes, and having writ
> Moves on; nor all thy piety and wit
> Shall lure it back to cancel half a line
> Nor all thy tears wash out a word of it.

What has been is, and shall stand so forever. Once and for all, what is done is done. Necessity forces us to recognize that fact. Wisdom prompts us to accept it in grace and truth. Penitence can make restitution, and forgetfulness wipe from memory, but what is done cannot be undone.

It must be granted that the situation is somewhat different, says Sartre, when it comes to lying to oneself, because it is from myself that I am attempting to hide the truth. There is no possibility of taking advantage of the duality between myself and myself in the eyes of the Other, because there is no other. Thus I must maintain the lie in the unity of a single consciousness, my own. And this I must do, not at two different times but simultaneously. I must know the truth very exactly the more effectively to hide it, so I am faced with the impossibility of simultaneously affirming and denying the truth. Success is impossible. The lie is "ruined by my look." Only the attempt is possible - never success - and it is possible to continue the attempt indefinitely so that it becomes a constant style of life, which Sartre calls "bad faith."

Not only does lying to others manifest at heart the characteristics of callous disrespect to them, treating them as Object, but so also does lying to oneself display, in its engrossment with self, a callous neglect of others, possible again only upon the initial assumption that they are Object. Again, we have our attention called to the remnant of solipsism, the initial, enormous, appalling assumption that only one's own existence has real meaning, that only oneself is really real.

As we have seen above, all such attempts are foredoomed. They all have their genesis in the subconscious notion that the structure of reality can somehow be bent to fit one's own desire and to one's own ends. It always involves an illegitimate approach, the denial of others as Subject, whereas legitimate avenues of action always recognize others as Subject. The attempt is foredoomed because the structure of reality cannot be bent and an attempt to bend it rebounds with often disastrous consequences.

In one's uniqueness, one is always alone. This is the price we pay for uniqueness. Sometimes it seems that life is one long exercise in attempting to break out of the inviolable privacy in which one is forever locked. There are ways in which one can partially succeed in the attempt. But first, why should one try?

Jourard, in his book The Transparent Self, has given us the key. ". . . it seems to be another empirical fact," he says, "that no man can come to know himself except as an outcome of disclosing himself to another person."

If the Socratic injunction, "Know thyself" is a moral dictum of the highest order--as it has been taken for more than 20 centuries--then the mechanism of morality is inextricably involved with the disclosure, accompanying honesty.

The need to know oneself is seen in the directing of choice. One must not risk the invalidity of choice based on a faulty conception of one's self. One cannot direct one's destiny when one does not know his real self. So disclosure is also bound to freedom.

It is evident now why lying is so threatening to self-hood. In lying, one conceals and withholds himself; the lie is divisive, separating one from another, ultimately from all others, and even from one's own self.

Moreover, the lie is always futile. Not only is it ruined by one's look when one is lying to oneself, but even when it is apparently successful in the case of lying to others, it fails in its fundamental purpose. It ends, ultimately, in enhancing precisely those fears and anxieties for the sake of which it was undertaken in the first place.

When one treats others as objects, one is prone to treat them as means, especially in the act of lying to them. At the very least, lying is a means of manipulating others. The act is predicated on an immoral misconception of their nature as selves and strikes a devastating blow at the concepts of freedom and dignity which self-hood comprehends. But the sword cuts both ways. One cannot strike without wounding oneself. Therefore, the lie not only involves immorally misconceiving the true nature of other's selves, but tragically, stupidly misconceiving the nature of one's own.

For it is the nature of selves that they are growing, vital entities. Lying inhibits self-growth; it then meets face-to-face with freedom and destroys freedom's accomplishments. In going against reality, it attempts to create a structured world, narrowly bounded by the concept of the lie, denying freedom and its open alternatives. Within the confines of its reality, it attempts to create a fictional self, which by its nature is cut off--alienated--from other selves. From then on, relationships between the liar's self and other selves are to some extent artificial, and in so far as they are artificial, they have no real meaning.

Nor is this all. That such a situation has the elements of a genuine sickness is attested by Jourard's account of the ex-patient who observed that "the crucial break in schizophrenia is with sincerity, not reality."

We must not lightly pass over other and perhaps even more important implications. The need for self-disclosure is implicitly recognized in some human institutions. Marriage is certainly the most free of these, in that it affords most opportunities for self-disclosure, hence accords the most freedom. So far from being confining, because it offers most opportunities for self-disclosure it actually offers most for self-growth.

Almost any sort of public service (especially elected office) is similarly crucial in the alternatives it offers for honor or betrayal. We have only to look about us to identify examples, and we see that the higher the office, the greater the honor and the baser the betrayal.

The insights of poets and prophets from Amos to George Meredith have been accurate: We are betrayed, not by circumstance, but by what is false within.

(Author's note: I should like to acknowledge my debt, not only to Sartre, whose influence is obvious, but to William O'Neil, whose writing first started me thinking seriously about the subject.)

AUTHOR'S INDEX

ALKIN, MARVIN C., "The Importance of Category Systems in Evaluation Theory: A Theoretical Viewpoint" 145

ALLEY, STEPHEN., "Some Aspects of Selfhood: The Self and the Other" 239

BLACK, HUGH C., "Expository Writing, General and Moral Education, and Educational Philosophy" 216

BLACK, HUGH C., "Our Relationships: A Response to the Presidential Address by Donald S. Seckinger: 'Dialogical Dilemmas and the Philosophy of Education'" 8

BLAKE, R., "Democratic Participation: A Polemic Part I of Democracy, Models, and a Paradigm for Internship" 223

BOYER, EILEEN, "Moral Dilemmas in Evaluation" 83

BUYS, EKDAL J., "Teacher-Evaluators as 'Ideal Observers'" 124

CONNELY, JOHN, "Our Curriculum Dilemma" 151

CONNELY, JOHN, "Our Educational Quandary" 119

DECKER, C., "Democratic Participation: A Polemic Part I of Democracy, Models, and a Paradigm for Internship" 223

ELLETT, FREDERICK S. "The Importance of Category Systems in Evaluation Theory: A Theoretical Viewpoint" 145

ELLETT, FREDERICK S. "Moral Reasoning, Needs Assessment and Universalizability" 199

ELLETT, FREDERICK S. "Philosophical Remarks About Educational Evaluation: Evaluation and Values" 88

ENGLE, J., "Democratic Participation: A Polemic Part I of Democracy, Models, and a Paradigm For Internship 223

ERICSON, DAVID P., "Is Aristotle's Account of Happiness Incoherent? 169

FENSTERMACHER, G.D., "Philosophical Remarks about Educational Evaluation: Evaluation and Values." 88

IRVINE, JANE FUNK, "Søren Kierkegaard's Ethical Sphere and Moral Education." 58

JARRETT, JAMES L., "Teaching for Value" 34

JELINEK, JAMES JOHN, "Counter Forces in Modern Educational Psychology and Philosophy of Education." 12

LoPRESTI, DR. PETER L., "The Place of Educational Foundations in State Teacher Preparation Policy: Grist for the Philosophic Mind" 179

MASTNY, ALETA YOU, "In Search of Joy" 165

MASTNY, ALETO YOU, "Sexism in Education: Myth or Reality?". . . . 137

MCDONALD, GERALD E., " Goal Setting: A Values Clarifying Process" 42

MCLAREN, ROBERT B., "A Philosophical Norm for an Abnormal Time" 20

NEWMAN, R.E., "Moral Reasoning, Needs Assessment and Universalizability" 199

NODDINGS, NEL, "Joy" 157

PRAETORIUS, MICHAEL, "A Theory for the Evaluation of Student Term Papers: Plato's Divided Line Revisited" 105

RUST, VAL D., "An Educational Interpretation of Marcusian Thought" 191

SAUNDERS, T.F., "Democratic Participation: A Polemic Part I of Democracy, Models, and a Paradigm for Internship" . . . 223

SCHELLIN, P. ISRAEL., "Evaluating Aesthetic Values and Arts Education" 51

SECKINGER, DONALD S., "Presidential Address: Dialogical Dilemmas and the Philosophy of Education" 1

SHUMENER, B.,"Moral Reasoning, Needs Assessment and Universalizability 199

SHUMENER, B., "Philosophical Remarks About Educational Evaluation: Evaluation and Values" 88

STIGLIANO, ANTHONY, "Philosophy of Education: Source and Cric of 'New' Methods in Educational Research" 208

WEINBERG, LOIS, "Evaluating the Competency of High School Students: An Arbitrary Matter?" 114

YULISH, STEPHEN M., "Character Education as Propaganda: An Historical Critique" 69

Officers of Far Western Philosophy of Education Society:

Francis Villemain-President
San Jose State University

Nicholas Appleton-Vice President
Arizona State University

Colleen Decker-Secretary-Treasurer
Tucson Public Schools

Dennis Collins-Executive Committee
Jesuit Provincial Office

Ekdal Buys-Executive Committee
Central Arizona College

Earl L. Grossen-Editor Proceedings
Brigham Young University